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 ECONOMIC VOTING IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 
 
Byong-Kuen Jhee 
 
Dr. James W. Endersby, Dissertation Supervisor 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates economic voting in 70 new democracies that have 
experienced regime transition since 1974. By incorporating the analysis of elections in 
virtually all new democracies, this study shows how electorates react to changes in 
economic conditions under various socio-economic, institutional, and political 
circumstances. This study addresses a series of questions related to the nexus between 
economics and elections in new democracies and makes several important findings.  
The findings are, first, economic performance under an authoritarian regime affects 
electoral support for authoritarian successors in founding elections. However, the vote 
share of an interim government is not affected by economic performance in the period of 
democratic transition. Second, electorates respond to economic performance of 
incumbents in post-founding elections. Contextual variables, such as economic 
development, level of democracy, and democratic consolidation have a weak relationship 
with economic voting. Third, the institutional clarity of responsibility for incumbents over 
economic performance does little to influence the relative strength of economic voting.  
 xi
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Economic voting has been one of the enduring themes of electoral studies for the 
past three decades. Economic voting refers to a “behavioral phenomena, namely that 
changes in economic conditions or in their perceptions (supposedly) lead to changes in 
individual voting preferences and via that in election outcomes” (Toka 2002: 1). Since 
the 1970s, economic voting has drawn much attention from scholars because of its 
significant influence on electoral outcomes and its positive relationship with democratic 
accountability. Most empirical studies have shown that changing economic conditions is 
a factor in a voter’s decision (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000: 114; Dorussen and Palmer 
2002). Furthermore, according to the paradigm, economic voting is an instrument of 
enforcing democratic accountability. Palmer and Whitten (2002: 66) argue that economic 
voting constitutes a “mechanism of electoral accountability that spurs governments to 
meet the policy goals of the public.” Other scholars have also emphasized that economic 
voting provides governments political incentives to respond to public demand for 
economic wealth and that it encourages democratic accountability (Manin et al. 1999; 
Kiewiet 2000: 427; Lewis-Beck 2000; Dorussen and Palmer 2002) 
This research examines economic voting in new democracies. Whether and how 
economic conditions affect electoral outcomes in founding elections and subsequent 
elections in 70 new democracies are probed. Whether characteristics of new democratic 
regimes increase or decrease the strength of economic voting are analyzed.  
There are critical reasons for directing scholarly attention to economic voting in 
new democracies. First, it provides important clues to the interactive relationship between 
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electorates and their political representatives, and to the working of democracy in those 
immature democracies. As many point out, the mere establishment of democratic 
institutions does not necessarily promote democratic accountability. Rather, many new 
democracies have experienced limited democracy with various hybrid forms (Diamond 
1999). Therefore, thorough research on how voters react to changes in economic 
conditions may help improve our understanding of democratic practices in those 
countries. 
Second, economic voting is deeply related to the consolidation of democracy. It is 
well known that, in the process of democratization, new democracies suffer from 
significant economic problems, such as exacerbated economic inequality and high 
inflation. Ex-Communist countries established a new market economy. Most other new 
democracies experienced serious economic deterioration before and after democratic 
transition. Such devastating economic conditions have weakened public belief in liberal 
democracy based on the capitalist market economy and the legitimacy of a democratic 
regime (Rose et al. 1998). Furthermore, skepticism over a new democratic regime may 
lead to the resurrection of the political successors to an authoritarian ruler and to a 
weakening of pro-democratic political elites.  
Despite its large political impact, little is known about whether and how 
electorates of new democracies assign the responsibility for economic performance to 
incumbents. Recent micro- and macro-level comparative studies have examined voting 
behavior in developed democracies. However, existing literature on economic voting has 
omitted new democracies, the ideal laboratory of electoral studies, from its research 
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scope, and cross-national studies analyzing elections in tender democracies are very rare 
(Pacek and Radcliff 1995b: 745; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000).  
One reason for the limited scope of the research is related to a conventional belief 
that electorates in most new democracies are not “highly informed, policy-oriented 
economic voters” as presented in earlier economic voting theory (Dorussen et al. 2002: 2). 
It has been implicitly or explicitly argued that electoral behavior in new democracies is 
strongly constrained by noneconomic factors, such as linguistic and ethnic diversity, a 
strong patron-client relationship, and ideological propensity (Bratton 1997, 1998; Scheler 
2002). However, such an argument does not justify the lack of systematic research on 
economic voting. Rather it suggests a need to give more attention to the conditions under 
which electorates of new democracies are driven by economic impulses. 
This study is an effort to extend the scope of research on economic voting by 
analyzing legislative and presidential elections in 70 new democracies, nations that joined 
the third wave of democratization since 1974. By incorporating the analysis of elections 
in virtually all new democracies, this research shows how electorates react to changes in 
economic conditions under various socio-economic, institutional, and political 
circumstances. As Remmer (1991: 778) argued, specifying various conditions of 
economic voting provides us an opportunity to understand the nexus between economic 
conditions and voting decisions. In that sense, this research contributes to the 
development of comparative studies on economic voting. 
This research investigates economic voting in new democracies and makes 
several important findings. First, economic performance under an authoritarian regime 
affects electoral support for authoritarian successors in founding elections. However, the 
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vote share of an interim government is not affected by economic performance in the 
period of democratic transition. Second, electorates respond to the economic performance 
of incumbents in post-founding elections. Contextual variables, such as economic 
development, level of democracy, and democratic consolidation have a weak relationship 
with economic voting. Third, clarity of responsibility of incumbents over economic 
performance does not serve well to explain the strength of economic voting.  
 
1.1  Research Questions 
Since 1974, about 70 nation-states have experienced democratic regime transition. 
Third-wave democracies, defined as a group of countries that have experienced political 
democratization since 1974, incorporates 20 countries in Africa, 11 in Asia, 19 in Eastern 
Europe, 16 in Latin America, and 4 in Southern Europe. Those countries varied in the 
timing of democratic transition. In the 1970s, 12 countries were transformed into 
democracies, and additional 11 new democracies were born before the fall of Berlin Wall. 
Since then, 47 more countries have joined the third wave of democratization. Economic 
conditions in those countries were also diverse and had little commonality. As 
Karatnycky (2004: 83) documents, these new democracies vary a great deal in terms of 
economic conditions as well as authoritarian legacies. Democracy is not the “exclusive 
province of wealthy lands,” and there exist significant differences in economic wealth 
among these new democracies. New democracies were transformed from a diversity of 
authoritarian regimes. Likewise, they established different sets of democratic institutions. 
Does economic voting matter for electoral politics in (post-) transitional societies? How 
do citizens in such diverse new democracies react to changing economic conditions?  
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Traditional theories of economic voting have assumed that voters have clear 
information, or at least clear perceptions, of incumbent responsibility for economic 
conditions in their respective countries. They also assume that elected officials are held 
accountable by voters for economic conditions of voters. Accordingly, economic voting 
is an instrument that serves to discipline politicians with respect to seeking democratic 
accountability with voters. In other words, voters cast their ballots to punish or reward 
incumbents based on their respective evaluations of economic performance. However, 
elected officials, the bearers of democratic accountability, perceive economic voting is as 
“a sort of ‘witch hunt’” (Gregory 2003: 557). That is, elected officials make efforts to 
maintain or improve economic performance to avoid electoral punishment.  
Nonetheless, it is yet to be tested whether the traditional economic voting theories, 
which have been developed based on the analyses of advanced or Western democracies, 
can be applied to new democracies. Skepticism about the viability of the existing 
economic voting theories arises from various economic and political conditions 
embedded in new democracies.  
First, it is not certain whether voters struggling with economic poverty in new 
democracies have enough resources, such as education and disposable time, to gather 
sufficient information about economic performances of incumbents, nor is it certain 
whether they are capable of assigning the responsibility for economic growth to 
incumbents reasonably. Furthermore, political instability of new democracies makes it 
difficult to estimate to what extent authoritarian rulers or incumbents are responsible for 
economic conditions.  
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The limited level of democracy in those countries may also discourage citizens 
from economic voting. Existing literature on economic voting assumes that voters’ ability 
to reward or punish incumbents on the basis of their economic performance is efficient 
only when politicians are vulnerable to electoral outcomes. Voters in immature 
democracies may not use electoral sanctioning as an effective tool to discipline 
politicians.  
Voters are more enthralled by political issues in the earlier period of 
democratization. As a result, economic performance may not be the primary concern of 
voters. Rather, electoral competition in transitional societies is centered on issues about 
transforming the political regime. In transitional countries, then, political issues are more 
important than economic issues in electoral politics.  
As such, new democracies have many characteristics and circumstances which set 
them apart from Western democracies where economic development, political stability, 
and high quality of democracy have been achieved. Prior research, however, does not 
provide convincing theoretical or empirical analyses to explain the impact of such 
economic and political features of new democracies on voting behavior. We do not know 
how or whether to apply theories of economic voting to new democracies. We also do not 
know the parameters or limitations of economic voting for advanced democracies either. 
This research addresses a series of questions related to the nexus between 
economics and elections in new democracies. 1) Does a nation’s economic performance 
under an authoritarian regime promote the electoral success of their inheritors or of 
democratic oppositions in founding elections? 2) Does economic performance of an 
authoritarian regime promote the alternation of authoritarian governments to democratic 
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oppositions? (3) What does determine the strength of economic voting in transitional 
societies? More specifically, do economic underdevelopment and lower level of 
democracy promote or suppress electoral punishment of incumbents based on the voter 
evaluation of economic performance? Does international economic integration between 
nations dampen the strength of economic sanctioning or rewarding, because it demurs the 
responsibility for national economic conditions on incumbents? 4) Does democratic 
consolidation promote economic voting? 5) What sorts of democratic institutional 
arrangements affect the strength of economic voting? For example, do majoritarian 
institutions, pervasive in new democracies, promote economic voting? To date, no 
systematic research has been conducted to address these questions. The first two 
questions posed here are investigated in chapter 4. The next two questions are 
investigated in chapter 5. The final question is the focus of the study in chapter 6.  
Electoral scholars have paid little attention to the influence of economic 
performance of an authoritarian regime on electoral politics in a new democracy. It is not 
clear whether voters are sophisticated enough to identify economic performance and 
responsibility for it within an authoritarian regime during a time of instability. Nor is it 
clear whether voters ascribe the responsibility of economic deterioration in the period of 
democratic transition to successors or incumbents. For this reason, it is necessary to 
examine economic origins of the electoral support for authoritarian successors to 
understand the electoral politics of immature new democracies. 
It is also important to understand how economic performance under an 
authoritarian regime and economic conditions in the period of democratic transition 
affect government alternation to democratic oppositions. Government alternation is 
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widely perceived as an indicator of democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000). In some cases, 
economic crises facilitated democratic transition. However, it is not certain whether the 
economic motivation of democratization and the high economic transition costs lead to 
government alternation to democratic oppositions.  
In addition, specifying the influence of economic underdevelopment, democracy, 
and globalization on economic voting may help us develop more accurate models of 
economic voting. Economic underdevelopment may dampen the strength of economic 
voting. Lower levels of education strongly associated with economic poverty increase the 
cost of access to information for voters. Accordingly, economic voting based on voter 
evaluation of the responsibility of incumbents may not be effective in poor countries. It is, 
however, plausible that economic underdevelopment may instigate economic voting 
because of relatively high public desire for economic prosperity, while simultaneously 
hindering voters from getting information about incumbents’ responsibility. Even though 
the low level of education in underdeveloped countries weakens motivation to cast votes 
in order to sanction poor performance by incumbents, the salience of developmental 
issues may lead citizens to economic voting in elections.  
The impact of democracy on economic voting is also questionable because of the 
ambiguous influence of democracy on establishing the clarity of incumbents’ 
responsibility. On the one hand, a high level of democracy diversifies policy-making 
resources and may attenuate economic voting by demurring the responsibility for the 
outcomes of incumbents’ economic policy. On the other hand, democracy may also 
promote economic voting by clarifying economic policy decision-making procedures.  
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Existing theories of economic voting imply that economic voting may weaken as 
international economic integration increases, because voters recognize that incumbents 
have limited responsibility for the national economy. For example, economic 
deterioration that originated from international oil shocks or international conflicts may 
attenuate incumbents’ responsibility. However, it is also plausible that increasing 
economic conflict between countries facilitates voters’ economic concerns and promotes 
economic voting behavior, as globalization is deepening. 
Fourth, it is also important to examine the nexus between economic voting and 
democratic consolidation, because voters’ reaction to the economic performance of 
incumbents may vary according to shifting levels of democratic consolidation. It is 
reasonable to say that the strength of economic voting varies according to differences in 
the experience of democratic elections. However, democratic consolidation may also 
have contrary impact on economic voting behavior. By stabilizing the democratic regime, 
voters may move their concerns from political issues to economic issues. Therefore, 
consolidation of democratic regime may reduce economic voting for the diversified 
responsible policy makers.  
Fifth, how institutional arrangements affect economic voting is also controversial. 
Recent research on economic voting has developed the idea that the strength of economic 
voting depends on the clarity of the responsibility for the economic performance on the 
governing parties. It claims that voters are less likely to be driven by economic issues 
under the political contexts with less clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993). 
This implies that majoritarian institutions, such as presidential systems, plurality electoral 
systems, unicameral systems, and non-federal systems, help voters have centralized 
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perceptions about what incumbents did for economic growth and to what extent they are 
responsible for it. However, majoritarian institutions could discourage economic voting, 
because voters are more likely to feel that their participation has little or no influence on 
electoral outcomes and, ultimately, policy outcomes under less efficient systems of 
representation and accountability.  
 
1.2  Structure of this Research 
Six chapters follow this introduction. Chapter 2 reviews theoretical debates over 
various aspects of economic voting. First, basic assumptions and hypothetical arguments 
of the traditional economic voting theory are introduced, and then theoretical and 
empirical efforts to produce advanced models are discussed. Second, the chapter assesses 
recent efforts based on macro-level cross-national data to analyze economic voting 
behavior in new democracies. A Western-centric research tradition not only narrows the 
research scope of existing literature on economic voting, but also leads to a restriction on 
incorporating diverse socio-economic, political, and institutional factors. Excessive 
reliance on the clarity of responsibility claim, which focuses on the perceptual procedure 
of assigning responsibility to incumbents, overshadows an important aspect of economic 
voting, i.e. strategic voting behavior to discipline incumbents. Therefore, how the 
efficacy of economic voting constrains voter choice has not been sufficiently explained. 
A more systematic effort to extend our research scope by analyzing electoral behavior in 
new democracies and thorough examination of the impact of diverse contextual factors 
on economic voting is necessary to make progress in developing advanced models. 
Furthermore, economic voting should be understood not only as a function of the clear 
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identification of responsible executives, but also as that of the strategic, instrumental 
choice to maximize democratic accountability.  
Chapter 3 explains the research design to test various hypotheses. The chapter 
explains the basic rules of case selection, the main features of new democracies and the 
Third wave democratization. Next, the chapter introduces various methodological issues, 
such as units of analyses, selection bias, model specification, and estimation methods, in 
cross-national studies on economic voting. It introduces the basic rationale of each 
approach to these issues, rather than providing alternative solutions. Then, research 
strategies adopted for this research are presented. Although specific research designs to 
test various hypotheses are explained in each chapter, a general scheme related to the 
measurement of main variables, estimation methods, and hypotheses are discussed here. 
The following chapters examine economic voting in new democracies.  
Chapter 4 analyzes founding elections and examines how economic performance 
prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers. 
Economic performance in authoritarian regimes varies. It is well known that in some 
countries, including Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, authoritarian states initiated 
successful economic development, whereas most authoritarian regimes in African and 
Eastern European countries lagged far behind in terms of economic development. How, 
then, did economic achievement under authoritarian regimes affect their political 
successors in a new era of electoral competition? Furthermore, in most cases, significant 
economic downturns followed the period of democratic transition. Did voters ascribe the 
responsibility of the transition costs to the authoritarian regime? Or did they simply show 
a “knee-jerk reaction” to the economic conditions by blaming interim governments?  
 11
To address these questions, the fourth chapter develops an economic voting model 
by incorporating two political variables, the nature of authoritarian regimes and of 
interim governments. It finds that economic voting is an important determinant of 
electoral outcomes in founding elections. Successful economic performance under an 
authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors. Interim governments initiated 
during democratic transition, however, are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic 
transition costs. Electorates are not myopic and economic voting is not a knee jerk 
reaction. Political factors, including the nature of an authoritarian regime and the type of 
an interim government, have a significant influence on electoral outcomes. Successors to 
a political party-based authoritarian regime gain more electoral support from the public, 
which reduces the alternation of authoritarian regime to democratic oppositions.  
Chapter 5 moves to the analysis of post-founding elections to see whether an 
economic voting pattern exists and, if so, how economic and political changes in new 
democracies strengthen or weaken economic voting. The chapter develops interaction 
models with GDP per capita, democracy, democratic consolidation, and globalization to 
test the main hypotheses. Those four contextual variables do not produce a linear 
relationship. Instead, a certain level of economic development and democracy produces 
consistent economic voting behavior. In those countries where the GDP per capita is 
more than $3000, a positive change in economic growth measured with the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita increases the vote share of an incumbent. A consistent 
relationship with economic voting is also found only in those countries where the level of 
democracy is high, measured with the Polity IV democracy score of eight or higher.  
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The fifth chapter also shows that the dynamics of economic voting reflect the 
process of democratic consolidation. After the second post-founding election, there exists 
a consistent positive effect of the economic growth rate on the vote share of an incumbent. 
This suggests that voters do not ascribe the responsibility of transition costs to 
incumbents in the earlier period of democratization. Economic deterioration during the 
earlier transition period does not harm the electoral support for incumbents. Voters seem 
to be aware that incumbents have limited responsibility for the current economic 
downturn. 
Chapter 6 examines how two different institutional configurations, majoritarian 
and consensual democracies, affect voter choice. Existing literature on the economic 
voting theory has suggested that either voter perceptions of economic conditions and 
incumbent responsibilities are strongly influenced by institutional arrangements. Based 
on the clarity of responsibility notion, economic voting theorists have suggested that 
voters under those political institutions which promote clear identification of the 
economic responsibility are more likely to be driven by economic conditions.  
This chapter develops an alternative explanation of economic voting. It claims 
that institutional consensuality may promote economic voting because the higher levels 
of democratic responsiveness and of representativeness make electoral sanctioning more 
efficient. To measure the consensuality of institutions, it uses four indicators, presidential 
systems, proportional electoral systems, bicameral systems, and federal systems. It finds 
that individual characteristics of majoritarian institutions do not strengthen economic 
voting. Rather, a combined index of consensuality has a positive impact on the strength 
of economic voting. 
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Chapter 6 shows that the clarity of responsibility hypothesis, which focuses on the 
informational procedure of voting decision, has a critical limitation in accounting for the 
origins of the insignificant influence of institutional clarity on the strength of economic 
voting. Based on these findings, this chapter argues that economic voting may be a 
function of democratic accountability that determines the efficacy of electoral sanctioning. 
Voters blame or reward incumbents only when elected officials are vulnerable to the 
electoral sanctioning.  
In the final chapter, the main findings are summarized, and contributions to the 
economic voting literature are discussed. The present research provides an extensive 
examination of the patterns of economic voting in new democracies. It also provides 
important clues to the influence of diverse socio-economic, political, and institutional 
contexts on the strength of economic voting. This research, however, does not examine 
the impact of several contextual variables related to the ideological, organizational 
features of ruling governments on electoral outcomes. It is well known that left-wing or 
right-wing ruling parties received different responses from voters (Pacek 1994; Bielasiak 
et al. 2002; Oates et al. 2001). Furthermore, the level of party cohesion causes different 
electoral outcomes in the process of democratic consolidation (Ishiyama 1999). 
Incorporation of such contextual variables into the analysis and the supplemental analysis 
of various economic voting patterns based on survey based studies may help to produce 
more concise explanations about economic voting patterns in new democracies. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature on Economic Voting 
 
Over the past few decades, the literature on economic voting has provided 
theoretical explanations of the nexus between economic conditions and electoral behavior. 
The traditional economic voting theory claims that voters cast ballots for incumbents with 
successful economic performance, whereas they withdraw electoral support for those 
with poor economic performance. Political reality, however, does not correspond to the 
ideal conditions of economic voting theory, and the direct influence of economic 
conditions on electoral support for incumbents is not “automatic” (Lewis-Beck 1984: 
206; Powell and Whitten 2002: 66).  
Due to the “instability” of economic voting across nations over time, scholars 
have focused on two main links in the causal chain of the traditional economic voting 
theory: how do voters perceive the economic conditions and how do voter perceptions 
affect voter choices (Lewis-Beck 1991, 2000)? To answer the former question, some 
scholars have examined the process by which voters evaluate economic conditions and 
ascribe the responsibility of economic performance to incumbent politicians or parties. 
Emerging literature regarding the institutional constraints on informational clarity of 
responsibility reflects such an effort (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 
1999; Kiewiet 2000; Royed et al. 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002). Others, however, have 
centered on the latter question and have explored how diverse political contexts, such as 
the availability of alternative oppositions (party system), issue priority of political parties 
(party ideology), and the salience of economic issues (diversionary factors), affect the 
 15
strategies of citizens to make their votes count (Lewis-Beck 1986, 1988; Powell 1989; 
Jacobson 1991: 33; Anderson 2000, 2002). 
Prior comparative studies on economic voting in new democracies also have 
examined how voters perceive and respond to economic conditions under diverse 
economic and political conditions. Most of these studies have shown that economic 
underdevelopment and limited democracy, which are characteristic features of immature 
new democracies, marginalize informational clarity of incumbents’ responsibility and 
distort sincere economic voting intentions to enforce democratic accountability.  
This chapter explores the literature on economic voting theory and assesses the 
attendant contributions and limitations in explaining the nexus between economics and 
elections. This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section briefly summarizes 
basic assumptions and hypotheses of traditional retrospective theories of economic voting. 
The next section discusses various efforts to develop advanced models of economic 
voting focusing on four sequential issues: evaluation of economic performance, 
ascription of responsibility, salience of economic issues (electoral circumstances), and 
efficacy of electoral punishment or reward (electoral accountability).  
The third section assesses existing comparative studies on economic voting in 
new democracies. Major findings related to the characteristics of economic voting 
behavior in new democracies are summarized and the limitations of prior research are 
discussed. Finally, the argument is made that the expansion of research scope into new 
democracies, along with more theoretical efforts to examine the efficacy of economic 
voting in disciplining representatives, may improve our understanding of the nexus 
between economic conditions and voter choice.  
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 2.1  Traditional Theories of Economic Voting   
As rational-choice theorizing increased its influence in political science, literature 
on electoral behavior, which had been dominated by the party identification propositions, 
provided room for analyses of the impact of candidate attributes and issue voting (Key 
1966; Fiorina 1983; Dalton 1993). The emerging research tradition underscores that 
“citizens are not fools” and are sophisticated enough to understand electoral issues and 
party positions, and that elections function as a necessary condition of democratic 
accountability by disciplining the government (Key 1966: 7; Fiorina 1983: 5; Katznelson 
1999: 202).  
To explain the relationship between economic conditions and electoral choice, 
economic voting scholars have often relied on a rational choice perspective. As Dorussen  
and Palmer (2002: 1) argued, economic voting theory is a “theory about applied rational, 
i.e. reasoning, behavior.” As Figure 2-1 illustrates, the traditional economic voting theory 
requires a set of premises related to the nature of voters, political parties, and elections. 
First, elections are assumed to function as a market in which voters and politicians 
effectively exchange interests (Downs 1957). Second, voters are assumed to be 
responsible, rational, and goal-seeking by exchanging their votes for economic benefits, 
including low inflation, low unemployment, and high GDP growth (Key 1966; Fiorina 
1981). Third, ruling political parties are mainly responsible for economic outcomes; 
ruling parties are also rational and office-seeking. Therefore, ruling parties can be held 
accountable for economic conditions by voters in order to receive electoral support 
(Schneider 1984: 211; Kiewiet 2000: 428).  
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[Figure 2-1 Here] 
As Dalton (1993: 198) pointed out, Downs does not assume that “all voters are 
sophisticated on all issues; instead, he asks whether they possess an informed basis for 
making policy choices through their vote. For instance, this perspective assumes that 
people can evaluate past performance (or future promises) of the parties and use this as a 
basis for decision making.” The traditional retrospective voting theory does not 
necessarily deny the influence of prospective voting. However, it assumes that voters are 
more concerned about “actual outcomes than about the particular means of achieving 
those outcomes” (Fiorina 1981: 8). Based on the pragmatic approach, Key (1966: 61) 
also argued that the electorate “commands prospectively only insofar as it expresses 
either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before. Voters may reject what 
they have known; or they may approve what they have known. They are not likely to be 
attracted in great numbers by promises of the novel or unknown.” Drawing on the 
Downsian theory of retrospective voting, Fiorina (1981: 12) pointed out that it is 
informationally cheaper to gain “knowledge of the past” than “knowledge of future 
plans.” 
Traditional retrospective economic voting theory has been criticized for such 
simple assumptions and hypotheses. Critics of the traditional economic voting theory, 
however, do not deny the fact that voter choices are driven by economic conditions in a 
given society. Instead of rejecting the traditional reward-punishment theory, they have 
produced various propositions to overcome the limitations of the retrospective voting 
claim. 
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2.2  Revised Theories of Economic Voting 
Scholars have developed several groups of alternative propositions based on the 
criticisms of traditional economic voting theory. Table 2-1 summarizes research 
questions, theoretical issues, and hypotheses presented by advanced theories of economic 
voting. As shown, diverse efforts to explain the variance, often called “instability,” in 
economic voting behavior have focused on four basic types of research questions: (1) 
what kind of economic performance matters? (2) who is more competent or responsible? 
(3) do economic issues matter? (4) is economic voting a strategic behavior?  
[Table 2-1 Here] 
 
2.2.1 What kind of economic performance matters?  
First, one group of alternative hypotheses is related to the mechanism with which 
voters perceive the future economic performances of ruling parties. The proponents of the 
prospective hypothesis hold that voters are more likely to vote for political parties that 
might perform well in the future rather than those who performed well in the past 
(Chappell et al. 1984; MacKuen et al. 1992). Proponents of the sociotropic hypothesis 
insist that voters are altruistic, and that national economic conditions have more influence 
on voter decision than do family and personal financial conditions (Kramer 1983; 
Feldman 1984; Norpoth 1984; Reed et al. 1984; Lewis-Beck 1986; Markus 1988). 
Inspired by Downs’s (1957) rationale for the expected utility-based voting 
decision between alternatives, many subsequent studies have shown that voters are not 
only retrospective, but also prospective. Chappell et al. (1984: 12) criticized the 
preceding literature on retrospective voting insofar as “they do not explain how 
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expectations are formed or related to past experience.” According to Chappell and 
colleagues (1984: 12-13), “naïve” voters refer to those “unaware of constraints relating 
outcomes at a given point of time or across time,” whereas “sophisticated” voters are 
those who have “some sense of feasibility constraints in evaluating outcomes and would 
be concerned with future as well as current implications of present choices.” They (p, 13) 
argue that voters do not simply punish incumbents and deliver consequences only for 
undesirable economic outcomes, because sophisticated voters would consider “inherit[ed] 
high rates of inflation and unemployment from the predecessors” and would “recognize 
that short-run choices are constrained by economic possibilities … they would reward or 
punish according to whether selected policies would promote movement toward desired 
long-run outcomes.” Challenging the traditional Keysian retrospective models, MacKuen 
et al. (1992) claim that the “usual” indicators of the retrospective model have no 
significant effect on presidential approvals in America.  
2.2.2  Who is more competent or responsible? 
Second, scholars also have explored how the expected competence of candidates 
and of political parties and the clarity of incumbents’ responsibility affect economic 
voting behavior. The proponents of the issue priority hypothesis insist that voters support 
parties on the right because of a policy priority of lower inflation, while they support 
parties on the left because of a desire for lower unemployment. Based on the assumption 
that voters are more sensitive to economic frustration when they have higher expectation, 
the issue priority hypothesis claims that a “right” government is more vulnerable to high 
inflation, whereas a “left” government is more vulnerable to high unemployment. 
Focusing on voter perceptions of political parties’ capabilities in resolving economic 
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problems, a number of scholars have examined the manner in which economic voting is 
constrained by ideological orientations (Rattinger 1991; Powell et al. 1993; Carlsen 2000; 
Stevenson 2002).  
Rattinger (1991: 51), for instance, insists that the general logic of “bad times hurt 
the ins [incumbents]” does not tell us “who would benefit, whether it should be the major 
opposition parties, radical fringe groups, or the ‘party of the nonvoters.’” Challenging the 
“simple incumbency-oriented logic” of economic voting, he (p, 57) explored whether 
unemployment had the same effect on the vote share of left-right parties in Germany and 
found that the unemployment rate had a consistently positive impact on the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)’s electoral success. Analyzing party-specific 
economic voting in four Western countries, Carlsen (2000: 142) also showed that left 
parties gain electoral benefits from high unemployment, whereas right parties gain from 
high inflation.  
Whereas the issue priority hypothesis centers on voters’ ascription of 
responsibility based on the ideological orientations of incumbents, the clarity of 
responsibility hypothesis focuses on the impact of diverse socioeconomic and political 
contexts that undermine voters’ identification of the responsibility of incumbents. Such 
contextual factors as globalization, divided government, coalition government, party 
cohesion, bicameral systems, and federal systems demur or clarify the responsibility of 
incumbents. Based on the assumption of contextual constraints on the ascription of 
responsibility to the incumbents, it hypothesizes that the higher the clarity of 
responsibility, the stronger the link to economic voting behavior (Paldam 1991; Remmer 
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1991; Powell and Whitten 1993, 1999; Chappell et al. 2000; Stevenson 2002; Nadeau et 
al. 2002; Samuels 2004; Anderson 2004).  
Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1990) analyze five countries, i.e. Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain, to find that unemployment and inflation undermine seat 
shares of incumbents. Furthermore, they find that the strengths of economic voting 
depend on political context. They argue that the strongest economic voting, in Britain, 
and the weakest, in Italy, reflects the “diffusion of government responsibility” under a 
multiparty coalition government. 
Paldam (1991) shows that voters are driven more by economic issues within 
political contexts that provide clearer information about economic performance. His 
analysis on the impact of party systems and the stability of majority governments 
provides important motives to expand the analysis to the mediation role of other 
institutions. Powell and Whitten (1993: 398) also shows the impact of a set of 
institutional variables, including bicameral systems, party cohesion, opposition 
committee chair, minority governments, and the number of government parties, on the 
strength of economic voting. They argue that “the greater the perceived unified control of 
policymaking by the incumbent government, the more likely is the citizen to assign 
responsibility for economic and political outcomes to the incumbents.” They conclude 
that “both positive and negative effects of economic performance will be diminished in 
countries where responsibility is widely diffused” (Powell and Whitten 1993: 399). For 
them, economic voting is a function of the clarity of responsibility. 
Although such efforts focus on the nature of incumbency and horizontal 
accountability, other researchers have extended their attention to vertical accountability. 
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Anderson (2004) examined the impact of “multi-level governance” on economic voting 
by analyzing nineteen Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries. Focusing on the “vertical dimension of clarity of responsibility,” he 
hypothesized that multilevel governance reduces economic voting because it diffuses the 
responsibility of incumbents. He found that federalism and the presence of regional 
elections weaken economic voting. Samuels and Hellwig (2004) also examined whether 
vertical clarity measured by the level of constitutional, electoral, territorial, and fiscal 
decentralization affects the strength of economic voting, and find strong evidence to 
support the clarity of responsibility hypothesis. Decentralization reduces the strength of 
economic voting. 
 
2.2.3  Do economic issues matter?  
Third, scholars also have explored how diverse electoral contexts, including 
economic underdevelopment, political instability, postmaterial values, election types, 
international conflict, and election timing, affect public perception of the importance of 
economic satisfaction for voters. Assuming that the salience of noneconomic issues 
undermines the impact of economic issues on voter choice, they hypothesize that such 
diversionary factors decrease the strength of economic voting (Pacek et al. 1995b; 
Western et al. 2001).  
Dalton et al. (1993: 207) argued that “[e]lections are seldom dominated by a 
single issue. Thus the impact of any one issue for the entire public is often modest 
because not even all the informed voters will be interested in it.” As Pacek et al. (1995b: 
748) pointed out, electoral issues in postauthoritarian countries often are dominated by 
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democratization itself, rather than economic issues. Analyzing voting behavior in Latin 
American countries, Pacek et al. (1995b) argued that different sensitivities to poor 
economic performances caused the asymmetry in the strength of economic voting. Only 
those who experienced either economic growth or deterioration should react to such 
changes, and less modernized areas might be isolated from the impact of the national 
economy.  
Tracing the changing issue competition in elections, some scholars argued that 
emerging postmaterial issues weaken economic voting. Drawing on Inglehart’s (1990) 
claim on changing voting behavior, Dalton (1993: 207) pointed out, “issue voting is 
shifting from the economic and security issues that arose from the class cleavage and 
social divisions to the new post-material issues of advanced industrial societies.” 
Recently, Western and Tranter (2001) explored the impact of the displacement of 
materialist concerns with postmaterial values on voter choice in Australia. They found 
that postmaterial values as well as economic voting account for voter choice in the 1990s 
in that country.  
Recently, Samuels (2004: 427) argued that in concurrent presidential elections 
with legislative elections, low clarity of responsibility does not attenuate the strength of 
economic voting, whereas in concurrent legislative elections with presidential elections, it 
does. He suggested that the concurrence or nonconcurrence of elections is the unique and 
influential factor that may mediate the “accountability relationship between voters and 
elected officials.” He argued that when elections are held nonconcurrently, economic 
issues are less likely to be noticed in either presidential or legislative elections: there is 
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less focus on national messages in legislative elections and more focus on personal 
qualities in presidential elections.  
 
2.2.4  Is economic voting a strategic behavior?  
Another strand of research into economic voting focuses more on strategic voting 
behavior than other research strands do. Voters consider not only the responsibility of 
incumbents but also the efficacy of electoral punishment or reward. Whereas other 
theories of economic voting assume that responsible incumbents or political parties are to 
be blamed or rewarded, this research strand claims that voters do not behave in this 
manner. Again, economic voting is not “automatic.” 
As Cox (1997) argued, voters do not cast their ballots for the most preferred 
parties when those parties have little possibility of being elected. In the same vein, when 
voters have no political alternatives, economic voting as a strategy to reward or to punish 
ruling parties to promote democratic accountability loses its explanatory power and 
viability. As Key (1966: 3, 7) argued, “[i]f the people can choose only from among 
rascals, they are certain to choose a rascal” and “in the large, the electorate behaves about 
as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives 
presented to it and the character of the information available to it.” Some scholars have 
developed the “clarity of opposition” hypothesis, which states that the strength of 
economic voting decreases when there is no practical alternative in the electoral arena 
(Anderson 2000; Samuels et al. 2003; Samuels 2004; Duch 2005). 
 
2.3 Economic Voting in New Democracies 
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Recently, an increasing number of comparative studies on economic voting have 
attempted to explain variance in economic voting across nations and over time. Some of 
these studies have included new democracies. Table 2-2 summarizes literature based on 
aggregated data of election outcomes since the 1990s. Paldam’s (1991) seminal work on 
economic voting in 17 old democracies initiated the studies based on aggregated election 
data, even though he found only a marginal effect of economic indicators including GDP 
per capita growth, inflation, and unemployment on the changes in vote share of 
incumbents. It is notable, however, that only a few studies incorporate non-Western 
countries in their analyses. Most of the literature focuses on industrialized countries 
(Lewis-Beck 2000: 208-211). Only five out of fourteen studies examine elections in new 
democracies.  
[Table 2-2 here] 
Economic voting in Latin American countries and Eastern European countries has 
gained relatively more attention from scholars than other regions (Remmer 1991; Pacek 
1994; Pacek and Radcliff 1995b; Fidrmuc 2000; Benton 2005). Remmer (1991) analyzes 
election outcomes in twelve “old” and “new” democracies in Latin America during the 
1990s to examine how economic conditions affected electoral support for incumbents. 
Her findings support the idea that the retrospective voting model is applicable to the 
region. Empirical test results show that inflation and exchange rate depreciation account 
for the total percentage shift in votes for incumbents between presidential elections. 
However, they find that the age of democratic regime, a measure of democratic 
consolidation, has no significant mediation effect on the dependent variable. New 
democracies in the region are not particularly vulnerable to economic setbacks. Pacek et 
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al. (1995b) also examine economic voting in developing countries in Latin America as 
well as in Asia to find the presence of economic voting behavior.  
In post-Communist countries, the impact of economic performance on voter 
choice is somewhat ambiguous. Pacek (1994) finds evidence of strong economic voting 
behavior in East Central Europe. His finding is also supported by other survey- based 
studies. Bielasiak and Blunck (2002) find that economic evaluation affected electoral 
choices of voters in Poland. Hesli and Bashkirova (2001) also show that the reward-
punishment proposition accounts for voter choice in Russia. 
Harper (2000: 1191), however, finds that economic voting behavior hardly 
accounts for the replacement of pro-market incumbents with ex-communist parties in 
Eastern European countries. Analyzing survey data in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Lithuania, 
he argues “economic factors had at best a modest effect on party choice in these nations.” 
Fidrmuc (2000) also finds that retrospective economic voting cannot account for electoral 
choice of voters in post-Communist countries. He analyzes electoral support for pro-
reform right parties in four Eastern European countries (i.e., Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland) to find that voters in transitional countries are more likely to be 
prospective than retrospective.  
Duch (2001) provides a convincing claim over the origins of such variance in 
economic voting in post-Communist countries. He analyzes surveys conducted in 
Hungary and Poland and proposes a developmental model of economic voting. 
According to Duch, information and trust in democratic institutions determine the 
variance in economic voting in transitional societies. He hypothesizes that “as citizens 
become more informed about democratic processes they engage in higher levels of 
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economic voting,” and that “as they develop more trust in nascent democratic institutions, 
they are more likely to anticipate a responsive government and will be more likely to 
engage in economic voting” (p. 895). Empirical test results supporting his hypotheses 
challenge the trend in the earlier research applying the classic sanctioning model to 
developing countries. Duch’s findings suggest that voters in new democracies, where low 
levels of information of and trust in democratic institutions in the earlier period of 
transition are pervasive, are less likely to be guided by economic performances of 
incumbents.  
The limited influence of economic voting behavior is also reported in some 
electoral studies of Southern Europe (Veiga 1998; Hamann 2000; Fraile 2002). 
Analyzing the repeated electoral victories of the Spanish Socialist Party regardless of 
economic conditions, Hamann (2000) examines the effect of three political variables - 
political party systems (the location and strength of rival political parties), compensatory 
policies (structural adjustment policies), and internal party systems - on the continuous 
electoral success of the socialist party. He insists that the political variables that promote 
electoral coalitions account for the reelection of the party and furnish a better explanation 
than the economic voting literature. In a similar vein, Fraile (2002) argues that political 
discourse helps the socialist party to avoid responsibility, even though the weakening 
efficiency of the discourse increases the relevance of the retrospective economic voting in 
the 1990s.  
Literature on economic voting in Asia and African countries is rare in either 
survey or aggregated data based studies. Only old Asian democracies, such as Australia 
and Japan, have gained attention from scholars (Reed and Brunk 1984; Western and 
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Tranter 2001). For most electoral studies on new democracies, the main concern is not 
about specific electoral behavior, including economic voting, but how elections have 
affected political rule and democratic consolidation in general (Cowen and Laakso 1997). 
Furthermore, those studies on economic voting in Asian countries have found limited 
influence of economic conditions on voting decision. For example, analyzing Korean 
elections, Lee and Jhee (2002), Horowitz and Kim (2004), and Shin and Jhee (2006) 
found that economic voting behavior has marginal and unstable impact on voter choice in 
post-democratization elections.  
Most comparative studies on multiparty elections in Africa’s new democracies 
focus on describing historical contexts of regime changes to electoral democracy and 
discuss the nature of elections in the region as well as the theoretical correlation between 
elections and democracy (Rakner 2002; Bratton 1997, 1998; Scheler 2002; Wantchekon 
2003). For example, criticizing the “fallacy of electoralism,” Bratton (1998: 52) argued 
that elections “do not, in and of themselves, constitute a consolidated democracy.” 
Analyzing elections in Africa’s illiberal democracies, he insisted that the quality of 
elections measured with voter-registration and the presence of opposition boycotts, was 
declining. Adejumobi (2000: 66) also described elections in the region as an electoral 
coup d’etat or a “military-turned-political” procedure to achieve political power by 
holding national elections. Analyzing the pervasive manipulations of electoral outcomes 
by authoritarian rulers with various tactics, he discussed the prerequisites for changing 
the nature of election as a “component of liberal democracy.” In one exception, Posner 
and Simon (2002) analyzed Zambian voters to find a moderate economic voting pattern. 
Voters withdrew electoral support for incumbents when economic conditions 
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declined. Interestingly, they found that voters also withdrew from the electoral process, 
rather than support opposition parties or candidates.  
 
2.4 What Is To Be Done?  
Despite increasing efforts to explain the variance in economic voting behavior in 
new democracies, the existing literature has failed to explain how distinctive features of 
transitional societies and the diverse economic and political features of new democracies 
affect voters’ response to the changes in economic conditions. First, prior research has 
failed to consider the effect of economic performance under an authoritarian regime on 
the outcomes in a founding election, in order to control noise of political instability. 
Likewise, little is known about how electorates reacted to changes in economic 
conditions in the transitional period of democratization.  
Second, although Pacek et al. (1995b) initiated the scholarly efforts to analyze the 
impact of socio-economic conditions on economic voting in new democracies, they could 
not provide a convincing rationale, as well as empirical evidence, for the negative impact 
of economic underdevelopment on the sensitivity of economic issues. They could provide 
no evidence that at the national level voters in underdeveloped countries are less 
interested in economic wealth than in developed countries. If some segments of the 
electorate are not participating in a modern economy, we do not know whether they are 
less sensitive to the conditions of the national economy.  
Third, the existing literature is not capable of explaining how dynamic changes in 
political democratization affect economic voting behavior. Lopez de Nava (2004b), for 
example, attempts to show whether economic voting becomes strong together with 
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advances in democratic consolidation, measured with the length of democratic regime. 
Yet, Lopez de Nava fails to provide corroborating evidence. It is reasonable to expect that 
increases in the experience of democratic practice and the shifts of issue salience from 
politics to economy may promote economic voting. However, a challenging argument 
that rapid deterioration of national economy in the initial period of democratization 
intensifies the salience of economic issues is also reasonable. Prior research does not 
address this fundamental question. 
Fourth, the existing literature also does not sufficiently explain how the 
democratic accountability of incumbents, a premise of economic sanctioning, affects 
voters’ sincere intention to blame or to reward. Recently, the development of an 
economic voting theory has been dominated by the institutional “clarity of responsibility” 
hypothesis, which claims that voters do not have perfect information about economic 
conditions and that institutional diversity explains the variance in the strength of 
economic voting. The clarity of responsibility hypothesis has contributed to an expansion 
of our understanding of variance in economic voting behavior across countries. The 
“identifiability” of the responsibility, however, is only part of the story.  
The clarity of responsibility hypothesis cannot explain why voters, even under 
“clear” institutional arrangements, are marginally driven by economic conditions without 
considering the strategic meaning of economic voting. As many have pointed out, 
economic voting works only when voters feel that a sincere response to the economic 
performance of incumbents is necessary to make their votes count. Benton (2005: 419-
422) insists that when institutional constraint “forces voters to behave more strategically” 
to “avoid wasting votes on parties unlikely to win,” sincere economic voting may decline. 
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He insists, “sincere economic evaluations interact with more strategic electoral concerns 
to affect voting behavior” and that “strategic voting also affects how people punish 
parties, that is, whether they will hold them accountable for causing economic distress.”  
The existing literature based on the alternative opposition hypothesis provides an 
important theoretical implication, namely that strategic adjustment of economic voting 
behavior is inevitable (Duch and Stevenson 2005). However, it should be noted also that 
the presence of alternative oppositions is only one of the factors that determines the value 
of economic voting as an efficient electoral strategy for voters. Furthermore, neither the 
clarity of responsibility nor the alternative opposition hypothesis can sufficiently address 
a fundamental issue related to the efficacy of economic voting as a tool of democratic 
accountability: why do citizens use their precious votes for electoral sanctioning?  
Many scholars have pointed out that economic voting promotes the accountability 
of a regime by punishing incumbents based on poor economic performance, but only a 
few empirical studies have examined this normative claim. However, the disciplinary 
aspect of economic voting and its positive relationship with democratic accountability 
cannot be regarded as an untouchable myth. Recently, Kiewiet (2000: 427, 430) 
examined the possibility that economic voting provides “incentives to pursue good 
economic policies.” Kiewiet (2000: 42) hypothesized that the higher the clarity of 
institutional responsibility, the more accountable the government is. He argued that 
economic voting theory has a two-sided analysis: a demand side and a supply side. The 
demand side includes “voters’ desire for income growth, high employment, and low 
inflation,” and the supply side includes economic policies for satisfying voters’ desires. 
Kiewiet claimed, “electoral competition promotes efficiency-enhancing policies and 
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discourages rent-creating policies.” However, Kiewiet (2000: 429) also pointed out that 
the political business cycles (PBC) distorting a national economy can be engendered by 
retrospective economic voting. See Nordhaus (1975) for further discussion on the PBC 
theory.  
Some democratization theorists have suggested that the resurrection of 
authoritarian or ex-Communist parties and reverse democratization often are driven by 
poor economic performances of new democratic governments, and that voters’ lack of 
patience with poor economic performances tends to undermine the political legitimacy of 
new democratic governments and lead to decreased public support for democracy (Rose 
et al. 1998; Rose and Shin 2001; Chu et al. 2001). Some authoritarian or Communist 
parties have maintained public support in elections. Failure of economic and political 
reform under new democratic governments led to the electoral failure of democratic 
parties and threatened the legitimacy of democratic governance (Ishiyama 1999). 
The reported negative functions of economic voting shows that voters’ reaction to 
economic performance of incumbents does not automatically promote democratic 
accountability. Rather, it implies that the strength of economic voting depends on the 
accountability of incumbents in a democratic regime. In other words, economic voting is 
a function of incumbents’ accountability to the voters. Poor accountability in an 
immature democracy may distort electoral outcomes and, ultimately, weaken the efficacy 
of economic voting. There is no doubt that the supply side of electoral accountability, the 
quality of democracy, constrains the strength of economic voting. This is because voters 
would not vote for economic performance of incumbents when the voters feel that their 
strategy does not improve democratic accountability. In other words, when “audience 
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costs” of incumbents are low and when rulers are less vulnerable to electoral sanctioning 
for their performances, including economic growth, low inflation, and low 
unemployment, voters generally will not become economic voters.  
Even under political contexts that are expected to reduce clarity of responsibility, 
high accountability of incumbents may facilitate economic voting. If voters become 
suspicious about the efficiency of economic voting, they will not use the ballot as a tool 
to discipline their representatives and to hold their governments accountable. As Duch 
(2001: 897) argued, democracy may promote economic voting because the public trust in 
the responsiveness of the government increases the chance to guide the government, 
whereas “a low level of political trust may inhibit voters from employing sanctioning 
strategies that are critical for the economic voting model.” In other words, voters may not 
be driven by economic conditions when they recognize that their sincere voting does not 
punish or reward incumbents or that it only has a marginal effect on election outcomes 
and, ultimately, the political incentive to be accountable. However, the existing literature 
does not provide sufficient answers to the regime effect on the efficacy of electoral 
sanctioning and ultimately on the strength of economic voting. 
Fifth, the disciplinary function of economic voting also depends on the 
mechanism through which voters control elected officials and their ability to implement 
what voters want in a given society. Therefore, it is important to examine how economic 
voting works under many types of democratic institutions. Few studies have examined 
the impact of institutional arrangements in new democracies so far. The advocates of 
consensual institutions have argued that consensual democracy is a superior form of 
democracy, as opposed to majoritarian democracy, in terms of the representativeness of 
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subnational entities and economic performance (Schmidt 1997; Lijphart 1999). Therefore, 
it is interesting to examine whether voters in a consensual democracy are more likely to 
be driven by economic performance than those in a majoritarian democracy. Does a 
consensual institution’s power sharing nature reduce the clarity of responsibility and 
weaken economic voting? Or does the higher representation of minorities and its 
plausible high accountability promote economic voting? The existing literature provides 
few answers to these questions.   
In sum, prior theories and empirical studies provide very limited answers to 
important questions related to the impact of diverse socioeconomic and political 
conditions on economic voting behavior in a new democracy. Therefore, the first step is 
to incorporate electoral behavior of non-western democracies into the analysis and 
examine how economic and political conditions affect economic voting behavior in the 
process of democratization. In addition, it is necessary to examine the way in which 
democratic accountability affects the disciplinary efficacy and, ultimately, the calculation 
of voters seeking to maximize the utility of economic voting. Finally, it is important to 
examine how diverse institutional arrangements affect voting behavior, because the 
strength of economic voting is determined not only by the clarity of responsibility but 
also by the efficacy of the sanctioning. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
 
This chapter discusses the research designs employed in this study. This 
discussion includes empirical questions of operationalization and measurement as well as 
the methodology utilized. Which countries are operationally defined as new 
democracies? Which variables are included in the models of economic voting for the 
explanation of election outcomes in transitional societies? How can we measure 
dependent and independent variables? Which estimation method should be employed? To 
address these questions, this chapter explains case selection rules and discusses the 
dynamics of regime transitions from authoritarian rule. Then the discussion moves to 
various methodological issues in the field of economic voting. Finally, it explains 
variables, estimation methods, and hypotheses employed in this research.  
 
3.1 Case Selection  
This research examines elections in 70 new democracies that have experienced 
regime transition since 1974, which has been widely perceived as the beginning year of 
the third wave democratization. Democratic regime transition is identified with any 
positive change to the polity score of 5 or more in Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004). 
The polity rates each country annually on a twenty-one scale (full democracy 10, full 
autocracy –10). The polity is made up of a weighted sum of the following components, 
such as competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of recruitment, 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, regulation of participation, and 
constraints on the chief executive. However, five small countries (i.e., Cyprus, Comoros, 
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East Timor, Fiji, and Guyana), where the total population was less than 1 million as of 
the year of democratic transition, were excluded (Krieckhaus 2006, Appendix). As a 
result, presidential and legislative elections in 70 countries have been selected for this 
research. See Appendix 1 for the identification of elections examined here. The unit of 
analysis in all statistical models is the nation-election year. 
Polity IV identifies regime changes and transitions with changes in the polity 
scores (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). Regime changes are observed when the score 
changes by 3 or more, which is an arbitrary gap between two consecutive years. However, 
such conceptualization of regime changes may fail to differentiate gradual regime 
changes within democracy or non-democracies from those from authoritarian regime to 
democratic regime. As Bunce (2000) argued, the conceptualization of democracy as 
gradations of political regime may not identify the critical differences between 
democracy and non-democracy. Therefore, it is necessary to set a reasonable threshold of 
democracy for the empirical research on democratization based on one of the most 
widely used datasets. This research set the polity score of five as the threshold of 
democratic regime change. 
According to Polity IV, there had been 528 cases of score changes in any 
component variables in 142 countries between 1974 and 2002. Twelve old democracies, 
including Botswana, Colombia, Gambia, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Trinidad 
& Togo, Venezuela, France, Germany, and Israel, also experienced such changes. 
Excluding those cases of 12 old democracies and 5 small countries, the number of the 
score changes decreases to 479 in 125 countries. Among them, 72 countries experienced 
regime changes to the polity score of 5 or higher. Excluding two vanished countries, 
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Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the number of democracies becomes 70 countries. These 
countries experienced 308 changes in regime scores. These figures show that each new 
democracy experienced about 4.4 times of regime change in the period of 1974-2002.  
Using Polity III, Doorenspleet (2004: 322) classified a country as democratic 
when it satisfies several conditions: “competitiveness of executive recruitment” 
(XRCOMP) with codes 2 or 3, “openness of executive recruitment” (XROPEN) with 
codes 3 or 4, “competitiveness of participation” (PARCOMP) with codes 0, 3, 4, or 5, 
and “constraints on the power of the chief executive” (XCONST) with codes 4, 5, 6, or 7. 
She uses these four indicators to identify democracies to avoid arbitrary selection of 
democracies by choosing an arbitrary point of polity widely adopted in other studies. 
However, this method of classification allows four limited democracies (i.e., Iran, Ivory 
Coast, Malaysia, and Uganda) that could not reach the polity score of 5 to be classified as 
democratic. This research omits these limited democracies. All other instances selected 
by Doorenspleet’s method and the five-point change method overlap. 
 
3.2  Transition from Authoritarian Regime to Democracy  
Beginning in Southern Europe, the third wave of democratization moved onward 
to Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s, democratic regimes expanded 
to every region, especially in Eastern Europe and Africa. Karatnycky (2004: 83) reports 
that the number of “Free countries” enjoying the “open political competition, respect for 
civil liberties, vigorous independent media, and vibrant independent civic life” increased 
from 41 in 1974 to 88 out of 192 sovereign states in 2003. The number of “Partly free 
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countries” also increased from 48 countries to 55 countries, whereas that of “Not free 
countries” declined from 69 to 49 countries between the same period.  
A preliminary analysis of Polity IV also presents historical trends of global 
democratization. Figure 3-1 shows the shifts in democratization as measured by the mean 
scores of polity between 1974 and 2002. The mean scores consistently increased in the 
period. Among 70 new democracies, the mean score is –5.1 in 1974, but it increases to 
6.2 in 2002. Across the globe, the average polity score increases from -2.4 to 2.0 in the 
same period.  
[Figure 3-1 Here] 
Such global democratization was achieved across many levels of economic 
development. Most new democracies in the earlier period of the third wave 
democratization had higher levels of economic development, which supports the 
modernization theory of democratization: the higher the level of economic development, 
the higher the probability of democratic transition. According to modernization theory, 
economic development is a prerequisite of democratic transition. However, 
modernization theory cannot account for democratization during the 1990s when poor 
countries joined the third wave of democratization. See Chapter 4 for more discussion on 
the economic condition of new democracies. 
The third wave of democratization transformed various authoritarian regimes. 
This research classifies seven ideal types of authoritarian regimes: military, military party 
dominant, nationalist party dominant, socialist party dominant, communist totalitarian, 
seceded communist party, and other regimes. Among 70 new democracies, military 
regime has the largest portion with 26.8 percent, followed by military party regime 
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(22.5 %), seceded communist party regime (18.3 %), communist party (9.9 %), socialist 
party (8.5 %), nationalist party regime (7.0 %), and others (7.0 %).  
New democracies have experienced various paths of democratization. In some 
countries, authoritarian rulers initiated democratic transition without losing critical power. 
For example, in Argentina, after the failure of the Falklands war, President Leopoldo F. 
Galtieri resigned and Reynaldo B. Bignone, another leader of military junta, took over the 
presidency and prepared democratic elections for a civilian government. Responding to 
political challenges from civil societies and opposition parties, some authoritarian rulers 
were replaced with independent personnel from the outside as in Haiti, Pakistan, and 
Thailand. In some cases, ruling coalitions broke down, and leaders of opposition parties 
or heads of military groups that initiated coups replaced authoritarian rulers formed 
interim governments and initiated democratic transition as in Bolivia, Greece, and Spain.  
Among the 70 new democracies 46.5 percent of democratization was initiated by 
authoritarian incumbents. Other initiators included opposition parties (21.1 %), coup 
leaders (12.7 %), reformers (12.7 %), and independent personnel (7.0 %). Pro-democratic 
coups were the primary forces of democratic transition from military regimes. In other 
types of authoritarian regimes, however, authoritarian incumbents initiated a majority of 
democratic transitions. For example, ten out of seventeen military party dominant 
regimes - Brazil, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chile, Dominican Republic, 
Ghana (1992), Kenya, Mozambique, Panama, and South Korea - were democratized 
under the accommodations with authoritarian rulers. Four out of five nationalist party 
dominant regimes in Malawi, Mexico, Taiwan, and Zambia were also led by leaders of 
ruling parties, the Malawi Congress Party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, Kuo-Min 
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Tang, and the United National Independence Party respectively. The major role of 
authoritarian rulers is not unusual in former Communist countries. In Albania, Mongolia, 
Poland, and Russia, communist leaders initiated democratization without losing controls 
of the government.  
It is notable that democratization in most-seceded countries from ex-Communist 
states was initiated by non- or anti-communist nationalists or oppositions. As Lewis 
(2000: 18) argued, the eventual regime changes in Eastern Europe came from a “policy 
shift within the Soviet leadership” rather than pressures from opposition parties. The 
failure of a conservative communist coup in 1991 facilitated nationalist movements and 
internal conflict within the ruling communist parties: Ter-Petrosyan led the Pan-
Armenian National Movement; Shushkevich and his successor Grib led interim 
governments in Belarus; Ruutel led the Estonian Popular Front; Gamsakhurdia led Round 
Table Free Georgia in Georgia; Gorbunovs led Latvian Way Union; Snegur led the 
interim government in Moldova; and Kravchuk led the Supreme Soviet in Ukraine. In 
two former republics of Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, the first non-
communist president Havel also replaced Husak and the Civic Forum in Czech Republic 
and its counterpart in Slovakia, Public Against Violence, crumbled the communist rule. 
In Croatia, a former republic of Yugoslavia, the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union, 
led by Tudjman, initiated democratic transition. Only in Lithuania and two former 
republics of Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Slovenia, successor parties to communist 
regimes initiated democratization as well as the pro-independent movement. 
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3.3 Methodological Issues in Economic Voting Research 
Cross-national studies on economic voting have relied on many types of data, 
case selection rules, model specifications, and estimation methods. Some scholars have 
argued that such methodological differences might cause the empirical “instability” of 
economic voting discussed in Chapter 2 (Lewis-Beck 1986, 2002; Wlezien et al. 1997; 
Chappell et al. 2000; Anderson 2000: 152). 
Table 3-1 summarizes several methodological issues within the economic voting 
literature. Among the methodologies used to test various hypotheses, no one set of 
options seems to be better than any other. It is meaningful, however, to summarize the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach here before explaining the design of the 
current study. It may help us get a good sense of the advantages and disadvantages of 
methods employed in this research.  
[Table 3-1 Here] 
3.3.1 Micro vs. macro?  
There have been two strands of research strategies used to examine the impact of 
economic conditions on electoral outcomes (Feldman et al. 1991: 185). Some have 
analyzed various survey data collected in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and North 
America. It is well known that the inception of traditional economic voting theory was 
based on national electoral surveys culled from the United States (Key 1966; Fiorina 
1983). Subsequent electoral studies also analyzed diverse national or cross-national 
survey data, such as Euro-Barometer surveys, Pew Global Attitudes surveys, and the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module1 (Duch and Palmer 1999; Harper 2000; 
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Duch 1998; Wlezien et al. 1997; Cohen 2004; Fournier et al. 2003; Nishizawa 2002; 
Nadeau et al 2002; Anderson 2000). 
Another group of scholars has analyzed aggregated election data to examine the 
nexus between national economy and electoral outcomes. For example, Paldam’s (1991) 
seminal work initiated analyses of Seventeen Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and developed two main hypotheses of economic 
voting, including the clarity of responsibility hypothesis and the issue priority hypothesis. 
Remmer (1991) and Pacek (1995) examined the elections of non-Western countries, 
including 12 Latin American and 8 less developed countries, respectively. Macro-level 
analyses have increased gradually during the last decades. This change reflects the 
increasing number of democracies and free elections beyond advanced Western 
democracies.  
Critics of aggregated level analysis have argued that it cannot provide a precise 
explanation for voter perception of economic conditions. They point out that there is a 
gap between objective economic conditions and public evaluation, and that only an 
individual level of analysis would make it possible to test whether and how voter 
perception of economic performance directly affects electoral choice. For example, 
Cohen (2004: 28–29) argued that using survey data is more appropriate than aggregate 
economic indicators, because it allows individual’s weighting schemes (sociotropic or 
egocentric aspects and prospective or retrospective aspects) and economic misperceptions 
and inaccuracies. Since economic voting as a theory requires a voter to cast a ballot based 
on economic evaluation, aggregate analysis investigates economic voting at the wrong 
level of analysis. On the other hand, critics of the survey-based studies insist that survey-
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based studies would constrain the number of examined elections, and that aggregate data 
analysis is more appropriate for cross-national studies to examine the impact of diverse 
economic, political, and institutional contexts on the patterns of economic voting. 
Aggregate analysis increases the breadth of potential studies since availability of survey 
data is limited.  
Neither the survey-based individual level analysis nor the aggregated level 
analysis is universally superior to the other. There has been a strong consensus among 
scholars that each approach is complementary, and some scholars have suggested 
combining both methods together (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
 
3.3.2  Limited research scope and selection bias 
Most literature on economic voting has examined variance in voting behavior by 
focusing on stable Western democracies. Elections in new democracies have been 
excluded from the mainstream of cross-national studies of economic voting. Furthermore, 
only a few studies have examined voter choices in presidential elections (Samuels 2004). 
Some attempts at examining elections in less developed societies fail to provide empirical 
evidence corroborating electoral accountability (Remmer 1991; Pacek 1994; Pacek and 
Radcliff 1995; Wilkin et al 1997; Fidrmuc 2000). 
The limited scope of research on cross-national voting behavior causes several 
limitations for the economic voting literature. First, even though emerging, survey-based 
studies have shown the ways in which voter perception of economic conditions constrains 
choice, only limited generalization of findings is possible without the analysis of cross-
national survey data. Second, the excessive dependence on Western and advanced 
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democracies cannot provide sufficient explanations for the characteristics of economic 
voting generally nor specifically in transitional societies with diverse economic and 
political conditions, such as economic underdevelopment, limited democracy, and 
immature democratic regimes. A large family of more than 70 new families and frequent 
elections in these countries have recently made it possible to study economic voting on 
broader cross-national and cross-regional scope.  
 
3.3.3 Model specification 
Some researchers have suggested that a problem related to “omitted variables” 
has been pervasive in cross-national studies on economic voting and that important 
political variables have been excluded. This problem is especially serious for the analysis 
of non-Western countries in which continuous political instability has dominated 
electoral competitions. Responding to such criticisms, recent studies have developed 
voter choice models by incorporating diverse contextual variables in their analyses. 
Another issue is the inclusion of the so-called “Big 3s,” inflation, real GDP per capita, 
and unemployment. Traditionally, scholars have used those three main economic 
variables to examine how such indicators of economic conditions affect voting behavior. 
They have collected monthly or annual data from World Development Indicators (WDI), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Labor Organization (ILO).  
Recently, some have attempted to incorporate other economic indicators, such as 
the exchange rate, welfare spending, consumption, an economic performance index, and 
the stock market (Remmer 1991; Pacek & Radcliff 1995a; Chappell et al. 2000; Jensen & 
Jeong 2004). Others use only the minimum number of economic variables to examine 
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economic voting (Royed et al. 2000). Advocates of using a minimum number of 
economic variables point out that this is appropriate and sufficient for examining 
economic voting (Pacek & Radcliff 1995b: 750; Royed et al. 2000). For example, Royed 
et al. (2000: 673) proposed to drop economic growth, conventionally measured with GDP 
per capita growth rate, because it had no significant effect in every model they made. 
Samuels (2004: 428) employed changes in per capita GDP growth but neither 
unemployment nor inflation in their analysis of electoral accountability. The rationale for 
the exclusion of these two variables is twofold. First, information regarding 
unemployment is not available for most of the selected countries. Second, it was not 
certain “whether voters respond to the level or direction of inflation.” However, it should 
be noted that, as Palmer and Whitten (2003: 146) have argued, it is misleading to omit 
“theory-rich” economic variables simply for the statistical nonsignificance.  
 
3.3.4 Measurement of variables 
As Powell and Whitten (1993) summarized, there are two types of dependent 
variables used in the analysis of economic voting: the absolute vote or seat share won by 
the incumbent parties (Lewis-Beck and Michell 1990) and changes in the percentage of 
the vote received by the incumbent parties (Powell and Whitten 1993). However, there is 
no significant difference in the coefficients of the independent variables if a model 
includes the previous vote share received by the incumbent (Powell and Whitten 1993: 
394). The latter may provide a more convenient interpretation of test results by showing 
how economic conditions affect the changes in vote share. However, many elections are 
inevitably excluded due to the instability of political party systems, especially in new 
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democracies. A third way to measure the dependent variable is to use the vote shares of 
ruling coalitions instead of using that of a single major incumbent party. However, as 
Lopez de Nava (2004: 16) insisted, “it is very unlikely that voters can assign 
responsibility to a whole coalition.” Furthermore, it is hardly applicable to the analysis of 
new democracies due to frequent changes in the formation of electoral coalitions and, 
thus, unreliable reliable data.  
Another issue is related to the measurement of economic variables. Assuming that 
voters perceive their economic conditions in comparison with those of other countries, it 
has been argued that comparative figures of GDP, inflation, and unemployment are more 
useful than the straight approach using absolute values (Powell and Whitten 1993). The 
comparative approach uses the mean of the values of each economic variable as a 
comparison figure (Chappell et al. 2000). However, the assumption of the comparative 
approach, in which the voters simply compare their economic development with average 
economic achievement, is difficult to accept, even for critics of advanced democracies. 
The information costs to make cross-national assessments of economic prosperity, 
particularly in new democracies, are huge.   
 
3.3.5  Estimation methods 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method has been used widely for 
analyses of pooled or cross-sectional election data. There has been a strong consensus 
that using OLS creates no major problems for the analysis of cross-national electoral data. 
Although other methods, including panel-corrected standardized error methods (PCSEs) 
and Least Squared Dependent Variable (LSDV), have been used, most scholars use OLS, 
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assuming that there is no significant autocorrelation problem between elections (Royed et 
al. 2000). Few studies, however, report the preliminary analysis to identify structural 
problems in the data used. Moreover, the cross-national election data do not satisfy 
restrictive conditions of more advanced models, so OLS regression seems the most 
appropriate model for the data. 
 
3. 4 Variables and Estimation Methods 
3.4.1 Dependent variables 
This research uses the valid vote share of incumbents as a dependent variable. 
Note that an absolute majority of new democracies have been democratized since 1989. 
The number of experienced elections in most new democracies is not large, so an 
alternative dependent variable of change in vote share for incumbents is not adopted here. 
Another reason for using valid vote share is that in many new democracies, no 
comparable previous election exists before the founding election. Data sources for the 
dependent variables are described in Appendix 2. 
 
3.4.2 Independent variables of national economy 
The base model of economic voting includes one year lagged GDP per capita 
growth rate and one year lagged inflation (logged) as indicators of economic performance. 
Most annual data for national GDP per capita growth rate and inflation rate are available 
from the World Development Indicators. Most values for unemployment are not. 
Approximately fifty percent of the data for unemployment is missing. Inflation has 
measurement problems because of the presence of outliers. To reduce their influence, this 
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research uses logged inflation as an economic variable. However, quite a few cases 
experienced deflation, so the negative values decreased a significant portion of cases, 
especially for empirical tests for founding elections in Chapter 4. Therefore, a positive 
number of 10 is added before log transformation for the analysis of founding elections in 
Chapter 4 and of post-founding elections in Chapter 5. Note that the minimum value for 
inflation was -9.6 percent.  
 
3.4.3 Noneconomic Independent Variables  
This research employs models with various noneconomic variables. First, for the 
model of economic voting in founding elections, two political variables (i.e., the nature of 
authoritarian regimes and the characteristics of interim governments), are included. For 
the collection of these data, this research relies on various data sources including the 
Political Handbook of the World, World Almanac, and CIA World Factbook. In other 
models, general government consumption, globalization, level of democracy, democratic 
consolidation, election types, electoral systems, bicameral systems, presidential systems, 
and federal systems are collected to classify the political features of new democracies. 
These variables allow tests for the impact of political contexts and institutional 
configuration on the strength of economic voting. Data sources for these independent 
variables are described in Appendix 2. To control region-specific factors, Asia, Latin 
America, and Europe are included as dummy variables. Africa is used as the base 
category.  
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3.4.4 Estimation method 
Time is an important factor in the pooled, cross-sectional data. Incumbent vote 
share for one election is reasonably a function of vote share from the previous election. 
To solve the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problem of the pooled data, Wilkins 
et al. (1997) selected only the latest election per country. However, their method may 
waste important information of the pooled data. Following Royed et al. (2000: 671), for 
models of post-founding elections, this research performs OLS with a lagged dependent 
variable to avoid the autocorrelation problem. Incumbent vote share in the previous 
election is used as an independent variable in the regression model.  
 
3.4.5 Hypotheses       
To test the fundamental research questions, various hypotheses are discussed and 
tested in each chapter in detail. Here are summaries of the seven main hypotheses: (1) a 
positive change in GDP per capita under an authoritarian regime increases the percentage 
of votes for an incumbent government in founding elections (the responsibility 
hypothesis I); (2) a positive change in GDP per capita under an authoritarian regime 
reduces the likelihood of power transition to opposition parties in founding elections (the 
responsibility hypothesis II); (3) the higher the level of economic development, the 
stronger the economic voting (the asymmetric issue salience hypothesis); (4) the higher 
the level of democracy, the stronger the economic voting (the democratic accountability 
hypothesis); (5) the longer the experience of democratic elections, the stronger the 
economic voting (the political learning hypothesis); (6) the higher the level of 
globalization, the weaker the economic voting (the diversionary hypothesis); and (7) 
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economic voting in majoritarian democracies is stronger than consensual democracies 
(the democratic consensuality hypothesis).  
The responsibility hypothesis I suggests that successful economic performance of 
an authoritarian regime promotes electoral support for authoritarian rulers or their 
successors. Poor economic performance leads to electoral punishment. The hypothesis 
examines whether traditional retrospective economic voting theory works in the period of 
democratic transition. The responsibility hypothesis II claims that economic performance 
of authoritarian regime affects the likelihood of government alternation to opposition 
parties. This hypothesis examines whether economic voting promotes government 
alternation, which is a critical condition of democratic consolidation, in founding 
elections.  
The asymmetric issue salience hypothesis claims that a high level of economic 
development increases economic voting, whereas a low level of economic development 
decreases the strength of economic voting. A large share of rural voters in less developed 
countries should be less sensitive to changes in economic conditions than those in 
developed countries. Pacek et al. (1995b) claim that only voters in industrialized areas are 
sensitive to national economic performance. Based on the assumption that the salience of 
economic issues is determined by the degree of industrialization, their research implies 
that economic development has a positive impact on economic voting. It is, however, 
plausible that economic voting corresponds to the public desire for economic wealth, and 
voters in poor countries are more sensitive to economic performance of incumbents.  
The democratic accountability hypothesis claims that voters in a nation with a 
high level of democracy are driven more by changes in economic conditions. As 
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economic voting is an instrument to discipline elected politicians, the strength of 
economic voting increases as voters feel greater political empowerment and efficacy of 
electoral sanctioning. Therefore, the level of democracy promotes economic voting. On 
the other hand, it is also plausible that power sharing under conditions of a high level of 
democracy decreases the strength of economic voting.  
The political learning hypothesis claims that entrenched democratization 
promotes economic voting. As Lopez de Nava (2004b: 26) argued, voters learn how 
democracy works and realize how political representatives are controlled through 
elections. Decreasing salience of political issues may also increase the strength of 
economic voting. Empirical test results of the democratic consolidation hypothesis may 
provide important clues to the dynamics of economic voting in the transitional societies.  
This research also tests the diversionary hypothesis which applies the basic logic 
of the clarity of responsibility proposition to the analysis of the impact of globalization on 
economic voting. As the clarity of responsibility hypothesis suggests, the presence of 
multiple origins of responsibility reduces the strength of economic voting. Not only the 
dispersion of policy making power, but also international economic integration reduce the 
impact of economic voting. Voters may not ascribe the responsibility of economic 
outcomes to incumbents who have little domestic authority over economic policies. It is 
also plausible to argue that international economic integration intensifies economic 
disputes between countries and promotes economic voting.  
Lastly, the democratic consensuality hypothesis claims that consensual 
institutions promote economic voting. The clarity of responsibility proposition suggests 
that political and institutional contexts affect ascription of economic policy responsibility 
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to incumbents, and ultimately, shapes voter choice. Based on the proposition, this 
research examines how two clusters of democracies, i.e. majoritarian and consensual 
democracies, have different effects of economic voting. According to the clarity of 
responsibility proposition, majoritarian institutions promote economic voting due to 
highly concentrated policy-making power of incumbents compared to that of the 
consensual institutions. However, it is also plausible that consensual democracies provide 
more favorable electoral circumstances because of the stronger disciplinary impact of 
consensual institutions, including parliamentary systems, proportional electoral systems, 
bicameral systems, and federal systems. Empirical tests of the clarity of responsibility 
hypothesis may provide a view of the impact of individual as well as collective 
institutional arrangements on the incentive of economic voting. 
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Chapter 4   
Founding Elections and Economic Voting 
 
Many studies on democratization have examined whether good economic 
conditions promote democratic regime transition as well as the breakdown of 
authoritarian regimes. They have shown that economic development has a strong positive 
association with democracy or with democratic regime transition (Doorenspleet 2004). 
However, compared with the fully blossomed regime-level analysis, few have attempted 
to explain how economic conditions affect electoral politics in transitional societies 
(Remmer 1991). Cross-national empirical studies on voting behavior have paid little 
attention to the dynamics of democratic transition and economic voting behavior in new 
democracies. Furthermore, few cross-national studies on economic voting have focused 
on the applicability of existing economic voting theories to non-western countries. As a 
corollary, little has been known about voters’ reactions to economic conditions in 
unstable, transitional political circumstances.  
As a first step to examine economic voting behavior in the context of political 
democratization, the present chapter raises several fundamental questions: did the 
economic performance of authoritarian regimes affect the electoral support for their 
successors in founding elections? If so, how did political legacies of authoritarian 
regimes and transitional politics matter in voter choice? Did economic deterioration in the 
period of democratic transition harm electoral support for interim rulers? To address 
these questions, the present research analyzes founding elections in 70 third-wave 
democracies. It develops an economic voting model that incorporates two contextual 
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variables, the nature of authoritarian regimes and the characteristics of democratic 
transitions, neglected in previous literature on economic voting. 
Answering these questions is important in that, first, electoral support for ex-
authoritarian successors is directly related to the replacement of authoritarian rulers with 
democratic oppositions, which has been perceived as a critical condition of democratic 
consolidation (Przeworski et al. 2000). Therefore, whether and how the economic 
performance under authoritarian regimes affects election outcomes in founding elections 
may improve our understanding of democratic consolidation, beyond the nexus between 
economic conditions and electoral support for incumbents.  
Second, election outcomes in founding elections, as many have argued, have a 
freezing effect on electoral politics in a new democratic era (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986; Oates et al. 2001). That is, the first election after the beginning of democratic 
transition establishes “both rules and players of the democratic game in a configuration 
that remains stable for subsequent repetitions of the democratic cycle” (Benoit 2004: 365). 
Therefore, the analysis of economic voting in founding elections provides important clues 
to the nature of subsequent electoral politics in new democracies.  
This chapter consists of four sections. In the following section prior research on 
the influence of economic development on democratization and on the nexus between 
economic conditions and the electoral support for successors to authoritarian regimes are 
briefly summarized. Several limitations of the existing research are discussed. Second, 
basic features of third wave democratization and founding elections are described. Next, 
an empirical research design to test main hypotheses is explained. In this section, case 
selection rules, measurements of variables, and estimation methods are discussed. Finally, 
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test results are reported, followed by the implications for further research on economic 
voting behavior. 
  
4.1 Transitology and Electoral Support for Authoritarian Rulers 
Many scholars have attempted to explain the phenomenon of massive 
democratization (Huntington 1991; Bunce 2000; Doorenspleet 2004). As Poznanski 
(2001) summarized correctly, various approaches explain the origins, procedural features, 
and outcomes of democratization in different ways. On the one hand, the individualist 
approach, which includes the liberal, institutional, personalist, and evolutionary models, 
emphasizes the critical role of strategic choices by political elites. On the other hand, the 
collectivist approach, which includes totalitarian, modernization, Marxist, and 
structuralist models of democratization, focuses on the impact of economic conditions, 
such as the level of economic development and economic dependence, on democratic 
transition (Potter 1997; Doorenspleet 2004). The collectivist approach claims that 
economic conditions are strongly associated with regime transition. 
The Modernization theory, for example, emphasizes that economic development 
promotes democracy. It argues that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances 
that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959: 75). Lipset (1959, 1960: 83) showed that 
various indices of economic development, including wealth, industrialization, 
urbanization, and education, are highly correlated with democracy. Lipset also stresses 
that economic development changes the form of the “class struggle” via the increasing 
role of the middle class and the exposure of the lower class to middle-class values. A vast 
number of subsequent studies on the relationship between economic development and 
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democracy have challenged or corroborated his findings (Coleman 1960; Russett 1965; 
Dahl 1971; Bollen 1979; Diamond 1980; Bollen 1983; Diamond 1992; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1994, 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003; Doorenspleet 2005).  
It is surprising, however, that although such attempts to study the political 
economy of regime transition have gained significant attention from scholars, little is 
known about how economic factors shape electoral politics in transitional societies and 
how economic accountability affects electoral support for the government. Most studies 
of democratization have provided only descriptive analyses that explore economic 
stimulation of democratic transition and political contexts in which democratic electoral 
rules and multi-party systems were established, rather than electoral behavior (Reich 
2001).  
As a result, the dynamics of electoral politics in the initial period of 
democratization have not been explained sufficiently. Despite the initiation of democratic 
elections in a country, democracy may not be consolidated if the public continues to 
support authoritarian successors. Therefore, it is important to examine the socio-
economic origins of electoral support for successors as well as for democratic oppositions. 
The existing democratization literature, however, does not explain the macro economic 
origins of the electoral support for authoritarian rulers in post-democratization elections, 
especially in founding elections.  
Cross-national electoral studies have examined the direct relationship between 
economic conditions and electoral outcomes. Recently, an increasing number of studies 
have examined elections in new democracies to show that economic conditions constrain 
electoral support for incumbents (Remmer 1991; Pacek 1994; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; 
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Fidrmuc 2000). Furthermore, recent literature on economic voting has developed diverse 
hypotheses that provide important theoretical implications for the research on electoral 
behavior in transitional societies. For example, Paldam’s (1991) seminal work shows that 
institutional “clarity of responsibility” constrains the mechanism that voters evaluate 
economic performance of incumbents. Subsequent studies have shown how diverse 
political contexts determine the strength of economic voting. See chapter 5 for further 
discussion. However, no systematic empirical studies examine how the economic and 
political legacies of authoritarian regimes affect election outcomes in transitional 
societies. Instead, their efforts are restricted to showing the viability of diverse economic 
voting theories in non-western societies. As a corollary, the relationship between 
economic conditions and election outcomes in the contexts of democratization has not so 
far been sufficiently explored. 
It is important to see whether economic factors are a prominent determinant of 
election outcomes in new democracies, because economic voting is widely believed to be 
a law-like voting pattern in western democracies. Therefore, how the unstable political 
conditions constrain economic voting provides important clues to electoral politics in 
new democracies. More importantly, electoral studies of economic voting in new 
democracies may show us how economic voting is related to democratic consolidation. 
The analysis of founding elections, therefore, is the necessary first step to examine post-
democratization elections in new democracies.  
Some prior electoral studies, especially those of post-communist countries, have 
examined why voters supported successors to an authoritarian regime after the 
achievement of democratic systems in new democracies (Markowski et al. 1993; Tucker 
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2000; Fidrmuc 2000; Harper 2000). Exploring the dynamic ties between economic 
conditions and electoral choice in transitional societies, the existing literature pointed out 
that not only the organizational benefits of ex-ruling authoritarian parties, but also the 
poor economic performance of pro-democratic governments encouraged electoral support 
for left-wing parties whose rule was perceived to be more successful in controlling 
inflation and unemployment in the pre-transition period (Pacek 1994; Bielasiak et al. 
2002; Oates et al. 2001). In addition, these studies argued that electoral support for the 
leftist parties mainly came from those economically disadvantaged from marketization 
(Hesli et al. 2001: 394; Fidrmuc 1998).  
Using aggregate district-level data, Pacek (1994: 735) found that unemployment 
has a positive impact on the voting decision for left-wing parties in the 1991 presidential 
election of Poland and the 1991 legislative election of Bulgaria. Bielasiak et al. (2002) 
also found that negative evaluations of current national economy increase the vote for 
post-communist parties in the 1993 legislative election of Poland. Oates et al. (2001: 16) 
explored the causes for the endurance of communist parties in six Eastern European 
countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. They 
found that the presence of a common hatred of a market economy caused electoral 
support for successors to the authoritarian regime. They argued that public nostalgia for 
the past economic stability and social welfare systems which had been guaranteed by 
communist governments led to electoral support for the far left communist parties in 
those countries. Urban (2003: 257) also argued that economic grievances help garnering 
votes for the left-wing parties in the post-communist societies. He argued that not only 
such organizational features of ex-communist parties as “inherited organizational skills, 
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local networks, and latent identification in the voters’ minds with communist-era social 
entitlements,” and the high internal cohesion, but also the “basic social safety net,” a 
positive legacy of communist regime, provided electoral benefits for the left-wing parties.  
Another interesting finding of prior research is that voters under unstable political 
conditions are less likely to be retrospective. For instance, Fidrmuc (1998) found that the 
unemployed supported left-wing parties in the 1997 presidential election in Poland and 
the 1998 legislative election in Hungary regardless of their incumbency. He argued that 
voters supported political parties expected to deliver favorable policies, and that 
retrospective economic voting has only a moderate effect on electoral outcomes.  
Such prior studies of post-communist elections have shown that economic 
conditions have at least a moderate impact on electoral support for ex-authoritarian 
parties. Furthermore, they have shown the heterogeneity of economic voting in a 
transitional society, because the positive impact of marketization is uneven among voters. 
However, these earlier studies, first, have examined only a limited number of new 
democracies. It is difficult to believe that findings from surveys conducted in several 
Eastern European countries are applicable to non-European transitional societies that 
followed different trajectories of democratization. Furthermore, most of them do not 
incorporate into their analyses founding elections that are critical to examine the 
dynamics of economic voting in transitional societies. 
Second, prior empirical studies fail to show how macroeconomic performance of 
authoritarian regimes affected economic voting behavior in transitional societies. Even if 
most scholars acknowledge that poor economic performance and the following nostalgic 
sentiments weaken legitimacy of a newly established democratic regime, no existing 
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literature based on aggregated data has examined how the past macroeconomic 
achievements under authoritarian regime shaped the electoral outcomes. Instead, prior 
survey based studies have tested for the presence of a statistical association between 
economic hardships after democratization and electoral support for ex-communist parties 
to show the influence of nostalgic sentiments. Such a treat, however, cannot clarify 
whether the electoral support for left-wing parties comes from their electoral competence 
as an alternative, or from the economic legacies of the past authoritarian rule.  
Third, empirical tests in the existing literature often ascribe a moderate or null 
impact of retrospective economic voting in new democracies to political instability that 
might impede the correct evaluations of incumbent responsibility and accurate 
identification of competitive candidates during the transitional period (Tucker 2005: 5). 
Such an interpretation, however, might lead one into a mistaken belief that voters are not 
aware of the economic performance of authoritarian rulers, or that voters are not 
retrospective. It is, however, more reasonable to say that voters would not blame only the 
incumbents of a post-communist era for their poor economic performance, because voters 
understand the longstanding impact of past economic policies, as handled by the 
authoritarian regime. Therefore, it is more promising to incorporate the analysis of the 
impact of the past economic performance under authoritarian regimes on electoral 
outcomes, and to compare it with that of economic conditions under incumbent 
governments.  
By analyzing founding elections and economic voting behavior in third-wave 
democracies, this research highlights the impact of economic conditions on two different 
aspects of electoral politics in the process of democratization: electoral support for 
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successor parties and power transition to democratic opposition parties. This research 
examines the first free election outcomes in the context of democratization by focusing 
on the influence of economic conditions on electoral support for successors to 
authoritarian rulers, who were responsible for economic deterioration or prosperity as the 
case may be, during their governance. 
 
4.2 Third-Wave Democratization and Founding Elections 
Huntington (1991) defines third-wave democracies as a group of countries that 
have experienced political democratization since the year 1974. Seventy countries that 
experienced dramatic regime changes from diverse authoritarian regimes to democratic 
systems belong to this category. See Chapter 3 for the conceptualization of 
democratization and new democracies. Most new democracies are, however, politically 
immature in that they have a relatively short experience with a democratic regime. Forty-
nine countries, a majority of new democracies, were democratized in the post-Cold war 
period. Furthermore, as many have noted, democratic regimes among those countries 
were not easily consolidated (Diamond 1999; McFaul 2002). Only fifty-two countries 
among them could avoid any regime level challenges until 2002, whereas the rest, 
eighteen countries, have experienced a reverse transition to authoritarian regimes. The 
unstable democracies, with the year the country returned to authoritarian rule, are Albania 
(1996), Armenia (1995), Belarus (1991), Burkina Faso (1980), Congo-Brazzaville (1997), 
Ghana (1981), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Haiti (1991), Lesotho (1998), Nepal (2002), Niger 
(1996), Nigeria (1984), Pakistan (1999), Peru (1992), Russia (1993), Sudan (1989), 
Zambia (1996), and Zimbabwe (1983). Even though most of these unstable democracies 
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reinstalled democratic regimes within a few years, some are still unable to accomplish 
democratic consolidation at this point in time. 
As a third-wave democratization syndrome, elections have been regarded as a 
“vehicle of democratization” (Huntington 1991: 174). Emphasizing the influence of 
public experience of peaceful power shifts to opposition parties upon the consolidation of 
democracy, scholars have argued that holding elections is a necessary first step to achieve 
the ultimate goal of democratic transition (Huntington 1991: 187; Adejumobi 2000: 60). 
For the “freezing effect” on subsequent political development, especially, founding 
elections, defined as the first, free, competitive, and multiparty elections, have gained 
much attention from scholars (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 62; Reich 2001).   
 Founding elections have been held on diverse paths and economic conditions. In 
some countries, especially Eastern European countries, elections to constitutional 
assemblies preceded them. In most African countries national conferences for 
constitutional amendment were called before the founding elections (Mulikita 2003: 106; 
Nohlen 1999). Yet other countries, including most Asian and Latin American countries, 
where partially free electoral competitions were allowed, non-democratic constitutions 
were amended under the guidance of authoritarian rulers or in conditions of compromise 
between ruling parties and opposition groups, without holding elections to constitutional 
assemblies or national conferences.  
Table 4-1 reports election years, election types, vote shares of successor parties, 
and the occurrence of government replacement in founding elections from 1974 to 2002. 
On average, ex-authoritarian parties gained about one fifth of valid votes in the founding 
elections. In some countries, authoritarian parties gained a majority of public support. 
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Authoritarian rulers or successor parties in 15 countries continued to govern and 
successfully adapted to the new era of electoral politics. As Huntington (1996) noted, the 
establishment of electoral democracy often resulted in the “red return” and the electoral 
victory for anti-democratic parties.  
[Table 4-1 here] 
Table 4-1 also reports economic conditions, measured by GDP per capita (in 
constant 1995 US dollars) and the rate of inflation, in the year of founding elections. 
Founding elections were conducted under diverse economic conditions. The level of 
inflation varied between –6.2 % in Mali and 11,750 % in Bolivia, an extremely large rage.  
The level of economic development measured by GDP per capita also varied widely, 
from $135 in Malawi to $10,759 in Spain. The mean GDP per capita in the year of 
founding elections is about $1,924, which is much lower than the amount widely insisted 
upon as the prerequisite economic condition of democratic transition by other modernist 
theorists (Huntington 1991; Przeworski and Limongi 1997).  
While rejecting the idea that a certain level of economic development is a 
necessary or sufficient condition of political democratization, Huntington (1991: 61) 
argued that three quarters of third wave democracies were in the middle level of $1,000-
$3,000 (GNP per capita, 1976 dollars). Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 160) also argued 
that the transition zone lies between $1,000 and $6,000 (Purchasing Power Parities in 
1985 U.S. dollars). However, unlike these expectations, almost half of new democracies, 
34 countries, were below the level of $1000 GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US dollars). 
Many poor countries joined the latest wave of democratization. In the year of founding 
elections, the average GDP per capita of the third wave democracies between 1974 and 
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1988 is slightly more than $3,000, whereas the figure in the post cold-war era is even less 
than a half that amount. Furthermore, other economic indicators also show the 
devastating circumstances of the founding elections. The average inflation rate for the 
same period is more than 400 percent.  
 
4.3 Research Design  
This research analyzes an original dataset of democratic founding elections held 
from 1974 through 2002 in 70 new democracies across four continents. A founding 
election is operationally defined as the first, free election to the highest executives, the 
first presidential election in a presidential system or the first legislative election in a 
parliamentary system, in a new democracy. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 58, 1239–
40) define the founding election as a political contest that occurs when “for the first time 
after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under 
reasonably competitive conditions.”  
It should be noted that two different ways of identifying founding elections have 
been pervasive among scholars. One group has defined founding elections as simply the 
first free elections, including those to constitutional assemblies (Lewis 2000; Reich 2001). 
It emphasizes the freezing effect of such first elections on party alignments. Others, 
however, have defined founding elections as the first legislative or presidential elections 
to the highest executive positions (Bratton 1997; Lee 2004).   
Because the main theme of this research is to explore the relationship between the 
economic performance of incumbent “executives” and election outcomes, this research 
follows the latter definition and incorporates presidential elections, rather than legislative 
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elections, when both elections were held simultaneously. Two additional considerations 
are required for the identification of founding elections, due to institutional and 
contextual factors. First, two elections to a constitutional assembly that functioned like 
normal legislatures, including the 1986 legislative elections in Sudan and 1989 in 
Namibia, are identified as founding elections. Second, there were several unstable 
countries that experienced regime changes repeatedly. They are Albania, Armenia, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Peru, and Russia. For those cases, each democratization is 
assumed to be independent only if there were more than 10 years of temporal gap 
between democratic transitions. This would include one case of the 1992 presidential 
election in Ghana. As a result, 71 elections in 70 countries, including 23 legislative 
elections and 48 presidential elections, are identified as founding elections that occurred 
between 1974 and 2002. 
 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
The present chapter tests three research hypotheses of retrospective economic 
voting to examine whether and how economic conditions affect electoral politics in 
founding elections.  
  
Hypothesis 1: a positive change in GDP per capita under an authoritarian regime increases 
the percentage of votes for a successor party/president. 
 
Hypothesis 2: a positive change in GDP per capita increases the percentage of votes for an 
interim government. 
 
Hypothesis 3: a positive change in GDP per capita under an authoritarian regime reduces 
the likelihood of power transition to opposition parties. 
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The retrospective reaction to economic conditions is the basic argument in 
economic voting theories. Voters reward incumbents for good economic performance, 
whereas they punish incumbents for poor performance. Test results of these hypotheses 
may clarify the economic constraints on three different aspects of electoral outcomes: the 
electoral resurrection of ex-authoritarian rulers, the electoral support for interim 
governments, and government alternation to democratic oppositions.  
 
4.3.2 Variables and Estimation Methods 
This research uses two different types of dependent variables, including valid vote 
share of a successor party/president or of an interim ruling party/ president, and power 
transition. First, valid vote share of a successor party/president to a authoritarian ruler is 
employed as a dependent variable. Here, those successors are defined as the most 
effective parties/rulers representing the main ideological and organizational 
characteristics of the past authoritarian ruling parties/rulers. Authoritarian parties with 
internal factions might split into different successor parties. In those cases, only one 
successor party with the largest vote share is selected. It is necessary to exclude minor 
successor parties because of the lack of reliable data that may allow more accurate 
identification of electoral support for the whole successor parties. Second, valid vote 
share of an interim ruling party/president is also used as another dependent variable. The 
interim ruling party/ president refers to those that achieved the highest executive power 
between the period of political liberalization and founding elections. 
Third, the occurrence of power transition to opposition parties is used as a 
dependent variable to test the third hypothesis. Government alternation is a dichotomous 
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variable, coded as 1 if one transition occurs, and 0 if it does not. The power transition, 
however, does not simply refer to an electoral outcome that result in the replacement of 
the ruling government by opposition parties, because democratic oppositions often seized 
the government before holding founding elections. Regardless of the nature of ruling 
parties in the interim government, only if a democratic opposition won the founding 
election, is the dependent variable identified as a power transition (=1). Therefore, some 
cases, where democratic oppositions continued to rule the government are coded as 1. 
The number of those cases is 15. Fifteen countries in which democratic oppositions 
initiated interim governments achieved power transition in founding elections without 
any exception. Of the 71 founding elections, 56 elections resulted in power transition to 
oppositions, whereas 15 elections did not. Founding elections that failed to achieve 
government alternation are those in Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Paraguay, Senegal, 
Slovenia, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Data for the dependent variables are culled from various sources. Such as the 
Database on Political Institutions (DPI), Cross-National Time Series Data (CNTS), and 
the Comparative Data set on Political Institutions, have been released to the public 
domain. Unfortunately, however, those datasets do not report the incumbent vote shares 
directly. For example, the widely used DPI dataset released in 2000 reports only the 
proportion of seats held by the largest party in the parliament.  
Information about rulers before and immediately after a democratic transition and 
the electoral vote share for them or their parties in post-democratization elections are 
collected from published sources, including Elections in Africa (Nohlen et al., 1999), 
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Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe (Birch 2003), 
Keesing’s Record of World Events, Political Handbook, and World Factbook. Internet 
sources supplement this African Election Archives, Political Transformation and the 
Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, Political Database of the Americas, and 
Parties and Elections in Europe. Detailed explanations about variables and their sources 
are provided in Appendix 2. 
For the measurement of economic performance of authoritarian or interim 
governments, one-year lagged economic indicators are employed. These economic 
performance measures are annual GDP per capita growth rates and logged [inflation+10], 
of the ending year of an authoritarian regime. The World Development Indicators (WDI) 
data is the main source for the economic variables. Although widely used for economic 
data, the WDI provides only limited information about economic conditions in new 
democracies. It lacks information about 1 year lagged GDP per capita growth rates for 9 
new democracies examined here, especially those of Eastern European countries. The 
nine countries are Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Czech, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, 
Slovenia, and Taiwan. The WDI also does not have information for the rate of inflation 
under the authoritarian regime for 18 countries - Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Benin, 
Czech, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Since the economic data are highly 
skewed, a log transformation is necessary for an effective analysis of the data. 
Furthermore, a simple log transformation of the variable to moderate the effect of outliers 
would increase the number of missing cases, because some cases have negative values for 
inflation. To correctly analyze the data, ten points are added to the inflation rate before 
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the log transformation. This modifies the constant in estimated countries below, but has 
no substantive effect other than to reduce cases that would be lost as missing data. GDP 
per capita growth rate is expected to have a positive effect on the vote share of 
incumbents, whereas logged [inflation + 10] is expected to have a negative effect. 
Two characteristics of democratic transitions are also used as independent 
variables: types of authoritarian regimes and patterns of democratic transition. The types 
of authoritarian regimes can be divided into seven categories: (1) military regime, (2) 
military-party regime, (3) nationalist-party regime, (4) socialist-party regime, (5) 
Communist-totalitarian regime, (6) Communist-seceded regime, and (7) other that do not 
fit these categories. Patterns of democratic transition are identified with five types of 
interim governments: (1) authoritarian incumbents, (2) new authoritarian rulers, (3) 
independent personnel (4) opposition leaders, or (5) military groups. The main source for 
the identification of the type of authoritarian regimes and the patterns of democratic 
transition is the Political Handbook. Table 4-2 assigns each nation to the appropriate cell 
identifying the types of authoritarian regimes and the patterns of democratic transition.   
[Table 4-2 here] 
The type of authoritarian regime characterizes “who governs” in a nation before 
democratic transition. A military regime refers to the authoritarian regime that ruled by a 
group of military officials as a junta. Military regime often evolved into a military-party 
regime by transforming ruling groups into an independent political party or initiating 
political coalition with any other existing political parties. A nationalist party regime 
refers to a political party whose leader(s) obtained political legitimacy for involvement in 
secessionist movements. A socialist regime refers to those ideologically guided by Marx-
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Leninism when opposition parties were allowed. A communist regime refers to ex-Soviet 
regime or an Eastern European country where a communist party had maintained 
totalitarian rules. Some Communist regimes experienced massive secessionist 
movements and became independent in the end. Fourteen Eastern European countries, 
such as Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine belong to the seceded communist 
regime. Finally, other types of authoritarian regimes include the “racial discrimination 
regime” in South Africa, the “colonial regime” in Namibia and Papua New Guinea, and 
the monarchy in Nepal.  
Scholars have attempted to explain how the nature of an authoritarian regime 
constrains the features of politics in new democracies (Bratton and Walle 1994; Ishiyama 
2002). For example, analyzing democratization procedures in Africa, Bratton and Walle 
(1994: 456) argued that neo-patrimonial practice, the core feature of politics in Africa, 
affected transition outcomes by shaping the “short-term calculations and the immediate 
reactions of strategic actors to unfolding events.”  
The legacy of an authoritarian regime should be related directly to the attributes 
of the successor party. Each type of the identified authoritarian regimes, however, does 
not seem to have distinguished influence on electoral outcomes. It is reasonable to say 
that the electoral competitiveness of authoritarian regimes is mainly determined by the 
organizational capacity of successors. Accordingly, this research, again, divides those 
seven authoritarian regimes types into two: the non-party-based military regime and the 
party-based authoritarian regime. A military regime (=1), which lacks an authoritarian 
party organization, is expected to be vulnerable to electoral competition in democratic 
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fair elections. On the contrary, a successor party to a party-based authoritarian regime 
(=0) is expected to be more viable. The military-party dominant and other one-party 
dominant regimes are expected to have a positive effect on the vote share of successor 
parties, because successors to such regimes might utilize their experiences of party 
politics and organizational resources.  
The typology of democratic transitions has gained much attention from scholars. 
Criticizing the structural approach, Huntington (1991: 114, 123, 164–5) claims to shift 
our attention from the causes to the causers to identify distinct features of democratic 
transition processes including transformation, transplacement, and replacement. He 
argues that the “relative importance of governing and opposition groups” shapes the 
nature of the democratization process and various “methods of democracy.” Political 
negotiations, compromises, and agreements, demonstrations, campaigns, elections, and 
nonviolent resolutions of differences determine the characteristics of democratization. 
Huntington’s (1991) typology of democratization, based on the analysis of the power 
relationship between ruling authoritarians and oppositions, has been regarded as a 
milestone in the studies on democratization, because it effectively captures diverse 
patterns of democratization procedure. 
As he also admitted, Huntington’s typology remains “rough,” and his 
conceptualization of transitional paths based on multidimensional aspects of transitional 
politics, including the power ratios between rulers and oppositions, the presence of 
political strategies to compromise, and the level of replacement, leads into ambiguous 
identification of distinct transitional patterns. Therefore, each transitional path often 
overlaps with others. 
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Following Huntington (1991), this research assumes that the power relation 
between authoritarian rulers and opposition groups is the most important determinant of 
post-transitional politics. However, this research identifies the features of transitional 
paths with the nature of transitional (interim) governments to avoid the subjective 
identification of the initiator of democratization. Focusing on the changes in the 
formation of executives, this research differentiates five basic types of interim 
governments whose highest executives are (1) authoritarian incumbents, (2) new 
authoritarian rulers recruited among ruling authoritarian military groups/parties, (3) 
independent personnel as a compromise between rulers and oppositions, (4) opposition 
leaders who replaced authoritarian rulers, or (5) military groups that succeeded in 
replacing authoritarian governments and that initiated democratization.  
Characteristics of transitions might constrain electoral support for successors of 
authoritarian regimes. Lewis (2000: 18) argued, “the mode of transition has major 
consequences for later developments, the formation of new parties and the nature of the 
parties in the course of further evolution … more evolutionary processes of 
transformation or extrication … created conditions for the survival of authoritarian forces 
within partially reformed socialist parties with greater potential to block the emergence of 
a coherent oppositions.” Gradual transformation of authoritarian regimes may promote 
electoral support for authoritarian successors. On the other hand, opposition-initiated 
transitions that eradicated former authoritarian rulers in the interim governments are 
expected to have a negative effect on the electoral support for successors. Among the five 
types of interim governments the first two are expected to decrease the vote share of 
successors because of the limited replacement of authoritarian rulers. Other types of 
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interim governments, on the other hand, are expected to help successors to obtain more 
electoral success. 
To control the impact of the level of democracy on economic voting behavior, this 
research uses the level of democracy measured with Polity2 scores of Polity IV. Polity2 
of Polity IV is a revised Polity regime measure to facilitate “time-series analyses without 
losing crucial information by treating the ‘standardized authority scores’ (i.e., -66, -77, 
and -88) as missing values” (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/convert.htm). It 
ranges within –10 (=high autocracy) and 10 (=high democracy). An interaction term of 
the level of democracy and the annual growth rates of GDP per capita is also used as an 
independent variable. The level of democracy is expected to have a negative impact on 
the vote share of successors, because the development of a multi-party system and power 
sharing under a new democratic regime prevent the concentration of votes to the largest 
parties or candidates in elections.  
A dichotomous variable for Legislative election is also included in the basic 
model. A legislative election is expected to have a negative effect on the vote share of 
successor parties, because electoral competition in legislative elections might be less 
intensified between a pro-democratic bloc and pro-authoritarian parties than in 
presidential elections.  
Finally, a dummy variable for each region, Asia, Latin America, and Europe, is 
included to control the impact of region specific factors on voting decision. Africa, with 
the largest number of new democracies, is used as the base category here.  
This research uses the Ordinary Least Squares estimation method. In these basic 
models, an electoral outcome is identified as a function of transitional politics as well as 
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the economic environments in a country. The unit of analysis is the nation-election year. 
The regression models take forms of the estimated equations below. 
 
Svote (c) = β 0  + GDPgrowth a-1β 1 + Loginf10 a-1β2 + Militarya-1β 3 + Oppositioncβ4 
+ Legislative cβ5  + Polity2cβ6 + Polity2c *GDPgrowth a -1β7 + Asiacβ8 + LatinAmericacβ9 
+ Europecβ10 + ec  
 
Ivote (c) = β 0  + GDPgrowth cβ 1 + Loginf10 cβ2 + Militarya-1β 3 + Opposition cβ 4  + 
Legislative cβ5  + Polity2cβ6 + Polity2c *GDPgrowth cβ7 + Asiacβ8 + LatinAmericacβ9 + 
Europecβ10 + ec   
 
Svote  is the percentage of the vote for successor parties or presidents in a founding 
election. Ivote  is the percentage of the vote for an interim ruling party or president in a 
founding election. c denotes the year of founding elections. a denotes the ending year of 
authoritarian rule. β 0  is the notation of the intercept, and β1~10  are coefficients. e 
represents the error term. GDPgrowth is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
Loginf10 is logged [inflation + 10]. Military is military authoritarian regime. Opposition 
is democratic transition initiated by opposition parties. Polity2 is the score of polity2 in 
the Polity IV dataset. Polity2*GDPgrowth is an interaction term of the Polity2 score and 
the annual growth rate. Asia, LatinAmerica, and Europe are dummy variables for regions. 
Africa is used as the base category here. 
To test the hypothesis of the impact of economic conditions on the government 
alternation to opposition parties (Hypothesis 3), a logistic regression model is employed. 
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In the following equation, Alternation denotes the government alternation to pro-
democratic opposition parties or presidents. Other notations are the same as those in prior 
equations.  
 
Alternationc  = β 0 + GDPgrowth a -1β 1 + Loginf10 a-1β2 + Military a –1β 3 + 
Opposition cβ 4  + Polity2cβ5 + Polity2c GDPgrowth a -1β6 + Asiacβ7 + LatinAmericacβ8 + 
Europecβ9 + ec  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Economic Conditions and the Vote Share of Successors 
The first employed models predict vote share of successors as a simple function 
of economic performance under an authoritarian regime. Test results for the electoral 
support for successors to authoritarian rulers are presented in Table 4-3. In Model 1 and 
Model 2 the percentage of valid votes for an authoritarian ruler or his successor is used as 
the dependent variable. GDP per capita growth rate and/or inflation in the ending year (–
1) of authoritarian regimes are used as independent variables of economic performance 
under authoritarian regimes. Model 3 and Model 4, however, uses GDP per capita growth 
rate and/or inflation in the year of founding elections as independent variables. 
Unfortunately, for Model 1, only 50 founding elections have complete data. Data are not 
available for economic variables of 20 countries, and the polity2 score is missing for 
Namibia. Model 1 incorporates 16 legislative elections and 34 presidential elections. 
Except for founding elections of Benin and Taiwan, most dropped cases are those of East 
European countries. See Appendix 4 for the identification of missing cases. 
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[Table 4-3 Here] 
Model 1 of Table 4-3 shows that economic performance under authoritarian 
regimes promotes electoral success of successors to authoritarian regime. Annual growth 
rates of GDP per capita have a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent 
variable at the level of .01. The coefficient of GDP per capita growth rate is 1.99. In the 
model, however, the inflation rate has no significant influence on the vote share of 
authoritarian successors. Each percent of GDP per capita growth rate increases 
successors’ vote share by about 2 percent. However, the rate of inflation has no effect.  
The level of democracy has a significant and negative impact on successors’ vote 
share. In addition, the interaction between the level of democracy and GDP per capita 
growth rates has a negative effect on vote share. For a given polity2 score, a one percent 
increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita increases the vote share of successor 
parties by 1.99-.19(5.7)=0.91. At the mean GDP per capita growth rate (-1.2 %), an each 
unit increase in democracy as measured on the polity scale, decreases successor vote 
share by -1.80-.19=-1.99. See Chapter 5 for the further discussion on the impact of 
democracy on economic voting. 
The authoritarian regime type is the most influential factor that determines 
successor vote share in founding elections. The coefficient of military authoritarian 
regime is –17.06, and it is statistically significant at the level of .01. Pro-democratic 
opposition initiation of interim governments has the coefficient of –7.76, but its impact is 
not different from 0. The legislative election type has a significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable. Dummy variables for each region, however, have no statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable.  
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Model 2 of Table 4-3 reports test results excluding inflation, and allows the 
incorporation of eleven additional founding elections for which the inflation rate is 
missing. Those added cases are eight Eastern European countries (i.e., Albania, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine) and three 
non-European countries (i.e., Benin, Mongolia, and Sudan). The test results are not 
noticeably different from those reported in Model 1. GDP per capita growth rate has a 
statistically significant positive influence on the vote share of successors. Its coefficient 
decreases by a fourth, from 1.99 to 1.56. Military authoritarian regime again has a 
significant, negative effect on the dependent variable. As in Model 1, Polity2 has a 
negative impact on the vote share of successors and its interaction variable with GDP per 
capita growth rates has a negative effect on the dependent variable. One of the 
differences between Model 1 and Model 2 of the Table 4-3 is that opposition initiation of 
interim governments has a not only negative, but also statistically significant effect on the 
dependent variable. See Appendix 5 for the comparison of relative strength of influence 
of individual variable on the dependent variable. It reports standardized regression 
coefficients based on the models of Table 4-3. 
The first two models of the Table 4-3 are employed to examine the impact of 
economic performance under authoritarian regime on successor vote share. The latter two 
models, Model 3 and Model 4 are, however, employed to examine whether voters ascribe 
the responsibility of economic conditions in the period of democratic transition to 
authoritarian successors in founding elections.  
Model 3 and Model 4 incorporate the annual growth rate of GDP per capita and 
logged inflation rate in the year of the founding election instead of those indicators under 
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the authoritarian regime. This results in a larger sample size for Model 3 and Model 4. 
However, the test results are similar. In Model 3 the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita continues to have a significant positive effect on the vote share of successors to 
authoritarian regime, whereas inflation has no statistically significant effect on the 
electoral support for successors. The magnitude of the coefficient of GDP per capita 
growth decreases slightly to 1.92. The variable identifying a military authoritarian regime 
has a larger reduction impact on the vote share of successors to authoritarian rulers. 
Opposition initiation of democratization also has a statistically significant impact, and the 
coefficient of the variable is in the expected direction to reduce electoral support for 
successors.  
Model 4, in which inflation is excluded, shows that GDP per capita growth has a 
significant positive impact on the vote share of successors to authoritarian rulers again. 
The existence of a military authoritarian regime has a significant reduction impact, and 
opposition initiation also has a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable.  
In sum, Table 4-3 shows that the fate of successors depends on their economic 
performance and their organizational capability. GDP per capita growth improved the 
electoral success of successors. Party-based authoritarian regimes were much more viable 
than non-party–based military regimes. Party-based authoritarian regimes provide about 
17 percent of vote share advantage! Electoral survival of successors is dominated by 
political factors more than an 8 percent rate of change in GDP per capita under 
authoritarian regime. One interesting finding is that voters assigned the responsibility of 
economic conditions in the period of democratic transition to the successors.  
[Table 4-4 Here] 
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To examine the robustness of these test results, another form of economic data, 
the Penn World Tables 6.1 (hereafter PWT 6.1), was tested. Table 4-4 presents test 
results using real GDP per capita growth change of the PWT 6.1, replacing GDP per 
capita growth rates from WDI. Using PWT 6.1 allows two additional founding elections 
of Poland and Taiwan (in Model 2 of Table 4-4), or Slovenia and Taiwan (in Model 4 of 
Table 4-4) to be included into the analysis of economic voting, but the number of 
examined cases decreases in every model because of missing data for other cases. See 
Appendix 4 for the comparison of missing values between WDI and PWT 6.1. For 
example, in Model 2 of the Table 4-4, two founding elections of Poland and Taiwan are 
added by changing the data source, but those of nine countries, i.e., Albania, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Moldova, and Russia, and Sudan, are omitted for the 
lack of available data for GDP per capita growth rate. As a result, the number of cases 
decreases from 61 (in Model 2 of Table 4-3) to 54.  
At a glance, the test results based on real GDP growth change of PWT 6.1 are 
similar to those reported in Table 4-3. In Model 1, Model 2, and Model 4 real GDP per 
capita growth has a positive effect on the vote share of successors to authoritarian regime. 
Inflation, however, has no significant impact on the dependent variable. Furthermore, 
polity2 scores have a significant, negative effect on the vote share of successors. Military 
authoritarian regime also has a large impact on the vote share of successors. The type of 
legislative elections, however, has no consistent significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable. In these instances, the models of Table 4-4 are similar to the models 
of Table 4-3. 
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In Model 3, however, the positive impact of the real GDP per capita growth 
change weakens to an insignificant effect. In addition, the interaction term with Polity2 
also lose its significant effect in this model. The instability of the economic impact on the 
electoral support for successors arises mainly from the different set of selected cases. 
Compared with the 57 elections selected in the Model 3 of the Table 4-3, the 
corresponding model of the Table 4-4 has available data for 54 elections. In the latter four 
elections of Croatia, Lithuania, Mongolia, and Sudan included in the former, are excluded, 
but an election of Poland is included.  
It is also plausible that the discrepancy lies in the different measurement of GDP 
growth rates between two indicators of the WDI and the PWT6.1. For example, WDI 
reports that the GDP per capita growth rate in the year of its founding election (1994) for 
Guinea Bissau is 0.25, whereas PWT 6.1, 10.26. Test results excluding such cases with 
higher differences between two indicators of GDP per capita growth, however, do not 
show substantial differences from the models reported in Table 4-3 (not reported here).  
An additional set of tests using only common cases also corroborates the idea that 
different sampling of cases causes the discrepant empirical test results, as well as the 
different measurement of PWT 6.1 (Appendices 6, 7). Finally, test results based on a 
combined dataset in which missing values of the WDI are replaced with available data of 
PWT6.1 are not significantly different from those reported in Table 4-3 (Appendix 8).  
 
4.4.2 Economic Conditions and the Vote Share of Incumbents 
Prior regression results corroborate that the economic performance of an 
authoritarian regime is a determinant of electoral outcomes in founding elections. It 
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supports the idea that voters are aware of what authoritarian rulers did for the 
improvement of the national economy in the past. It also shows that economic conditions 
in the year of founding election affect electoral support for authoritarian rulers or their 
successors. It implies that voters are sophisticated enough to understand that the 
authoritarian regime is responsible for the conditions of the national economy in the 
period of democratic transition. Then how did transitional economic conditions affect 
electoral support for interim governments? Did voters assign the responsibility for high 
transition costs to interim governments?   
Test results for the estimation of the impact of transitional economic conditions 
on the electoral support for interim rulers are reported in Table 4-5. The vote share for the 
ruling interim governments (%) is used as the dependent variable. Furthermore, two 
economic indicators of the year of founding elections are employed as independent 
variables: both GDP per capita growth rate and logged values of the inflation [+10] rate 
are used in Model 1 of the table, whereas inflation is excluded in Model 2.  
[Table 4-5 Here] 
Model 1 of Table 4-5, shows that GDP per capita growth and inflation rates do 
not have any significant effect on the vote share of incumbents. The coefficient of the 
GDP per capita growth rate is 1.20, which is on the expected direction; it has no 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. The sign of the coefficient of 
inflation rate is not only insignificant but also in the opposite direction. These results do 
not strongly support the traditional retrospective hypothesis that voters punish or reward 
incumbents for economic performance.  
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Unlike the null impact of economic conditions, the military authoritarian regime 
type continues to have a significant, negative effect on the vote share of ruling parties of 
interim governments. A non-party based authoritarian regime reduces 25.2 percent of the 
vote share of incumbents of the interim governments. The variables for the level of 
democracy and the legislative election type also have significant negative effects on the 
dependent variable. Opposition initiation of interim governments, however, has no 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.  
In Model 2, where only the economic variable for GDP per capita growth is used, 
test results are similar. GDP per capita growth rate is positive, but has no statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable. The military regime type has a strong 
negative impact on the vote share of incumbents. Other political variables including 
opposition initiation of interim governments, the level of democracy, and its interaction 
term with GDP per capita growth have no significant impact on interim government vote 
share. A difference between two models is that the negative impact of the legislative 
election type weakens to an insignificant effect. 
Economic performance of interim governments does not appear to be a main 
concern of voters in founding elections. The weaker impact of the economic variables 
than those in models of Table 4-3 may reflect the limited responsibility of non-successor 
incumbents upon economic conditions. The findings are consistent with the view that 
voters did not simply assign the responsibility of economic conditions to incumbents of 
interim governments. Rather, voters punished or rewarded successors for the economic 
conditions in the year of founding elections. Voters may be sophisticated enough to 
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ascribe the responsibility of economic conditions in the transitional period to 
authoritarian regime.  
 
4.4.3 Economic Voting and Alternations in Government 
So far, this research has shown that the economic performance of an authoritarian 
regime and national economic conditions under interim governments have a significant 
effect on electoral support for authoritarian rulers or successors rather than interim 
governments. In that case, how are the economic conditions related to government 
alternation? Do the poor economic performance of authoritarian rulers and high transition 
costs facilitate ousting successors?  
Table 4-6 presents test results for the impact of economic conditions on 
government alternation. A logistic regression model is employed here. The dependent 
variable identifies whether there was a government alternation to a pro-democratic 
opposition (1), or not (0). Among 71 founding elections, successors to authoritarian 
regime lost their positions in 56 countries (=1). Fifteen successors obtained the highest 
executive power in founding elections (=0): six African countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal), three Asian countries (Mongolia, 
South Korea, and Taiwan), three Eastern European countries (Lithuania, Macedonia, and 
Slovenia), and three Latin American countries (El Salvador, Mexico, and Paraguay).  
In Model 1 and Model 2, GDP per capita growth rate and logged inflation [+10] 
are employed as independent variables of economic performance, whereas those in the 
year of the founding election are adopted in Model 3 and Model 4. Similar to previous 
tests, other independent variables include the military authoritarian regime type, 
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opposition initiation of interim governments, democracy, and the interaction term of 
polity*GDP per capita growth rates under authoritarian rule / in the year of founding 
elections, and three dummy variables for regions (Asia, Latin America, and Europe).  
[Table 4-6 Here] 
Model 1 of the table shows that economic performance under the authoritarian 
regime has no significant effect on the shift of executive power to opposition parties. Its 
interaction term with democracy also has no significant effect on the probability of 
ousting the authoritarian regime in founding elections. Inflation has no significant effect 
on the dependent variable. Furthermore, neither the military authoritarian regime nor 
opposition initiation of interim governments has significant effect on the likelihood of 
government alternation. The presence of authoritarian rulers who modified themselves as 
political parties may increase their adaptability to the new circumstances of electoral 
competition. However, the test results fail to provide evidence supporting the idea that 
the nature of authoritarian regime has any significant effect on the likelihood of 
government alternation. The opposition initiation of democratization has no significant 
impact on the alternation of authoritarian governments. Dummy variables for each region 
also do not have any significant effects on the dependent variable. Note that three cases 
of failed government alternation in Lithuania, Macedonia, and Slovenia, are dropped for 
the lack of available data for economic variables, and that the variable of Europe is 
dropped for the perfect prediction of ousting authoritarian rulers.  
Test results reported in Model 2 are different. GDP per capita growth under 
authoritarian regime has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of ousting 
authoritarian rulers. Its interaction term with democracy also has a significant effect on 
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the probability of ousting authoritarian regime in founding elections. The level of 
democracy has a significant influence on the likelihood of government alternation. 
However, neither military authoritarian regime nor opposition initiation of interim 
governments has any significant effect on the dependent variable.  
In Model 3 and Model 4, test results are similar to those in Model 2. GDP per 
capita growth rate in the year of founding election has a significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable. Its interaction term with democracy also has a significant effect on 
the probability of ousting an authoritarian regime. These results corroborate that 
economic conditions in the period of democratic transition affect the likelihood of ousting 
authoritarian rulers. Furthermore, opposition initiation of interim governments has a 
significant positive effect on the dependent variable. 
Using Model 4 of Table 4-6, Appendix 9 reports the marginal effect of each 
variable on the probability of government alternation to opposition parties in founding 
elections. It shows that a one percent increase in GDP per capita growth rates in the year 
of a founding election decreases the probability of ousting authoritarian regimes by 4 
percent. The probability of winning an election is mainly determined by political 
variables. Authoritarian regime types have a larger effect on the likelihood of ousting 
authoritarian rulers or successors. Non-party based military authoritarian regime 
increases the probability of ousting authoritarian regimes by 13 percent. Likewise, 
transitions initiated by opposition parties increases the likelihood of ousting authoritarian 
rulers or successors by 15 percent. Polity2 and its interaction term with GDP per capita 
growth rates have a marginal effect of 3 percent and of 1 percent of government 
alternation respectively. 
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 4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined economic voting behavior in transitional societies by 
analyzing founding elections. Findings of this research corroborate hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 3. Economic performance of authoritarian rulers has a statistically significant 
impact on electoral support for successors to authoritarian regimes. It seems to 
corroborate that voters punished or rewarded those successors for their past economic 
performance under the authoritarian regime by supporting incumbents or withdrawing 
votes from incumbents in founding elections. Furthermore, economic performance under 
an authoritarian regime affected the government alternation to oppositions in founding 
elections. The poor economic performance of an authoritarian regime harms their 
electoral survival in the new era of democracy. However, the present research fails to 
show that economic conditions in the period of democratic transition have a significant 
impact on the vote share of an interim government (hypothesis 2). Either the GDP per 
capita growth rate or the inflation rate has no significant impact on the vote share of 
interim rulers or their parties. Voters also seem to be sophisticated enough to assign the 
responsibility of economic conditions in the transitional period to successors, rather than 
interim governments in charge of transitional economy. Incumbency did not matter for 
voters in assigning the responsibility for economic conditions in founding elections.  
This research shows that the economic concerns have only a moderate impact on 
voting decision compared with other variables. Voters were barely influenced by poor 
economic achievements under an authoritarian regime they had experienced. One percent 
increase in GDP per capita growth rates under authoritarian regime reduces about 2 
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percent of the vote share of successors. Furthermore, it has about a four percent of the 
marginal effect on the likelihood of ousting authoritarian rulers. Economic voting 
behavior is not a dominant feature of electoral politics in transitional societies. Rather, 
political variables, including the nature of an authoritarian regime and the initiation of 
democratic transition, have more dominant influence on electoral outcomes.  
These findings corroborate the conventional wisdom that voters in transitional 
societies are marginally constrained by economic factors. This research, however, shows 
that there exists a relatively consistent retrospective voting behavior. Economic 
performance affected electoral support for successors and government alternation, which 
has been widely perceived as a condition of democratic consolidation. 
As this research examines only economic voting behavior in founding elections, 
this chapter excludes the majority of subsequent elections in new democracies. Therefore, 
it is not certain whether economic voting continues to factor into post-founding elections. 
Does democratic consolidation promote further economic voting as the experience of 
democratic governance becomes accumulated for voters? Or do voters pay more attention 
to non-economic issues? The following chapters examine the nexus between the national 
economy and voting behavior in post-founding elections by focusing on the influence of 
democratic consolidation and institutional arrangements.  
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Chapter 5   
Economic Voting and Democratic Consolidation 
 
 
This chapter examines whether economic performance has a significant impact on 
electoral support for incumbents and how various socio-economic and political factors, 
such as economic development, the level of democracy, and democratic consolidation, 
affect the strength of economic voting in post-founding elections in 70 new democracies. 
Chapter 4 has analyzed founding elections to find that the economic performance of an 
authoritarian regime and transitional economic conditions have affected electoral 
outcomes. It implies that voters consider past or transitional economic conditions to 
punish or reward authoritarian successors rather than interim governments. Certainly, it 
reflects the ambiguous responsibility of incumbent governments during the period of 
democratization. Then in what conditions do voters assign the responsibility of economic 
conditions to incumbents? Does the accrual of democratic experiences promote electoral 
sanctioning or rewarding of incumbents? How does economic underdevelopment 
pervasive in new democracies affect the strength of economic voting? Does the level of 
democracy promote economic voting? This research aims at addressing these questions 
related to the determinants of the strength of economic voting, which has been a main 
theme of comparative economic voting studies.  
Both electoral and democratization studies commonly agree that voters in new 
democracies are sensitive to economic conditions and would not throw away their 
chances to punish or to reward incumbents for their economic performances (Diamond 
and Linz 1989). However, only a few studies have examined economic voting in new 
democracies (Remmer 1991; Pacek 1994; Fidrmuc 2000). Furthermore, most of them 
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address a simple applicability of existing economic voting theories to the analyses of 
voter choice in non-Western democracies. As a result, little is known about distinct 
features of economic voting in new democracies compared with those in western 
democracies, and how diverse economic and political conditions, such as economic 
underdevelopment, low level of democracy, and little experience of democratic regime, 
embedded in new democracies have affected the patterns of economic voting.  
This chapter analyzes an original dataset that encompasses presidential and 
legislative elections in 70 new democracies in the period of 1974-2002. Five main 
hypotheses, the retrospective hypothesis, the asymmetric issue salience hypothesis, the 
democratic accountability hypothesis, the political learning hypothesis, and the 
diversionary hypothesis, are tested here. It finds that economic performance of an 
incumbent constrains electoral outcomes in new democracies, which supports the 
retrospective hypothesis. A positive change in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
increases the vote share of an incumbent. However, the present research fails to provide 
strong evidence to corroborate any other hypotheses. None of the contextual variables, 
including economic development, democracy, democratic consolidation, and 
globalization, has a consistent, significant linear effect on the strength of economic voting. 
However, it shows that there is a moderate trend that economic voting is stronger when 
the level of economic development or democracy is relatively high, and when the number 
of elections is more than 2.  
This chapter consists of four sections. The following section introduces prior 
research on the economic voting in developing countries, and assesses its theoretical and 
empirical contributions as well as its limitations. Section 2 outlines a research design to 
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test several hypotheses. Section 3 reports empirical test results. Finally, findings of this 
chapter are summarized, and implications for further research are discussed. 
 
5.1 Literature on Economic Voting in Developing Countries 
To unravel the nature of voting behavior in transitional societies some scholars 
have examined how voters react to economic conditions in new democracies (Remmer 
1991; Pacek 1994; Pacek and Radcliff 1995b; Fidrmuc 2000). Analyzing aggregate data 
of 21 presidential elections in 12 Latin American countries in the 1980s, Remmer (1991) 
found that economic deterioration, measured by short-term variations in GDP, inflation, 
and exchange rate depreciation, undermined electoral support for incumbent parties. She 
argued that the “responsiveness of electoral outcomes to economic reversals in Latin 
America” reinforces the theoretical relevance of prior research grounded in the 
experience of OECD nations (p. 795).  
Pacek (1994) examined presidential and legislative elections of three East Central 
European countries in the period of 1990-1992 (i.e., Poland, Bulgaria, and 
Czechoslovakia). Using interregional, district level aggregate data of elections, he found 
that economic conditions, measured by unemployment rates, had a significant negative 
effect on voting decision for incumbents in those post-Communist states. Pacek and 
Radcliff (1995b) expanded the temporal and spatial domains of the research by 
incorporating 52 legislative and presidential elections in eight developing countries 
between 1951 and 1990. They also have shown that economic conditions, measured by 
the percentage change in real GDP per capita, were one of the important determinants of 
the incumbent party’s percentage share of the vote. They found that each one-percentage 
point decrease in real GDP per capita reduced about one percent of the vote share of an 
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incumbent party. However, according to them, the economic effect is asymmetric. The 
economic effect on the electoral support for incumbents is nil during economic 
expansions. They argued that the asymmetric effect reflects “greater voter sensitivity to 
poor economic performances.”  
Existing research on economic voting, however, has failed to explain how diverse 
economic and political conditions, such as economic underdevelopment, the low level of 
democracy, and little experience with a democratic regime embedded in transitional 
societies affect the strength of economic voting in a systematic manner. These structural 
factors are expected to constrain the sensitivity of economic issues, the clear 
identification of incumbent responsibility, and the sanctioning function of economic 
voting. As Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) argued, the presence of a large share of rural area 
in underdeveloped countries, where voters are less sensitive to national economic growth, 
may decrease the strength of economic voting. Furthermore, economic underdevelopment, 
which constrains voters’ access to information, may reduce the strength of economic 
voting. The low level of democracy and the corresponding less sensitivity of incumbents 
to electoral sanctioning may also reduce the instrumental efficacy of economic voting to 
discipline governments. Accordingly, voters under the limited level of democracy may 
have a weaker motivation to use economic voting than fully democratized democracies. 
The level of democratic consolidation also affect the strength of economic voting, 
because voters in unstable and immature democracies are more likely to be interested in 
political issues related to the establishment of a new democratic regime than economic 
issues. Therefore, it is important to specify how such economic and political conditions 
constrain economic voting for comparative studies of electoral behavior.  
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Increasing aggregate-level studies of economic voting has expanded research 
scope by incorporating new democracies, but does not center on the features of voting 
patterns in transitional societies, either. For example, Anderson (2000) and Samuels 
(2004a, 2004b) examined elections in new democracies as well as old democracies, yet 
little was discussed on the features of economic voting under different economic and 
political conditions. 
Such a limitation is deeply related to the conventional approach of not 
incorporating elections held during transitional periods into the analysis of economic 
voting. For example, criticizing the case selection of Remmer (1991), Pacek et al. 
(1995b: 748) argued that incorporation of elections in post-authoritarian periods, 
“dominated by the very process of democratization itself,” is problematic, because 
electoral fraud and military interventions often occurred. And then, they examined only 
“relatively uninterrupted competitive elections” in a few less developed countries. 
However, it is hardly reasonable to find pure elections “immune from the intense political 
conflict” in non-western societies. Ironically, Pacek et al. (1995b) also noted that their 
samples included politically unstable countries, such as India, Uruguay, and Sri Lanka (p. 
749). Despite the intention to control the impact of transitional features, such a 
conventional approach narrows their research scope and exacerbates the selection bias. 
As a corollary, most studies show only the presence of economic voting in new 
democracies that are similar to mature democracies.  
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5.1.1 Economic Underdevelopment and Economic Voting  
Economic voting, a form of electoral accountability, requires voters’ accurate 
evaluation of incumbents’ performance and electoral sanctioning and/ or reward. 
Therefore, the strength of the economic voting depends on diverse contextual factors that 
promote or hinder informing citizens of the clear responsibility of incumbents (Paldam 
1991; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999). The level of economic 
development may also affect the strength of economic voting, because it constrains 
voters’ sensitivity to economic issues and their cognitive capacity, which comprise the 
mechanisms for gaining information of incumbent performance, and the procedure of 
involving in electoral sanctioning.  
Pacek et al.’s (1995b: 754) effort is a pioneering attempt to account for the impact 
of the level of economic development on the patterns of economic voting in non-Western 
democracies. They argued that “the economic effect on the vote may be driven by the 
behavior of only that part of society participating in the modern economy,” and therefore 
“the large share of voters who have been left out of the aggregate growth have no 
particular reason to reward incumbents for such [economic] growth” in Latin America (p. 
754). Their arguments imply that the limited sensitivity to economic growth in poor 
countries decreases the strength of economic voting.  
It is also plausible that economic underdevelopment may impede voter capability 
in achieving information about incumbent performance and participation in electoral 
sanctioning. Numerous scholars have argued that economic growth fosters more 
informed and politically active citizens (Lipset 1960; Verba et al. 1995). Accordingly, the 
strength of economic voting in poor countries, where voters are less educated and have 
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limited access to information, may be far below what the retrospective economic voting 
theory has expected. On the contrary, economic voting may tend to be relatively stronger 
in wealthy countries where voters have more access to information.  
 
5.1.2 Democracy and Economic Voting  
No cross-national study based on either aggregated data or survey responses has 
examined the mediation impact of democracy on the strength of economic voting. It 
reflects not only the limited consideration of the variations in electoral accountability 
among democracies, but also the limited research scope of prior research which mainly 
has focused on the analysis of economic voting in old democracies.  
The debate over a regime effect on economic growth provides important 
implications to the research on the nexus between democratic regime type and economic 
voting. Advocates of a positive relationship between democracy and economic growth 
argue that not only the presence of strong property rights, but also electoral accountability 
in democracies promotes economic growth by providing strong incentives to politicians 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Assuming the presence of higher audience costs of 
economic failure in democracies than those in non-democracies, they contend that 
politicians are more accountable in democratic regimes (Fearon 1994).  
It is, however, clear that democratic accountability varies across democracies, and 
the corresponding electoral sanctioning has diverse patterns across nations over time. 
Fearon (1999: 56) points out that the sanctioning function of electoral accountability 
decreases when voters feel “little ability to induce politicians to do what the voters would 
want done.” In other words, the limited empowerment of citizens and the lower 
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responsiveness of the elected in less democratized regime may weaken the strength of 
economic voting. Furthermore, the lower transparency of democratic governance in less 
democratized countries may also harm the capacity of voters in identifying performances 
for which incumbents are responsible. Existing literature has suggested that highly 
qualified democratic accountability and transparency promote economic voting. 
On the contrary, it is also plausible that democracy has a limited effect on the 
strength of economic voting. Some theories of economic voting support this argument. 
First, the issue salience theory suggests that economic voting decreases where political 
issues related to deepening democratization are salient. Under relatively less 
democratized countries, political debate over the path of political reform may arise, and 
therefore economic issues gain less attention from voters; the high salience of political 
issues may reduce the strength of economic voting. Second, the clarity of responsibility 
thesis also suggests that the level of democracy is negatively related to the strength of 
economic voting. It is because power concentration to executives in less democratized 
countries may help voters’ identification of responsible politicians, whereas the 
institutional checks and balances in highly democratized countries interrupt clear 
identification of voters’ targets to blame. See chapter 2 for further discussion on the 
theories of issue salience and of clarity of responsibility.  
 
5.1.3 Democratic Consolidation and Economic Voting  
As Doorenspleet (2004) argued, studies on democratization need to be 
differentiated from those on democracy, because democratic consolidation widely 
measured with the length of a democratic regime does not necessarily coincide with the 
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level of democracy. Even a high level of democracy can be achieved before a new 
democratic regime is consolidated. Rapidly democratized countries may have more 
discrepancy between the level of democratic consolidation and the level of democracy. It 
suggests that the mediation effect of democratization on the strength of economic voting 
may not be different from that of democracy.    
Democratic consolidation would promote economic voting by shifting voters’ 
concerns from political issues to economic issues. Political issues related to democratic 
transition weaken, and voters become more sensitive to economic issues than political 
issues as a new democratic regime matures. Furthermore, as Lopez de Nava (2004b: 26) 
argued, “voters have a learning curve with respect to how democracy works … in the 
‘oldest’ democracies the economic vote function will be more robust.” 
Such an expectation is, however, controversial because democratization was often 
driven by economic crises and economic reform became an important electoral issue in 
the initial period of democratization. As many studies on post-Communist transitions 
have pointed out, economic reform and adjustment under new democratic governments 
generated high transition costs, including high unemployment, inflation, and inequality 
(Hellman 1998: 203). Therefore, the consolidation of democratic regime may not 
promote economic voting, but reduce the strength of economic voting, as the highly 
salient economic issues in the initial period of democratic transition disappear.  
 
5.2 Research Design 
This chapter examines post-founding presidential and legislative elections in 70 
countries that experienced democratic transition since 1974, the beginning year of the 
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third wave of democratization. Challenging the existing empirical and theoretical 
literature in which elections in the period of democratization are regarded as only noise or 
outlying observations, it directly examines how economic and political features of new 
democracies, including the economic underdevelopment, the low level of democracy, and 
the limited democratic consolidation, affect the strength of economic voting by 
incorporating most elections in new democracies.  
Following previous research on economic voting, it excludes two different types 
of elections: elections to constitutional assemblies and founding elections. Founding 
elections, of course, were the focus of the previous chapter. Only post-founding elections 
are included in this analysis. Post-founding elections are defined as either legislative or 
presidential elections held after founding elections. In this chapter, the observations are 
limited to first-round elections, so that about 53 second-round presidential elections are 
excluded. The main reason to adopt the first-round elections rather than the second-round 
elections is to minimize the missing cases for those elections in which incumbents failed 
to gain sufficient votes for running the second round. Furthermore, compared with other 
presidential elections following the plurality rule, the vote share of an incumbent in the 
second-round may exaggerate voters’ electoral support for those candidates who have 
passed the first round. As a result, 330 elections (208 legislative elections and 122 
presidential elections) in 68 countries are identified as post-founding elections here. Of 
the sample of 70 new democracies, two countries, Indonesia and Sudan, are excluded 
because there were no post-founding elections. In total, 17.6 percent of post-founding 
elections are omitted due to missing data for one or more variables. See Appendix 11 for 
the identification of additional missing elections.  
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 5.2.1 Hypotheses 
This chapter tests several hypotheses, such as, the basic retrospective hypothesis, 
the asymmetric issue salience hypothesis, the democratic accountability hypothesis, the 
political learning hypothesis, and the diversionary hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: a positive change in GDP per capita increases the vote share of an 
incumbent party /president: (Retrospective Economic Voting Hypothesis). 
 
Hypothesis 2: the higher the level of economic development, the stronger the 
economic voting (the Asymmetric Issue Salience Hypothesis). 
 
Hypothesis 3: the higher the level of democracy, the stronger the economic voting 
(the Democratic Accountability Hypothesis). 
 
Hypothesis 4: the longer the experience of democratic elections, the stronger the 
economic voting (the Political Learning Hypothesis). 
 
Hypothesis 5: the higher the level of globalization, the weaker the economic voting 
(the Diversionary Hypothesis). 
 
 
The retrospective hypothesis claims that voters punish or reward incumbents’ 
economic performance. Voters withdraw electoral support for incumbents when their 
economic performance measured by the annual growth rates of GDP per capita is poor. 
Voters, however, cast their votes for incumbents as economic conditions improve. The 
asymmetric economic issue salience hypothesis claims that economic development 
facilitates economic voting. Economic development promotes economic integration of 
national economy, which increases voters’ sensitivity to the economic performance of 
incumbents. Furthermore, it also facilitates voters’ access to information and lowers the 
costs of participation in electoral sanctioning. The democratic accountability hypothesis 
refers that the level of democracy facilitates economic voting. Democratic accountability 
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and transparency promote the efficiency of electoral sanctioning and lower the costs of 
obtaining accurate information as to the responsible targets to blame. The political 
learning hypothesis claims that democratic consolidation facilitates economic voting 
because the accumulated experiences of democratic elections accelerate the efficiency of 
electoral sanctioning, and decreasing salience of political issues increases economic issue 
salience. Furthermore, finally, the diversionary hypothesis claims that increasing 
international economic integration weakens economic voting. International economic 
integration decreases not only incumbent influence on national economic conditions, but 
also their responsibility.  
The empirical tests below analyze an original pooled dataset. The unit of analysis 
here is the nation-election year. To solve the various problems related to pooled data, 
scholars have used various estimation methods. First, Pacek et al. (1995b) added dummy 
variables for each country to control the potential bias related to “country differences in 
the dependent variable (vote for incumbent party)” (p. 751). The Least Squares with 
Dummy Variables (LSDV) or other methods, such as the Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSEs) estimation method, are used to solve problems such as autocorrelation 
(Whitten and Palmer 1999). Minimizing the problems that arise from pooled data, some 
argue that no significant autocorrelation problem exists in election data (Royed et al. 
2000, 2004; Samuels 2004). Following the latter argument, this research uses the 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation method. The full statistical model of economic voting 
is as follows.  
 
Ivote (c) = β0+ Ivote (p)β1 + GDPgrowthc-1β2 + Loginf10c-1β3 + Econdevcβ4 + Democc β5 + 
Demconc β6  + Globalc β7+ GDPgrowth c-1 *Econdevc β8 + GDPgrowth c-1 *Democc β9+ 
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GDPgrowth c-1 *Demconc β10 + GDPgrowth c-1 *Globalc β11 + Govfinancec-1β12 + Asiacβ13 + 
LatinAmericacβ14 + Europecβ15 + ec
 
Ivote is the vote percentage for an incumbent party or president. c denotes the year 
of current election. p denotes the year of previous election. β 0  is the notation of the 
intercept, and β1~15  are coefficients. e represents the error term. GDPgrowth is the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita. Loginf10 is logged [inflation +10]. Econdev is the level of 
economic development measured by GDP per capita. Democ is democracy scores of 
Polity IV dataset. Demcon is democratic consolidation measured by the number of 
previous legislative or presidential elections counted, respectively. Global is 
globalization measured by the portion of trade to GDP (%). Govfinance is economic 
boosting efforts of the government. Asia, LatinAmerica, and Europe are dummy variables 
for regions. Africa is used as the base category here. It should also be noted that the same 
model is used for the regression of legislative elections, presidential elections, and both 
legislative and presidential elections, separately.  
 
5.2.2 Variables  
Because the main theme of this chapter is to estimate the effect of economic 
conditions on public support for incumbents, this research uses the vote share of an 
incumbent party or a president as the dependent variable. The mean incumbent vote share 
is 37.8 percent of valid votes, and the median vote share is 38.0 percent. The standard 
deviation of the variable is 19.0. The basic model includes two indicators of economic 
conditions: one-year lagged annual growth rate of GDP per capita and one-year lagged 
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inflation (logged). Among 272 elections examined here, 49.4 percent of elections were 
held in the first half of the year. Accordingly, using the economic indicators of the 
previous year seems to be more reasonable to measure the economic performance of an 
incumbent before holding elections than those of the election year. The source of those 
economic variables is World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita is expected to have a positive effect, whereas inflation is expected 
to have a negative effect on the vote share of an incumbent (the retrospective economic 
voting hypothesis).  
To test the asymmetric issue salience hypothesis, the level of economic 
development, which takes one, two, and three when the nominal values of GDP per 
capita are below USD $1000 (constant 1995), between $1001 and $3,000, and above 
$3001 respectively, is used. The source of the variable is World Development Indicators.  
The main reason for the lower criterion of the level of economic development is that most 
elections examined here were held under less developed countries. For example, 68.2 
percent of all elections were held in those countries whose GDP per capita is less than 
USD $3000 (constant 1995). The variable of the level of economic development is used 
to create interaction variables with two economic indicators, the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita and inflation rate. The coefficient for the interaction variable of the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita is expected to have a positive sign, whereas that of 
inflation has a negative sign.  
To test the democratic accountability hypothesis, this research employs the 
democracy scores from Polity IV (Democ), which identify regime types from –10 to 10. 
The variable of democracy is used to create interaction variables with two economic 
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indicators, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita and inflation rate. Some may argue 
that democracy weakens economic voting because institutional dispersion of policy-
making power given to incumbents makes it difficult to identify the responsible target to 
blame in elections. However, democracy may have a positive effect on the strength of 
economic voting, because democracy promotes economic voting by opening and 
clarifying the procedure of economic policy decision-making.  
To test the political learning hypothesis, the number of elections is used as a 
proxy for the level of democratic consolidation. There have been two different 
approaches in the studies on democratic consolidation: the structural approach and the 
survey-based cultural approach. The structural approach defines democratic consolidation 
as the durability of democratic regime. Huntington (1991) insisted that the two-turnover 
rule is the minimum condition of democratic consolidation. In a similar vein, 
Gasiorowski (1998: 740) defined it as the “process by which a newly established 
democratic regime becomes sufficiently durable that a return to non-democratic rule is no 
longer likely.” He (1998: 746-7) developed three indicators of consolidation: “the holding 
of a second election for the national executive,” “alteration in executive power through 
constitutional means,” and survival of democratic regime for an appropriate period of 
time.” Unlike the structural approach, which identified democratic consolidation as 
regime durability, recent cultural studies on democratic consolidation identify democratic 
consolidation as a perceptual change that accepts democracy as the “only the game in 
town” (Diamond 1999). This research employs the number of elections to measure the 
level of democratic consolidation. To calculate the number of elections, previously held 
legislative elections or presidential elections are counted separately, and it varies from 1 
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to 11 in legislative elections and from 1 to 8 in presidential elections. It is notable that 
more than 90 percent of elections examined here are fifth or below, and only about 10 
percent of elections were fifth or higher, which shows the short experience with a 
democratic regime. The variable of democracy is also used to create interaction variables 
with two economic indicators. The coefficient for the interaction variable of the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita is expected to have a positive sign, whereas that of 
inflation to have a negative sign.  
To test the diversionary hypothesis, globalization, a diversionary intervening 
factor, is used as an independent variable. Globalization has been defined as a procedure 
of economic and political integration between states over the globe. Here, the portion of 
trade to the GDP (%), a widely used proxy for the economic integration, is employed to 
measure the degree of globalization. The mean of the globalization is 67.5 percent, and 
its median is 63.2 percent in new democracies. As Hellwig’s (2001: 1141) cross-sectional 
individual-level analysis shows, globalization is expected to dampen the strength of 
economic voting in new democracies because of its diversionary effect on the 
responsibility of domestic economic issues. 
In addition, this research includes government economic boosting efforts 
measured with 1 year lagged general government consumption expenditure (annual % 
growth) from World Development Indicators as a control variable. The general 
government consumption includes “all current expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services by all levels of government, excluding most government enterprises” (World 
Development Indicators-CD Rom). As many political business cycle theorists have 
suggested, economic boosting efforts of incumbent governments are expected to have a 
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positive effect on the vote share of an incumbent (Dahlbert 2002; Franzese 2002; 
Maloney et al. 2003). Finally, three regional dummy variables, Asia, Latin America, and 
Europe, are included to control regional specific factors. 
 
5.3 Results  
As noted earlier, 330 elections are identified as post-founding elections in new 
democracies. Those elections were held under diverse economic conditions. It is well 
known that an increasing number of underdeveloped countries joined the third wave of 
democratization. Appendix 12 reports chronological changes in the average level of 
economic development, measured by GDP per capita, in new democracies as well as the 
all countries since 1974. It shows that economic underdevelopment is not an exceptional 
but a pervasive state among new democracies. As of 2002, the mean GDP per capita of 
those new democracies is USD $2755 (1995 constant), which is much lower than that of 
the whole 177 countries (USD $6568, 1995 constant). Furthermore, there exists a 
significant internal economic variance among new democracies. For example, WDI 
reports that Malawi has the lowest GDP per capita of USD $158, whereas Spain has the 
highest value of USD $18,050 in 2002.  
In the democratization process, most new democracies have experienced serious 
economic recession. Appendix 13 presents the averaged annual growth rates of GDP per 
capita in 70 new democracies before and after democratization. Note that zero refers to 
the first year of democratization. Polity IV’s ending year (EYEAR) of the previous 
regime and the beginning of a regime change to the polity score of 5 or higher is used to 
identify this zero-year of democratization. As Appendix 13 shows, there is a deep drop in 
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economic growth during the period of democratization. Rapid decreases in the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita precede democratic regime transition. The economic 
collapse, however, moderates after the onset of democratization. Finally, the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita turned into positive values in about four years.  
It is useful to examine the ruling cost, which is defined as the expected vote loss 
for the government in the following election, to identify the volatility of election 
outcomes in new democracies. As noted earlier, the mean incumbent vote share is 37.8 
percent. Incumbents gained 34.7 percent of valid votes in legislative elections, as 
opposed to 42.9 percent in presidential elections. The ruling cost of new democracies, 
measured with the mean value of differences in vote shares of incumbents between two 
sequential elections, is about -6.0 percent. Nannestad and Paldam (2002, 18) find that the 
ruling cost of 19 established democracies was -2.5. Compared with established 
democracies, incumbents in new democracies paid more ruling costs. The end of pro-
democratic coalitions and relatively lengthy economic hardships in the initial period of 
democratic transition might facilitate unstable electoral support for incumbents. The 
ruling cost is slightly higher in presidential elections than legislative elections. The mean 
vote share change is about -5.4 percent in legislative elections and -7.1 percent in 
presidential elections.  
Table 5-1 reports empirical test results. The vote share of an incumbent is the 
dependent variable. Only the basic independent variables, the vote share of the incumbent 
parties in the previous election, one-year lagged annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 
one-year lagged inflation, and dummy variables for Asia, Europe, and Latin America, are 
used. Other contextual variables are not included here. Among 330 post-founding 
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elections, only 170 legislative elections and 102 presidential elections have the available 
data for this analysis. See Appendix 10 for the descriptive statistics of data employed. 
Furthermore, four legislative and presidential elections in Congo (2002) and Mali (2002) 
and a legislative election in Haiti (1995) are excluded from this analysis in order to 
minimize the influence of outliers and the plausible distortion of the results. See 
Appendix 14 for the comparison of test results using the original dataset with those 
outliers. 
[Table 5-1 Here] 
The results reported in Table 5-1 shows that the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita has a positive effect on the vote share of an incumbent, controlling for past support 
and regional variables. Model 1 shows that the positive change in the annual growth rate 
of GDP per capita increases the vote share of an incumbent; each one percent growth in 
GDP per capita increases incumbent vote share by .87 percent. Model 2, however, shows 
that inflation has no significant effect on the dependent variable, even if its coefficient is 
in the expected direction. Model 3 also corroborates that increases in the annual growth 
rates of GDP per capita promote electoral support for incumbents, whereas inflation does 
not.  
In presidential elections, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita also has a 
positive effect on the vote share of an incumbent. In Model 4 the coefficient of the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita is 1.03. Economic performance has a consistent effect on 
the electoral support for an incumbent president than ruling party. The higher 
identifiability of the performance of an incumbent president than that of the legislature 
might explain the larger coefficient (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997, 33). Model 6 also 
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confirms that increases in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita promote electoral 
support for incumbents. In Model 5, inflation also has a statistically significant effect on 
the vote share of an incumbent, but the effect of inflation is lost in the hybrid model 6 
that includes the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. When both legislative elections 
and presidential elections are considered together, test results are not noticeably different 
from the prior ones. The annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a consistent and 
significantly positive effect on the vote share of an incumbent, whereas inflation serves as 
a weak proxy for the economic growth variable.  
In short, the test results support the retrospective economic voting hypothesis. 
Economic performance of incumbents does matter for voter support of an incumbent in 
new democracies. The annual growth rate of GDP per capita consistently has a 
statistically significant positive effect on the incumbent vote share. The retrospective 
economic voting works regardless of the type of elections. In either legislative elections 
or presidential elections positive changes in the annual growth rates of the GDP per 
capita increases the vote share of an incumbent.  
Table 5-1 shows that the electoral volatility is not much higher for presidential 
elections than legislative elections. The coefficients of the previous vote share of an 
incumbent in legislative elections are similar to those in presidential elections. Dummy 
variables for each region have significant, negative effects on the dependent variable, 
because Africa is used as the base category here. The results show that the incumbent 
vote share in three different regions is significantly less than that of African countries 
where patrimonial party politics dominates. 
 
 108
5.3.1  Underdevelopment, Limited Democracy, Immature Democracy, and                 
                       Economic Voting 
Table 5-2 reports regression results that show the influence of diverse contextual 
variables on the strengths of economic voting. Several outliers were identified. To 
minimize the influence of these unusual outliers on the analysis, the 1995 legislative 
election in Armenia, the 2002 legislative election in Mali, and 2000 legislative and 
presidential elections in Mongolia are excluded from this analysis. The dependent 
variable is incumbent vote share (percentage of vote for the incumbent president or party). 
One-year lagged variables of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita and logged 
inflation (+10) are used as economic variables to see the basic economic voting function. 
Four variables, including the level of economic development, the level of democracy, the 
number of elections, and globalization, and their interaction terms with the annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita and logged inflation are also used as independent variables. One-
year lagged change in government consumption is also included to see the impact of 
economic boosting efforts on electoral outcomes. Finally, three dummy variables for Asia, 
Europe, and Latin America are included.  
[Table 5-2 Here] 
Table 5-2 reports regression results for legislative elections (Model 1, 2, 3), 
presidential elections (Model 4, 5, 6), and both legislative and presidential elections 
(Model 7, 8, 9) separately. In each set of models, annual growth rate of GDP per capita, 
inflation rate, or both annual growth rate of GDP per capita and inflation rate are used in 
order. For example, Model 1 includes only the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, but 
excludes inflation rate. Model 2 includes inflation, but excludes the annual growth rate of 
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GDP per capita. In Model 3 both annual growth rate of GDP per capita and inflation rate 
are included.  
Test results for legislative elections fail to provide any strong evidence to support 
any of the four main hypotheses of economic voting: the asymmetric issue salience 
hypothesis, the democratic accountability hypothesis, the political learning hypothesis, 
and the diversionary hypothesis. In Model 1 the interaction term between economic 
development and annual growth rate of GDP per capita has no significant effect on the 
vote share of an incumbent. Other interaction terms between annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita and three contextual variables, including the level of democracy, the number of 
elections, and globalization, also have no significant effect on the dependent variable. In 
Model 2 and Model 3, test results are similar. Four interaction terms between contextual 
variables and logged inflation rate have no statistically significant effect on the vote share 
of an incumbent. Other independent variables, such as the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita, the level of economic development, the level of democracy, and the number of 
elections also have no consistent significant effect on the dependent variable. Inflation 
rate, however, has a statistically significant negative effect on the vote share of an 
incumbent.  
Test results for presidential elections reported in Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6, 
are somewhat different from those for legislative elections. In Model 4, globalization’s 
interaction term with GDP per capita growth rate has no statistically significant effect on 
the dependent variable. Democracy’s interaction term with the annual economic growth 
rate also has no significant impact on the vote share of an incumbent. It is, however, 
notable that interaction terms of two contextual variables, the level of economic 
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development and the number of elections, have a statistically significant relationship in 
the expected direction. The interaction term of economic development and GDP per 
capita growth rate has a coefficient of 1.94. As noted earlier, a trichotomous classification 
of the level of economic development is adopted here. When the GDP per capita is 
between USD $1,000 and USD $3,000, a one point increase in the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita increases the vote share of an incumbent by 0.65 (1.94*2-4.53) percent. 
The strength of economic voting measured with the marginal change of the vote share of 
an incumbent increases to 1.29 (1.94*3-4.53) percent, when GDP per capita is more than 
USD $3,000. The interaction term of the number of elections and GDP per capita growth 
rate also has a statistically significant impact on the vote share of an incumbent, which 
corroborates the political learning hypothesis. In Model 4 the coefficient of the 
interaction term is 0.99. It means that one additional election increases the impact of GDP 
per capita growth rate on the vote share of an incumbent by 0.99 percent. Model 5 shows, 
however, that any interaction term with inflation has no statistically significant impact on 
the vote share of an incumbent. Model 6 shows that two interaction terms with GDP per 
capita growth rate have a significant positive impact on the dependent variable, while 
others do not.  
When both presidential and legislative elections are considered in Model 7, Model 
8, and Model 9, test results are not notably different from those in prior models. The 
interaction term of the number of elections and GDP per capita growth rate continues to 
have a statistically significant impact on the vote share of an incumbent in Model 7. 
However, interaction terms of three contextual variables including the number of 
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elections, level of democracy, and globalization have no consistently significant effect on 
the dependent variable. 
 In sum, test results for legislative elections do not support the hypotheses of 
economic voting. None of the interaction terms of four contextual variables, i.e., the level 
of economic development, the level of democracy, the number of elections, and 
globalization, has any consistent significant influence on the vote share of an incumbent. 
It fails to show that there is a linear effect of those contextual variables on the strength of 
economic voting in legislative elections. Two interaction variables of economic 
development and the number of elections, however, have a consistent significant impact 
on the dependent variable in presidential elections. This supports the asymmetric issue 
salience hypothesis and the political learning hypothesis. However, any empirical test 
results reported in Table 5-2 support either the democratic accountability hypothesis or 
the diversionary hypothesis.  
 
5.3.2 Non-linear Impact of Contextual Variables on the Strength of Economic  
Voting 
The previous section examined whether and how the contextual variables, such as 
economic development, democracy, democratic consolidation, and globalization, affect 
the strength of economic voting as a whole. The results of simple regression with 
interaction variables fails to find strong evidence that supports the asymmetric issue 
salience hypothesis, the democratic accountability hypothesis, the political learning 
hypothesis, or the diversionary hypothesis. The null or weak impact implies that such 
contextual variables might not be linearly associated with the strength of economic voting.  
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To examine the robustness of the prior test results, this research employed a 
different strategy, in which the interaction terms are excluded but examined cases are 
controlled to compare the patterns of the economic voting in diverse conditions. First, 
original values of three variables, including the level of economic development, the level 
of democracy, and democratic consolidation, are recoded to create ordinal variables. And 
then, each dataset of the low, middle, or high level of those categories is adopted 
separately to test four hypotheses of economic voting: the asymmetric issue salience 
hypothesis, the democratic accountability hypothesis, and the political learning 
hypothesis. Compared with the prior tests using interaction variables, this research 
strategy may not only reduce the plausible multicollinearity problems, but also help 
identifying non-linear influence of contextual variables on the strength of economic 
voting.  
[Table 5-3 Here] 
Table 5-3 reports test results based on different levels of economic development, 
measured with the GDP per capita of WDI. In each model, the same variables are 
employed to examine whether economic voting function is systematically different under 
three categorized economic conditions: less than USD $1000, between $1001 and $3,000, 
and more than $3,000. Note that both coefficients and standard errors of the previous vote 
share of an incumbent, and of dummy variables for Asia, Europe, and Latin America, are 
not reported for the convenience of comparison.  
Model 1 shows that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a significant 
positive effect on the vote share of an incumbent in each subset of legislative elections. 
However, there exists variation in the strength of its impact among them. When GDP per 
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capita is less than USD $1,000, the coefficient on the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita is 0.90. It slightly decreases to 0.62, when GDP per capita is between $1,001 and 
$3,000. However, it increases to 1.12, when GDP per capita is larger than $3,000. Model 
3 also shows that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has the strongest impact on 
electoral outcomes in those countries whose GDP per capita is more than $3,000. As 
Model 2 shows, however, inflation rate has no significant impact on the dependent 
variable in any level of economic development. 
The strength of economic voting also varies among different subsets of 
presidential elections. In Model 4, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a 
statistically significant effect on the vote share of an incumbent at the level of .05, only 
when the GDP per capita is more than $3,000. Furthermore, the coefficient of the 
variable is the highest when presidential elections meet the level of economic 
development. In Model 6, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita also has the highest 
coefficient and its impact is statistically significant. Model 5 and Model 6 show that 
inflation rate has no significant negative impact on the vote share of an incumbent in 
every level of economic development.  
When both legislative and presidential elections are considered, as Model 7 and 
Model 9 shows, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a significant impact on the 
dependent variable in the middle or high level of economic development group. Again, 
the coefficient of the variable is the largest when the level of economic development is 
high. Similar to test results for presidential elections, inflation has no significant effect on 
the vote share of an incumbent in every level of economic development.  
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Test results in Table 5-3, first, corroborate that a certain level of economic wealth is not a 
prerequisite for economic voting in new democracies. Economic performance of an 
incumbent, measured by annual growth rate of GDP per capita and inflation rate, has a 
significant effect on election outcomes in underdeveloped countries as well as developed 
countries. Economic voting is not predicated on having a certain level of economic 
wealth. 
Second, the level of economic development has an asymmetric effect on the 
strength of economic voting in two different types of elections. The results show that 
economic wealth promotes economic voting in presidential elections. The higher the 
economic wealth, the stronger the economic voting. However, the impact of GDP per 
capita on the strength of economic voting is not correspondent to the level of economic 
development in legislative elections. This finding is also compatible with the null impact 
of the interaction terms between economic development and the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita reported in Table 5-2.  
Third, test results, however, show that a consistent influence of the economic 
performance on electoral outcomes can be found only in relatively wealthier countries. 
The annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a positive effect on the vote share of an 
incumbent in either legislative or presidential elections in those countries where GDP per 
capita is more than $3,000. Furthermore, when economic wealth meets the condition, the 
coefficients of the variable are the highest in each model. As Table 5-2 shows, economic 
development is not linearly associated with the strength of economic voting in legislative 
elections. However, it does not mean that the level of economic development does not 
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matter. Test results show that economic wealth provides positive circumstances for 
economic voting.   
This finding partially supports Pacek et al.’s (1995b) argument that the higher the 
economic wealth, the stronger the economic voting for the high sensitivity to economic 
performances in highly industrialized countries. However, the stronger effect of the 
annual growth of GDP per capita growth rate in poor countries with a low level of 
economic development than that in moderately poor countries with a middle level of 
economic development supports the idea that economic issues may have gained much 
more attention from voters in poor countries, where basic satisfaction with economic 
conditions is unrealized, than from those in wealthy countries.  
[Table 5-4 Here] 
Table 5-4 reports test results in different groups of democratic regime. In each 
model, the same variables are employed to compare the strength of economic voting 
under three different groups of democratic regimes: the score of democracy is less than 7, 
between 7 and 8, and more than 8. Here, again, both coefficients and standard errors of 
the previous vote share of an incumbent and of dummy variables for Asia, Europe, and 
Latin America, are not reported for the convenience of comparison. 
Test results show that the nexus between economic performance and electoral 
support for incumbents relies on the level of democracy. Model 1 shows that when a 
political regime stays in the low level of democracy, the annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita has no significant effect on the vote share of an incumbent in legislative elections. 
Only if the democracy score is 7 or higher, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has 
a statically significant positive effect on the vote share of incumbents. The coefficient of 
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the economic variable, .74 decreases to .61, when the level of democracy moves from 
low to middle. And then it rises to .94 in the high level of democracy. The fluctuation of 
the coefficient explains the null impact of democracy on the strength of economic voting 
in legislative elections, which is reported earlier in Table 5-2. Model 3 also shows that 
the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a significant positive impact on the vote 
share of an incumbent when the democracy score is 7 or higher. As Model 2 shows, 
inflation rate has a significant negative effect on the dependent variable in the low level 
of democracy. In Model 3 however, the significant effect of inflation rate disappears. In 
presidential elections inflation rate has a significant negative effect when the levels of 
democracy is between 7 and 8.   
When both legislative and presidential elections are considered together, test 
results are not notably different from those in prior models. In Model 7, the positive 
impact of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita is found when the level of democracy 
is middle or high. The positive effect of the variable is highest when the level of 
democracy is high. In Model 9, the annual growth rate has a significant positive impact 
on the dependent variable only when the level of democracy is high. In Model 8 inflation 
rate has a significant negative effect on the dependent variable when the level of 
democracy is middle. In model 9, however, inflation rate has no significant effect in 
every level of democracy.  
Test results show that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a significant 
effect on the vote share of an incumbent in legislative elections only when the level of 
democracy is high. Furthermore, the economic effect of the annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita is the strongest under the same condition. It is, however, notable that the 
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economic effect on electoral support for an incumbent is not consistent in the lower level 
of democracy. It shows that there exists a non-linear positive effect of democracy on the 
strength of economic voting. 
To examine the influence of the democratic consolidation on electoral outcomes, 
post-founding elections are divided into three groups: the first or the second elections, 
third elections, fourth or additional elections for the legislatures or presidency. Test 
results for each group are reported in Table 5-5. In general, test results show that 
economic voting is relative weak in the low level of democratic consolidation measured 
with the number of elections. The strength of economic voting is relatively higher in the 
third elections.  
[Table 5-5 Here] 
In Model 1 the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a statistically significant 
positive effect on the vote share of an incumbent in each group of legislative elections. 
The coefficient of the variable is 0.76 in the earlier elections, i.e., the first or second 
legislative elections, and it increases to 1.4 in the third elections. However, it slightly 
decreases to 0.79 in fourth or additional legislative elections. Model 3 of the table also 
shows that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has the highest coefficient of 1.28 in 
the third elections, whereas it has the lowest coefficient of .57 in the earlier elections. 
Inflation also has the highest significant negative effect on the dependent variable in the 
third elections. As model 2 and Model 3 show, inflation rate has no significant impact on 
the dependent variable in every level of democratic consolidation.  
Test results for presidential elections reported in Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6 
also confirm that economic voting is relatively weak in the earlier elections. Model 4 
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shows that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has no statistically significant effect 
on the vote share of an incumbent in the first or second presidential elections. However, it 
has a statistically significant positive effect on the dependent variable in the third 
presidential elections. The coefficient on the variable, furthermore, increases from 1.52 to 
3.90 in later presidential elections. Model 5 shows that inflation rate also has a 
statistically significant and the strongest effect on the dependent variable in the third 
presidential elections. However, the negative effect is not consistent and disappears in 
Model 6.  
When both legislative elections and presidential elections are considered, test 
results also show the limited influence of economic voting in the earlier elections. Only 
the third or later elections, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a significant 
effect on the vote share of an incumbent. Inflation also has a significant negative effect 
on the dependent variable in the third elections, but it disappears in the fourth or 
additional elections. 
These test results show that, first, economic voting has very limited effect on 
electoral outcomes in the earlier period of democratic consolidation. As Chapter 4 of this 
research has shown, voters are less likely to ascribe the responsibility of economic 
conditions to incumbents in the period of democratization. Voters seem to be 
sophisticated enough to understand that incumbents have less responsibility for the 
devastating economic conditions. They do not strongly punish incumbents for the 
economic transitional costs by withdrawing electoral support for incumbents.  
Second, it also finds that economic performance of an incumbent becomes a 
significant factor of electoral outcomes only in the third or later elections. Even if many 
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scholars use the second election as a critical juncture of democratic consolidation, more 
time is needed to normalize economic voting in new democracies. Not until the third 
elections were held, did the economic performance of an incumbent have consistently 
significant effect on the vote share of an incumbent.  
Third, it is notable that the timing of the normalization of economic voting is a 
little bit late in presidential elections. The strongest influence of GDP per capita growth 
rate is found in the fourth or later elections, rather than the third presidential elections. 
The late uprising of economic voting in presidential elections might arise from the 
personalization of party politics under presidential systems that suppress electoral 
accountability based on the performance of incumbents in new democracies.  
   
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how economic and political conditions, such as the 
level of economic development, the level of democracy, democratic consolidation, and 
globalization, affect the strength of economic voting in new democracies. Post founding 
elections in 70 new democracies are included to test five hypotheses, i.e., the 
retrospective economic voting hypothesis, the asymmetric issue salience hypothesis, the 
democratic accountability hypothesis, the political learning hypothesis, and the 
diversionary hypothesis. It finds that the economic performance of incumbents 
consistently affects election outcomes, supporting the retrospective economic voting 
hypothesis. In either legislative or presidential elections, the annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita or inflation promotes or reduces electoral support for incumbents, respectively. 
Elections provide a chance to punish or reward their incumbents based on economic 
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performance, and economic voting functions as an instrument of democratic 
accountability in new democracies. 
This research, however, fails to provide strong evidence to support the other 
hypotheses. The strength of economic voting does not simply correspond to the changes 
in the level of economic development, the level of democracy, democratic consolidation, 
or globalization. However, at the least, this research finds that there exists an “economic 
voting zone” in which election outcomes are more constrained by economic conditions: a 
significant effect of the annual growth rate of GDP is consistently found only in high 
levels of economic wealth and democracy. In addition, it finds that the third election is a 
critical election for the normalization of economic voting, in that economic performance 
of incumbents has a significant effect on election outcomes only after the election. These 
findings show that there exist non-linear effects of economic development, the level of 
democracy, and democratic consolidation on the strength of economic voting.  
The present research highlights the impact of economic and political constraints 
on the strength of economic voting. It, however, does not delve into the ways in which 
diverse institutions in new democracies affect the strength of economic voting. Although 
this chapter examines whether variance in the level of democracy and democratization 
account for the dynamics of economic voting, there is still a need for more specific 
research on the ways in which democratic institutions affect economic voting. The next 
chapter may provide important clues to the questions related to the variance in the 
strength of economic voting under diversified democratic institutions. 
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Chapter 6 
Consensual Institutions and Economic Voting: 
Does Clarity of Responsibility Matter?  
 
Prior chapters have shown that the economic performance of an incumbent is an 
important factor of electoral outcomes in new democracies. The strength of economic 
voting, however, varies across nations and over time and relies on diverse economic and 
political conditions. Chapter 5 shows that economic development, democracy, and 
democratic consolidation provide a positive circumstance for economic voting. Economic 
voting is moderately stronger in economically developed, highly democratic, and 
consolidated new democracies. This chapter, as a next step, examines how various 
arrangements of democratic institutions, especially majoritarian or consensual institutions 
described by Lijphart (1999), affect the strength of economic voting.  
Recently, an increasing number of studies examined whether economic voting 
behavior is constrained by institutional arrangements that intensify or attenuate voters’ 
ascription of responsibility to incumbents (Paldam 1991; Powell and Whitten 1993; 
Whitten and Palmer 1999). Based on the clarity of responsibility theory, some scholars 
have argued that voters under political and institutional contexts, in which incumbent 
responsibility for economic performance is not clear, are less likely to be driven by 
economic conditions (Duch and Palmer 2002; Palmer and Whitten 2003; Samuels 2004; 
Anderson 2004).  
The theoretical and empirical attempts to incorporate the influence of institutions 
into the analysis of electoral behavior, however, have not been developed fully. 
Methodologically, the limited spatial scope of prior research based on advanced Western 
democracies makes it difficult to examine how the variance in political institutions affects 
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economic voting. For example, Palmer and Whitten (1993) analyzed election outcomes in 
19 OECD countries in which only two countries, the United States and France, have 
presidential systems. Samuels (2004) analyzed election outcomes in 23 democracies with 
presidential systems. Theoretically, the existing studies on economic voting highlight 
only institutional impact on the identification of incumbent responsibility. It should be, 
however, noted that democratic institutions shape not only the perceptual capacity to 
identify sanctioning targets, but also the motivational strength to punish or reward 
incumbents based on their economic performance by constraining political 
responsiveness and representation.  
This chapter is an attempt to fill the gap by incorporating the analysis of the 
mechanism of democratic institutions that may constrain economic voting in new 
democracies. Democracies differ greatly from nation to nation. As Huntington (1991) 
argued, democracies are similar only in that they are not authoritarian. This research 
examines the influence of four consensual institutions, the parliamentary system, the 
proportional system, the bicameral system, and the federal system, on the strength of 
economic voting. The clarity of responsibility theory claims that majoritarian institutions, 
in which executive power tends to be concentrated in ruling majorities, promote 
economic voting, are discussed. Both legislative and presidential post-founding elections 
in 70 new democracies are analyzed. By specifying institutional conditions of economic 
voting, this research may improve our understanding of the nexus between economic 
conditions and voting decisions.  
This research finds that majoritarian institutions have no significant positive 
impact on the strength of economic voting. None of the four individual consensual 
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institutions, nor a combined index of institutional consensuality shows a statistically 
significant impact on the strength of economic voting. Based on the results that do not 
support the clarity of responsibility theory, this research argues that majoritarian 
institutional arrangements do not make a notable difference in the strength of economic 
voting in new democracies. Power concentration to incumbents might harm the efficacy 
of electoral sanctioning as an instrument of promoting democratic accountability and 
nullify the positive effect of majoritarian institutions on the strength of economic voting. 
The following section reviews literature regarding the role of institutional 
mediations on the nexus between economic conditions and election outcomes and 
discusses the viability of the clarity of responsibility theory. In section 6-2, a research 
design to examine whether majoritarian institutions affect the strength of economic 
voting is explained. In section 6-3, test results are reported, and, in the conclusion, basic 
findings are summarized and their implications for further research are discussed.  
 
6.1 Institutional Arrangements and Economic Voting 
Recent studies on economic voting paid much attention to the impact of diverse 
institutional contexts on voter choice and electoral outcomes (Whitten and Palmer 1999; 
Duch and Palmer 2002; Palmer and Whitten 2003). Powell and Whitten (1993: 392) 
argue that the solution of the inconsistent economic effects on election outcomes across 
nations lies in more attention to the “electoral context in which citizens choose and the 
policymaking context within which they evaluate the performance of incumbents.”  
The currently accepted view is that institutions influence economic voting only 
under conditions of higher levels of clarity of responsibility. Powell and Whitten (1993) 
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examine how five contextual variables, the presence of “bicameral systems in which 
opposition parties controls a second legislative chamber,” inclusive committee systems in 
the legislature, the lack of “voting cohesion of the major governing parties,” minority 
governments, and coalition governments, affect the changes in the percentage of the vote 
for an incumbent governing party. Using a dichotomous index of the clarity of 
responsibility based on these variables, they find that a comparative measure of GDP 
growth rate has a significant effect on the dependent variable only if the responsibility of 
a ruling party is clear. They conclude “both positive and negative effects of economic 
performance will be diminished in countries where responsibility is widely diffused” 
(Powell and Whitten 1993: 399).  
Analyzing surveys in eight European countries, Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 
(2002: 409) also find that a general economic situation of voters has a positive effect on 
the likelihood of voting for a party in government only in a cluster of countries, the UK, 
France, Ireland, and Germany, where the clarity of responsibility is high. They use an 
index of clarity of responsibility based on four contextual indicators, “the proportion of 
seats held by the largest party in the government among all seats held by government 
parties,” “the ideological cohesion of the governing coalition,” “the longevity of the 
government,” and “the number of political parties.”  
Some scholars take issue with this view and argue that clarity of responsibility has 
a limited impact on the strength of economic voting. Lopez de Nava (2004a: 5), for 
example, argues that the shift to the institutional approach led to a wrong conclusion, that 
economic voting could be found only in the context of higher clarity. Criticizing literature 
rejecting the occurrence of economic voting under a lower clarity of responsibility 
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context, she argues that economic voting behavior could be found regardless of the 
institutional clarity of responsibility. Lopez de Nava’s empirical results show that 
interaction terms between a clarity index, measured with the presence of minority 
government, the number of parties in coalition government, and the adoption of a 
proportional electoral system, and each of two economic variables, including inflation 
and GDP per capita growth, do not have a statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of the reelection of an incumbent. She argues that methodological problems, 
such as misspecification of economic variables and of dependent variables and the 
influence of outliers, may distort Paldam and Whitten’s (1993) finding of no robust 
economic voting in the political context of lower clarity.  
Similar to Lopez de Nava, Royed, Leyden, and Borrelli (2000: 677) insist that 
there is no robust association between institutional clarity and the strength of economic 
voting. They show that economic performance measured together with unemployment 
and inflation has similar effects on the change in the vote share of an incumbent in 
coalition governments and single-party governments. Even if economic voting is stronger 
in high-clarity countries (coalition governments) than in low-clarity countries (single 
governments), they argue, there is no notable difference between those two clusters. They 
suggest that political contexts other than the clarity of responsibility should be examined 
for the explanation of the unstable findings that support the clarity of responsibility 
theory.  
 
6.1.1 Causal Chains of the Clarity of Responsibility Theory 
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The basic causal chains of the clarity of responsibility theory are displayed in 
Figure 6-1. First, the clarity of responsibility theory presumes that institutional 
arrangements shape the power distribution among political actors. Second, it also 
presumes that the clarity of responsibility depends on power dispersion between 
incumbents and opposition parties. The higher the level of power concentration to 
incumbents, the lower the difficulty of identification of the responsibility (Powell and 
Whitten 1993: 398; Royed et al. 2003: 150).  Powell and Whitten (1993: 398) argue that 
voter assignment of responsibility for economic performance to incumbents reflects the 
“coherence and control the government can exert over that policy.” Based on these two 
premises, the clarity of responsibility theory claims that the clearer the responsibility, the 
higher the strength of economic voting (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 
1999).  
[Figure 6-1  Here] 
Empirical research to test the viability of the core claim, therefore, has focused on 
a set of contextual variables related to ruling governments’ power resources, including 
the presence of coalition governments, majority or minority governments, and bicameral 
oppositions, and so on (Powell and Whitten 1993; Samuels 2004; Samuels and Hellwig 
2004). However, such power-resource-based studies delimit institutional constraints on 
economic voting to electorate’s capacity to identify the responsibility of incumbents. As a 
result, the clarity of responsibility theory often leads to an invalid conclusion that 
institutional arrangements encouraging power dispersion dampen economic voting 
(Nadeau et al. 2002: 419). As Royed et al. (2003: 150) summarized correctly, advocates 
of the clarity of responsibility theory have argued that “[electoral] accountability can 
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exist only when there is a greater concentration of power,” and that “a significant amount 
of power-sharing” causes the lack of economic voting. 
Political institutions affect not only power resources of government, but also 
efficacy of economic voting as an instrument of democratic accountability by 
constraining responsiveness and representativeness of the government. Analyzing the 
relationship between public opinion and public policy, Hutchings (2003: 4) insists that 
legislators become responsive only if the latent preferences of their constituents, 
described as a “loose collection of ‘sleeping giants,’” are activated. For the same reason, 
citizens become economic voters only if their punishment or reward is an effective 
instrument with which to make politicians responsive and accountable. As Fearon (1999: 
56) argued, the extent to which voters feel economic voting is an efficient instrument to 
sanction non-responsive incumbents may determine the strength of economic voting. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine how political institutions affect not only voters’ 
identification of responsible targets, but also the efficacy of electoral sanctioning to 
improve our understanding of economic voting. 
 
6.1.2 Majoritarian or Consensual Institutions and Economic Voting 
It is well known that Lijphart (1999: 1, 2) divides democracies into two patterns: a 
majoritarian model and a consensus model. He contrasts two choices to solve the basic 
dilemma of democracy, “Who will do the governing and to whose interests should the 
government be responsive?” as follows: “the majority of the people” and “as many 
people as possible.” He insists that the consensus model “accepts majority rule only as a 
minimum requirement” and seeks “broad participation in government” (p. 2). 
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Furthermore, he distinguishes the majoritarian model from the consensus model because 
the latter tries to “share, disperse, and limit power,” rather than concentrate political 
power (p. 2). Political institutions are distinguished based on the principles of those 
models. Parliamentary systems, proportional electoral rules, bicameral systems, and 
federal systems constitute the consensus institutions. Presidential systems, non-
proportional electoral rules, unicameral systems, and non-federal systems constitute the 
consensus institutions.  
In a presidential system, executive power is concentrated in one person, who 
enjoys a strictly prescribed period without legislative confidence (Lijphart 1999: 117). 
Furthermore, contrary to the flexible and frequent government formation in parliamentary 
systems, the fixed term of the presidency characterizes the stable government formation 
in presidential systems. Disproportional electoral formulas, such as majority and plurality 
methods, systematically “advantage the larger parties and disadvantage the smaller 
parties” and promote two-party systems (Lijphart 1999: 167). On the contrary, federal 
systems and bicameral systems promote decentralization of power and representation of 
the constituent regions (Lijphart 1999: 187).   
As noted earlier, these characteristics of majoritarian or consensual institutions 
are deeply related to the strength of economic voting. As the clarity of responsibility 
theory claims, power concentration to a president, a majority party, and central 
government in majoritarian systems may lower the costs of gathering information and 
promote economic voting. On the contrary, power dispersion in consensus institutions 
may affect the economic voting in the opposite direction.  
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Advocates of the majoritarian model insist that institutions of the consensus 
model are weak in providing accurate appraisal of performance. They commonly 
emphasize that stable government formation and power concentration help the clear 
identification of policy responsibility. However, it should be noted that they do not 
exclusively rely on the power-resource based claim. Rather, they underline the direct 
election of the highest executive and corresponding accountability. Shugart and 
Mainwaring (1997: 33) emphasize that “identifiability,” which refers to “voters’ ability to 
make an informed choice before elections, based on their ability to assess the likely range 
of postelection government,” is a prerequisite of accountability. For them, “the more 
straightforward the connection between the choices made by the electorate at the ballot 
box and the expectations to which policymakers are held, the greater the electoral 
accountability.” Samuels and Shugart (2003: 40, 41) also argue that “direct accountability 
between voters and elected officials” is one of the critical benefits of presidentialism.  
Therefore, the presidential system, a core component of the majoritarian systems, may 
provide more information about incumbent performance than the parliamentary system, 
thus strengthening economic voting.  
There has been little doubt that the clarity of responsibility and the direct 
accountability in majoritarian institutions may help voters’ clear identification of 
responsibility. However, it is still unknown whether the majoritarian institutions 
strengthen economic voting. It is plausible that limited representation of minorities and 
lower responsiveness of ruling majorities in majoritarian institutions may discourage 
voters from using their ballots to discipline incumbents and weaken electoral punishing 
or rewarding for economic performance. As a result, these negative effects of 
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majoritarian institutions may nullify or overwhelm the positive influence on the strength 
of economic voting. For example, the frequent formation of coalition government and the 
high level of political representation in consensual democracies make it difficult to 
identify the responsible targets for votes. However, the flexible responsiveness and high 
representativeness increases the efficacy of economic sanctioning. As many argued, 
consensual institutions promote two prerequisites of democratic accountability: appraisal 
of incumbent performance and electoral sanctioning power. The stability of democratic 
regime and the lack of the stalemate between an elected president and a legislature under 
parliamentary systems help identify the responsibility of incumbents. Furthermore, higher 
proportionality, decentralization of power, and responsiveness under consensual 
institutions make electoral sanctioning more efficient. Therefore, it may be difficult to 
argue that majoritarian institutions make a notable difference in the strength of economic 
voting.  
The notion that lower democratic responsiveness and representativeness in the 
majoritarian system undermines the efficiency of economic sanction and the strength of 
voters’ intention to sanction incumbents leads to a hypothesis that consensual democracy 
has a positive intervening effect on the strength of economic voting. A statistical test 
investigates the clarity of responsibility theory in a comparative, new democracy 
perspective. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  individual consensual institutions (the parliamentary system, the  
proportional electoral system, the bicameral system, and the federal 
system) promote economic voting. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  the higher the consensuality of government institutions, the stronger  
the economic voting. 
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6.2 Research Design 
This chapter examines presidential and legislative elections in 70 countries that 
experienced democratic transition. Following the case selection rules of previous chapter 
5, it excludes two types of elections: constitutional assembly elections and founding 
elections.  
As the main theme of this chapter is to estimate the impact of consensual or 
majoritarian institutional arrangements on economic voting behavior, it uses the vote 
share of an incumbent party or president as a dependent variable. This research includes 
only one indicator of economic performance: GDP per capita growth rate. GDP per 
capita is expected to have the positive effect supported in previous chapters. Four 
institutional variables, parliamentary system, proportional electoral system, bicameral 
system, and federal system, which represent the consensus democratic institutions are 
included. The basic model of economic voting is as follows:  
 
Ivote (c) = β0+Ivote (p) β1 + GDPgrowthc-1β2 + Presidentialcβ3 + Proportionalc β4 + 
Bicameralc β5  + Federalc β6+ GDPgrowth c-1 * Presidentialc β7 + GDPgrowth c-1 * Proportionalc 
β8+ GDPgrowth c-1 * Bicameralc β9 + GDPgrowth c-1 * Federalc β10 + Asiacβ11 + 
LatinAmericacβ12 + Europecβ13 + ec 
 
Ivote is the vote percentage for an incumbent party or president. c denotes the year 
of current election. p denotes the year of previous election. β 0  is the notation of the 
intercept, and β1~13  are coefficients. e represents the error term. GDPgrowth is the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita. Presidential is a dummy variable for the presidential 
 132
system (=1). Proportional is a dummy variable for the proportional system (=1). 
Bicameral and Federal are dummy variables for the bicameral system (=1) and the federal 
system (=1) respectively. Asia, LatinAmerica, and Europe are dummy variables for 
regions. Africa is used as the base category here. It should be also noted that the same 
model is used for the regression of legislative elections, presidential elections, and both 
legislative and presidential elections, separately.  
The parliamentary system refers to a political system under which a premier has 
the highest executive power. The chief executive (prime minister) of the parliamentary 
democracy is elected by the parliament and the “terms of office are not fixed” (Shugart 
and Mainwaring 1997: 14).  Unlike the parliamentary system, the presidential system is 
defined as a political system under which the “chief executive [president] is popularly 
elected and the terms of office of both president and assembly are fixed” (Shugart and 
Mainwaring 1997: 14). There are two hybrid forms of regime types including the 
president-parliamentarism in which a popularly elected president requires parliamentary 
approval and the premier-presidentialism in which presidents are elected by the 
parliament.  
The electoral system is defined as a “method of converting votes cast by electors 
into seats in a legislature” (Bogdanor 1983: 1). The electoral system has been regarded as 
an important determinant of electoral behavior and party systems. Advocates of 
consensual democracy argue that the proportionality of an electoral system is positively 
correlated with economic voting: the more proportional an electoral system, the higher 
the likelihood of economic voting behavior. On the other hand, advocates for the clarity 
of responsibility theory argue that majoritarian electoral systems, which encourage two-
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party systems, promote economic voting for its positive impact on the one-party 
government formation.  
Scholars have developed a diverse classification of electoral systems (Beck, 
Klarke, Keefer and Walsh 2001; Golder 2005; Lundell et al. 2003; Endersby and 
Krieckhaus 2004). The Database of Political Institutions classifies them into two: (1) 
plurality and (2) proportional representation (Beck et al. 2001). Golder (2005) classified 
electoral systems into four different types: majoritarian, proportional, multi-tier, and 
mixed electoral systems. Lundell et al. (2003) created an electoral formula with eight 
different categories: plurality, alternative vote, second ballot, single–non-transferable 
vote, single transferable vote, proportional, mixed member majoritarian, mixed-member 
proportional, and mixed system with single-tier districting. Contrary to such a categorical 
approach, Birch (2005: 287) measured electoral systems with the “proportion of single-
member seats in the system.”  
However, it is common that proportionality is the main criterion of classifying 
electoral systems. Following Endersby and Krieckhaus (2004), this research divides 
electoral systems for legislative elections into four categories. The plurality system 
includes first past the post and party bloc vote systems. The majority system includes 
two-round systems and alternative vote systems. The semi-proportional system includes 
single non-transferable vote, parallel, mixed-member proportional systems, and, finally, 
the proportional system includes list systems and single transferable vote systems. Plural 
system is used as the base category.  
The bicameral system, coded as 1, should weaken economic voting because of the 
dispersion of policy decision-making power between lower and upper chambers. A 
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bicameral system promotes shared responsibility of economic outcomes between two 
chambers (Lopez de Nava 2004b). However, it is also plausible that a bicameral system 
may promote economic voting by promoting empowerment of voters and governmental 
responsiveness. A unicameral system is coded as zero. Here, tricameral systems in 
Croatia (1990) and Slovenia (1990) are also coded as 1 because of power dispersion.  
The federal system should reduce economic voting because of dispersion of 
policy responsibilities to regional governments. As Anderson (2004: 2) pointed out, the 
presence of multi-level authority held by sub-national institutions may undermine voters’ 
attribution to the governing party. By focusing on the “vertical clarity” of responsibility, 
he found that decentralization undermines the strength of economic voting (p. 10). 
Federalism is defined as a system in which “neither the federal nor the constituent units 
of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other, each is empowered to deal 
directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive, and taxing powers 
and each is directly elected by its citizens” (Watts 1999: 7, quoted in Anderson 2004: 5). 
Scholars have developed diverse measures of decentralization. For example, Anderson 
(2004: 5) created a combined index using four indicators including the presence of a 
federal constitution, the presence of elections to regional levels of government, the extent 
of territorial autonomy, and fiscal decentralization. In a similar vein, Jacobson (1991: 33) 
argued that decentralized electoral politics reduces the effect of economic conditions on 
election outcomes.  However, it is also plausible that the higher consensuality of federal 
systems reduces the impact of non-economic issues on electoral choice and promotes 
economic voting. A federal system is coded as 1, whereas a non-federal system is coded 
as 0.  
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To examine the impact of political contexts on the strength of economic voting, 
scholars have developed diverse indices to measure the level of clarity of responsibility. 
The existing measurement of the clarity of responsibility, in general, focuses on the 
nature of government formation. Despite the presence of diversely developed indices 
using institutional and circumstantial variables, whether a president or premier’s party 
shares the political power of economic policy decision-making with other parties has 
been a criterion of measuring the clarity of responsibility. The original form of the clarity 
of responsibility theory suggests that different types of power distributions for economic 
policy decision-making may affect the identification of those “who are responsible for the 
economic conditions,” which, in turn, may affect the strength of economic voting.  
Such an index, however, has hindered full development of the clarity measures, 
because existing indices of clarity do not incorporate diverse non-governmental factors, 
such as electoral systems and presidential systems. Furthermore, using such a clarity 
index may not show the impact of the individual effects of consensual institutions and 
contextual variables on economic voting beyond the stories that the clarity of 
responsibility theory tells us. 
To examine the impact of consensual institutions on the strength of economic 
voting, this research uses a combined index of consensuality based on four essential 
institutions, parliamentary systems, proportional electoral systems, bicameral systems, 
and federal systems. To generate the index of consensuality, first, each individual 
institutional variable is recoded as a dichotomous variable. Parliamentary systems (=1) 
include those political systems with an indirectly elected president, whereas presidential 
systems incorporate any type of presidential system under which a president is directly 
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elected. For the binary coding of electoral systems, proportional, (semi) proportional and 
majority systems are coded as 1, whereas the plurality system is coded as 0. Second, four 
institutional variables are summed to generate an index of consensuality. As a result, the 
most consensual cases have the highest value of 4, whereas the most majoritarian cases 
have the lowest value of 0.  As the clarity of responsibility theory expects, the index of 
consensuality may have negative impact on the economic voting due to the dispersion of 
the political power.  
Diverse institutional arrangements have been identified among 70 new 
democracies examined here. Unlike old democracies, new democracies more often adopt 
majoritarian systems. Table 6-1 presents political institutions in each nation as of 2002. 
As it shows, presidential systems are more popular than parliamentary systems. About 70 
percent of them have presidential systems or presidential-parliamentarism. Among the 
rest, only three countries (Niger, Papua New Guinea, and Spain) have institutionalized a 
relatively pure parliamentary system, whereas the others have a presidency that functions 
in a nominal role.  
[Table 6-1  Here] 
Consensual electoral systems are more pervasive in new democracies. As Table 6-
1 reports, more than half of the 70 countries employed proportional systems (41 %) or 
semi-proportional systems (29 %), whereas only 30 percent of them use majoritarian 
electoral systems, including plurality systems (22 %) or majority systems (8 %).  
Unicameral systems have been adopted by about 60 percent of third-wave 
democracies. A majority of new democracies in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and 
Southern Europe have unicameral systems, whereas bicameral systems are more popular 
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in Latin America. Finally, only eight countries of the third wave democracies, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, and Spain, have installed federal 
systems (Griffiths et al. 2005). The new federal democracies comprise about 30 percent 
of the total number of federal countries (25 countries) over the globe (Griffiths et al. 
2005).  
 
6.3 Results 
Tables 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4 report empirical test results that show the impact of 
individual institutions on the strength of economic voting. OLS regression is employed to 
obtain coefficients and standard errors. Note that coefficients for each dummy variable 
represent the estimated differences in the mean of the dependent variable (i.e., the vote 
share of incumbents) among types of institutions. In general, test results do not fully 
support either the clarity theory or the consensuality hypothesis. Only electoral systems 
seem to have statistically significant effects on the strength of economic voting in favor 
of the consensuality hypothesis.  
Table 6-2 shows the influence of parliamentary systems on the strength of 
economic voting. Model 1 and Model 2 report test results for legislative elections. Test 
results for presidential elections in Model 3 and for both legislative and presidential 
elections in Model 4 and Model 5 follow. Model 1 and Model 4 include three institutional 
variables and their interaction terms with GDP per capita growth rate, whereas Model 2 
and Model 5 include only one institutional variable, the parliamentary system, and its 
interaction term with GDP per capita growth rate. Model 3 includes president-
parliamentarism and its interaction term with GDP per capita growth rate. 
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[Table 6-2  Here] 
In Model 1, the presidential system is used as the base category. In the model, the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita has a positive effect on the vote share of an 
incumbent. However, the three types of political systems, including the president-
parliamentarism, the premier-presidentialism, and the parliamentary system, do not have 
any significant effect on the vote share of incumbents. Furthermore, interaction terms 
between those institutional variables and the annual growth rate of GDP per capita do not 
have any significant effect on the electoral outcomes in legislative elections. Model 2 of 
the table includes only the parliamentary system and its interaction term with the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita. However, test results are not different from those reported 
in Model 1. The interaction term between the parliamentary system and the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita has no significant effect on the dependent variable.  
Model 3, which presents test results for presidential elections, also fails to show 
that voters in president-parliamentarism have any distinguished economic voting 
behavior compared with those in the presidential system. When both legislative and 
presidential elections are considered in Model 4 and Model 5, test results are similar to 
prior ones. In short, test results have failed to show that the variation on the dimension of 
parliamentary systems and presidential systems does not make any statistically 
significantly difference in legislative or presidential election outcomes. Test results do 
not corroborate the clarity of responsibility theory. See Appendix 16 for the comparison 
of test results using models without interaction terms. 
Table 6-3 shows the influence of electoral systems on the strength of economic 
voting. Compared with test results reported in Table 6-2, it provides a slightly different 
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view on the impact of consensual democratic institutions on economic voting behavior. 
Model 1 and Model 2 presents test results for legislative elections. Model 3 and Model 4 
reports test results for presidential elections and both legislative and presidential elections 
respectively. The plurality system is used as the base category in Model 1, Model 3, and 
Model 4. Among four different types of electoral systems, the majority system, the semi-
proportional system, and the proportional system and their interaction terms with the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita are used as independent variables in Model 1 and 
Model 4. Note that two different types of electoral systems, the plurality system and the 
majority system, are adopted for presidential elections. Therefore, Model 3 includes only 
the majority system and its interaction term with GDP per capita growth rate. However, 
three kinds of non-proportional systems - plurality, majority, and semi-proportional 
systems - are used as the base category in Model 2. Therefore, the proportional system 
and its interaction term is included in the model.  
[Table 6-3  Here] 
Model 1 shows that the majority system does not have a significant effect on the 
vote share of incumbents in legislative elections. Its interaction term with the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita is –1.65, but it has no statistically significant effect on the 
strength of economic voting. Test results for the semi-proportional system and the 
proportional system also show that electoral systems do not have any significant effect on 
the strength of economic voting in legislative elections. The null impact of electoral 
systems continues, when only the proportional system and its interaction terms are 
included in Model 2.  
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In presidential elections, however, the majoritarian electoral system strengthens 
economic voting, which reinforces the consensuality hypothesis. Compared to the 
plurality system, the majority system, which may encourage voters to cast their votes 
strategically based on insincere preferences in the first round of presidential elections, 
provide favorable electoral circumstances to economic voters. When both legislative and 
presidential elections are considered, the positive effect of the majority rule on the 
economic voting is robust. See Chapter 5 (p. 98) for the discussion on the selection of the 
first round election outcomes in this research. 
The results here support the notion that economic voting occurs in presidential 
election systems with majority systems in which a runoff election can or does occur.  As 
the results of Model 3 in Table 6-4 reveal, evidence of economic voting occurs only for 
presidential incumbents in majority systems.  The vote share for an incumbent under a 
plurality electoral system is not significantly influenced by the economy.  Indeed, the 
vote share declines insignificantly as the economy improves.  However, the vote share of 
majority system incumbents increases significantly, by two and a quarter percent for each 
unit in the lagged GDP growth rate.  Majority system presidential incumbents, 
nevertheless, are disadvantaged at the onset.  They inherit a deficit of over seven percent 
in vote share before the influence of economic performance is factored into the equation.  
Lagged GDP per capita growth must improve by 3.3% (7.85/2.37) before a majority 
system incumbent executive receives larger vote shares than his comparable plurality 
system counterpart.   
Analyzing economic voting in Latin America, Benton (2005: 433) shows that 
runoff electoral systems have a positive effect on the changes in electoral support for an 
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incumbent party, but reduce the strength of economic voting. The results here do not 
contradict his finding, because Benton analyzes the election outcomes of the second 
round, rather than the first round. The institutional constraints of the runoff system may 
be different in each round.  
Empirical test results fail to show that a bicameral system strengthens or dampens 
the strength of economic voting in new democracies. In Model 1 of the Table 6-4, the 
sign of the coefficient on the interaction variable, GDP per capita growth rate * 
bicameral system, is negative. However, the interaction has no significant effect on the 
dependent variable. In presidential elections, the sign of the coefficient on the interaction 
term is turns to the opposite direction, and it also has no significant effect on the 
dependent variable. When both types of elections are considered together, test results also 
fail to show any significant reduction or escalation effect of the bicameralism on the 
strength of economic voting.  
[Table 6-4  Here] 
Table 6-5 also shows that federal systems have no significant impact on the 
strength of economic voting in either legislative elections or presidential elections. In 
legislative elections the interaction term of the federal system and the annual growth rate 
of GDP per capita is -.86, which is on the expected direction. However, it has no 
statistically significant impact on the dependent variable. Contrary to prior empirical 
studies that show the reduction impact of federalism on the strength of economic voting, 
the results do not support the clarity of responsibility theory (Jacobson 1991; Anderson 
2004).  
[Table 6-5  Here] 
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So far, the present research has examined how two different sets of democratic 
institutions interact with the nexus between economic conditions and electoral decisions.  
Empirical tests to examine the impact of individual institutions on the strength of 
economic voting, however, failed to show robust evidence to support the consensuality 
hypothesis. In that case, then, does overall institutional consensuality affect voter choice 
based on the economic performance of incumbents?  
Table 6-6 presents test results using interaction terms of the consensuality index 
and GDP per capita growth rate. The interaction term of the consensuality index has a 
significant negative effect on the vote share of an incumbent at the level of .1, which 
supports the clarity of responsibility theory. However, test results for presidential 
elections are not different from those of prior tests using individual institutional variables. 
The interaction term of the consensuality index has no significant effect in presidential 
elections. When both elections are examined, the null impact of the consensuality does 
not change. The results of the previous tests illustrated in Table 6-6 assume a linear 
relationship between the index of consensuality and incumbent vote share. 
[Table 6-6  Here] 
The influence of economic voting, however, may vary by the categorical level of 
consensuality, suggesting a non-linear relationship. Table 6-7 shows how the impact of 
GDP per capita growth rate on the dependent variable changes as the level of institutional 
consensuality increases. In legislative elections, test results do not corroborate either the 
clarity of responsibility hypothesis or the consensuality hypothesis. For legislative 
elections, the coefficient on the growth rate of GDP per capita is higher in low 
consensuality than moderate consensuality. The coefficient on the economic variable is 
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1.05 when elections were held under low consensual institutions, but it decreases to .63 in 
moderate consensuality. It increases to 1.05 when the consensuality is high, but this 
estimate is not significantly different from zero. Economic voting in parliamentary 
elections occurs stronger under conditions of low consensuality or, perhaps, at the 
extreme points of low and high consensuality. See Appendix 18 for the distribution of 
consensuality. 
 [Table 6-7  Here] 
In presidential elections, test results consistently corroborate the consensuality 
hypothesis. The coefficient on the annual growth rate of GDP per capita is -.78 when 
elections were held under low consensual institutions, but it increases to .02 in moderate 
consensuality. The estimate increases to 1.59, and reaches significance when the 
consensuality is high. When both legislative and presidential elections are considered, 
test results also corroborate the consensuality hypothesis. The coefficient on the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita increases, as the level of consensuality increases. This 
finding is surprising in that the positive effect of consensual institutions on the economic 
voting behavior is contrary to what the clarity of responsibility theory has suggested. 
Consensual institutions rather than the majoritarian institutions promote economic voting 
behavior in new democracies, even though the test results are not strong.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This research examines whether and how institutional arrangements affect the 
strength of economic voting. Developing the notion that diverse political contexts affect 
the public perception of the responsibility of incumbents’ past economic performance and 
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the efficacy of electoral sanctioning, this research has explored whether consensual 
institutions promote the strength of economic voting.  
Empirical test results show that the strength of economic voting behavior does not 
simply rely on the concentration of the executive power awarded to incumbents. No 
individual component of consensual institutions, including parliamentary, proportional 
electoral, bicameral, and federal systems, increases economic voting. The results do not 
corroborate the consensuality hypothesis. The present study, however, shows that such 
consensual institutional arrangements believed to disperse economic policy decision 
making power to non-executive actors do not systematically discourage economic voting 
in new democracies. Rather, the higher the level of consensuality, the higher the strength 
of economic voting in general. Contrary to the expectation of the clarity of responsibility 
claim, economic voting is slightly stronger under consensual institutions than 
majoritarian institutions in new democracies.  
Studies on electoral behavior have examined how diverse political and 
institutional contexts affect the strength of economic voting. However, only those that 
affect the evaluation of the responsibility of incumbents have gained attention from 
scholars, but diverse aspects of institutional constraints on electoral behavior has yet to be 
uncovered. Test results of this research imply that clear identification of responsibility of 
incumbents does not in and of itself determine the strength of economic voting. 
Majoritarian institutional arrangements that are believed to facilitate power concentration 
to ruling majorities simply do not promote economic voting. More research on the 
mechanism that institutions constrain voter perception and voting decision other than the 
clarity of responsibility theory suggests is needed for the development of studies on 
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economic voting. This research is only a first step to examine the institutional constraints 
on economic voting.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
This research has examined how electorates in 70 new democracies react at the 
ballot box to changes in economic conditions. It analyzes an original dataset that 
encompasses both legislative and presidential elections over the period of 1974-2002. 
Chapter 4 examines economic performance under authoritarian regimes and electoral 
support for their successors in founding elections. Contrary to some scholars’ 
expectations, voters are sophisticated enough to consider the past economic conditions as 
a criterion for voting decisions in founding elections. Economic performance under the 
preceding authoritarian regime promoted electoral support for the successors to 
authoritarian rulers in founding elections. However, economic deterioration under interim 
governments that initiated democratic transition did not harm electoral support for these 
interim governments. Economic voting is not the dominant factor in electoral outcomes, 
but an important one. The nature of the past authoritarian regime and the type of the 
interim government have a significant impact on electoral outcomes in founding elections. 
Economic performance of an authoritarian regime and economic conditions under an 
interim government have a significant negative impact on the likelihood of government 
alteration to democratic oppositions, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively smaller 
than that of political factors.  
Chapter 5 examines post-founding elections in new democracies. It finds that 
electoral outcomes are commonly constrained by the economic performance of an 
incumbent. In legislative elections and presidential elections, economic growth measured 
with the annual growth rate of GDP per capita facilitates electoral support for incumbents. 
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Economic development, democracy, and democratization are related to the strength of 
economic voting. Economic performance has no consistent effect on the vote share of an 
incumbent in those new democracies where the level of economic development is less 
than $3,000 GDP per capita. However, voters in relative wealthier new democracies are 
consistently driven by the changes in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. A higher 
level of democracy also provides a positive circumstance for economic voting.  
Another interesting finding is that the strength of economic voting is deeply 
related to the consolidation of a democratic regime. Economic conditions have no 
consistent effect on electoral support for interim governments in founding elections. In 
the earlier period of post-founding elections, voters do not seem to charge the inbents 
with responsibility for economic conditions. Only after the second post-founding election, 
does the economic performance of an incumbent have a consistently significant effect on 
the incumbent’s vote share. The timing of the normalization of economic voting, i.e., 
voters’ sanctioning or rewarding of incumbents based on their economic performance, 
also reflects the non-myopic nature of voters in transitional societies. Voters do not 
simply ascribe the responsibility of transition costs to new democratic governments. 
Chapter 6 examines how economic voting is constrained by different sets of 
institutional arrangements. It examines whether consensual or majoritarian institutions 
promote economic voting. The clarity of responsibility theory claims that power 
concentration to ruling majorities increases the strength of economic voting. Test results, 
however, show that majoritarian clarity of responsibility does not matter. No majoritarian 
institution has a significant, independent effect on the strength of economic voting. 
Rather, consensual institutions provide more positive circumstances for economic voting.  
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The contributions of this research are mainly in three areas. First, unlike prior 
research that exclusively focused on electoral behavior in Western parliamentary 
democracies, the present research investigates whether economic voting works in new 
democracies. Exploring both legislative and presidential elections in seventy new 
democracies, this research provides a grand view over the nexus between economics and 
electoral politics in the relatively unknown world for the students of economic voting. 
Evidence supports the presence of economic voting in founding and post-founding 
elections. 
Second, the incorporation of legislative and presidential elections in new 
democracies into the analysis of economic voting improves our understanding of the 
dynamics of economic voting under diverse economic and political conditions. The 
analysis of economic voting in founding elections accounts for the feature of economic 
voting in the period of democratic transition. It shows that voters do not assign the 
responsibility of transition costs primarily to interim governments, but to authoritarian 
successors. The subsequent analysis of economic voting in post-founding elections also 
shows how voters react to the economic deterioration of the earlier period of democratic 
transition. It provides empirical evidence that economic voting is consistent and stronger 
in certain levels of economic development, democracy, and democratic experience.   
Third, this research develops a model of economic voting by exploring the 
influence of institutional arrangements. Existing literature has focused on the institutional 
influence on the informational clarity of blaming targets. The institutional influence on 
the identification of responsible targets has an explanatory power for the analysis of 
economic voting. Institutional effects on voting decision are, however, much more 
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complex than the clarity of responsibility theory suggests. Political institutions affect not 
only informational clarity of responsibility, but also motivational strength of electoral 
sanctioning for voters. Contrary to the clarity of responsibility theory, this research shows 
that consensual institutions, in which the higher representation and responsiveness 
facilitates the efficacy of electoral sanctioning, provide a better terrain for economic 
voting in transitional or new democracies.  
Nonetheless, this research is not free from various problems of economic voting 
literature that arise mainly from the lack of reliable data. First, this research cannot 
include twenty percent of post-founding elections for the lack of reliable economic and 
political variables. As noted earlier, economic variables including unemployment, 
inflation, and GDP per capita growth are not available for a significant portion of new 
democracies, especially in the initial period of democratization. Likewise, frequent party 
formation and dissolution and personalized party politics make it difficult to identify 
consecutive changes in vote shares of an incumbent for both voters and researchers.  
Second, the economic voting models employed here do not include various 
contextual variables related to attributes of incumbents, such as the ideological 
orientation of ruling parties, the presence of divided governments, and the number of 
ruling parties, for the lack of available data. The fundamental limitation of available data 
not only narrows research scopes but also hinders from the development of advanced 
models of economic voting. Some cross-national studies of economic voting that focused 
on Western old democracies have developed models of voting behavior based on 
articulated data. It is, however, difficult to find corresponding data for new democracies, 
which are essential for further research on the dynamics of economic voting.  
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Third, the present aggregated-election-data-based research has critical limitations 
for understanding how the actual voter perception of economic conditions affects 
electoral choice. As a result, various articulated hypotheses of economic voting, including 
the prospective voting hypothesis, the pocketbook hypothesis, the sociotropic voting 
hypothesis, the issue salience hypothesis, and the issue priority hypothesis, discussed 
earlier, cannot be tested. Despite the extensive research scope of this research, the 
fundamental limitation of the aggregated level analysis is clear. It cannot provide a 
precise explanation of the nexus between economic conditions and electoral choice based 
on the data of actual perception of voters. However, increasing survey-based studies 
encompassing multi-nations may fill the gap.  
As noted earlier, young democracies are the ideal laboratory for understanding the 
development of economic voting on the macro-level. This research investigated 
economic voting in new democracies and made several findings. Economic performance 
under an authoritarian regime is an important factor of transitional electoral politics. 
Economic voting occurs in post-founding elections in new democracies. Economic 
development, democracy, and democratization provide positive circumstances for 
economic voting. Institutional influence on economic voting is not as simple as the clarity 
of responsibility theory suggests. Majoritarian institutions do not simply promote 
economic voting. As an extensive aggregate-level analysis of economic voting in new 
democracies, this research shows the occurrence of economic voting in new democracies 
and improves our understanding of the parameters and constraints of economic voting. 
Table 2-1 Advanced Theories of Economic Voting 
  
Research Questions Theoretical Issues Hypotheses 
What kind of economic performance? Naïve vs. Sophisticated voters Retrospective vs. Prospective 
  Selfish vs. Altruistic voters Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic 
Who is more competent/ responsible? Asymmetric party competence 
determined by Left or Right 
parties 
Issue Priority 
  
Asymmetric responsibility for 
economic conditions of 
incumbents 
Institutional clarity 
Do economic issues matter? The presence of different 
sensitivity to economic 
conditions 
Issue Salience 
Is economic voting a strategic 
behavior? 
The presence of alternative 
opposition party 
The clarity of opposition 
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Table 2-2  Selected Cross-National Empirical Studies on Economic Voting 
 
Researcher(s) 
Year of 
Publication Method 
Countries  
examined 
Number of 
elections 
Temporal 
Domain 
Paldam 1991 OLSa 17 OECD countries 197 1948-85 
Remmer 1991 OLS 12 Latin America 21 1982-90 
Powell &  Whitten 1993 OLS 19 industrialized democracies 102 1969-88 
Pacek 1994 OLS 3 Eastern Europe (district) 4 (49)* 1990-92 
Pacek & Radcliff 1995a LSDVb 17 industrialized democracies 127 1960-87 
Pacek & Radcliff 1995b  LSDV 8 Less Developed Countries 51 1951-90 
Wilkin et al.  1997 OLS 38 worldwide 38 1989-94 
Whitten & Palmer 1999 PCSEsc 19 industrialized democracies 142 1969-88 
Fidrmuc 2000 PCSEs 4 Eastern Europe (181 counties) 9 (442) 1992-98 
Royed et al.  2000 OLS 19 industrialized democracies 104 1967-93 
Chappell et al. 2000 OLS 13 European democracies 116 1960-97 
Stevenson 2002 OLS 12 Western Europe 60 since 1950 
Samuels 2004 OLS 23 Worldwide 178 1958-2001 
Benton 2005 PCSEs 13 Latin America 39 1948-2003 
  
a Ordinary Least Square.  
b Least Squared Dependent Variable estimation method. 
c Panel Corrected Standard Errors estimation method. 
 
* Number of cases in parentheses 
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Table 3-1  Methodological Issues within the Economic Voting Literature 
  
Issues Approach Strengths Weaknesses 
Data Survey direct measurement of voter intention less available data 
  Aggregate more available data indirect measurement of voter intention 
  Both  incorporation of micro-, macro-level 
   indicators 
less available data 
Case Selection Stable democracies less outliers less cases 
  
Including unstable       
   democracies 
more cases more outliers 
Measurement        
Dependent Variables I Comparative approach   less cases 
     (changes in vote share)     varying length in terms of offices 
  Straight approach more cases static, not dynamic 
     (vote share)     
Dependent Variables II Whole govn't parties* complete measurement of ruling  
   coalition 
complexity for instable coalition 
  Single govn't party simplicity for stable ruling group incomplete measurement of ruling coalition 
Economic Variables  Comparative approach  controlling international influence complexity for measurement of neighbors to compare
  Straight approach simplicity lack of controlling international influence 
  
Both  complete measurement of ruling 
coalition 
complexity for measurement of neighbors to compare
Clarity of Responsibility Modification of clarity    
   indices 
inclusion of core political contexts exclusion of individual institutional effect 
New indicators of clarity inclusion of peripheral influence . 
Model Specification Big 3s (GDP per capita,   
   unemployment,  
   inflation) 
individual effect of each indicators less cases 
  
Minimum number of   
   variables 
more cases no comparison of economic indicators 
  Additional indicators inclusion of peripheral influence less cases 
  Political contexts  . 
Estimation Methods OLS Simplicity autocorrelation problem 
  
PCSEs autocorrelation problem no simplicity 
   non-standard lags 
    
  
* (changes in) vote share of a whole ruling coalition 
     
 
Table  4-1  Founding Elections and Economic Conditions in New Democracies 
   Nation Year Election Type GDP per capita Inflation
Vote Share of  
Successors 
Ruler 
Change
Africa       
Benin 1991 presidential. 351.8  . 
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27.2  Yes 
Burkina Faso 1978 presidential. 212.8 8.3 42.2  No 
Central African Rep.   1993 presidential. 316.6 -2.9  12.1  Yes 
Congo 1992 presidential. 808.9 -3.7  16.9  Yes 
Ghana 1979 presidential. 391.9 54.4  0  Yes 
Ghana 1992 presidential. 356.5 10.1  58.4  No 
Guinea-Bissau 1994 presidential. 210.6 15.2  46.2  No 
Kenya 1992 presidential. 340.9 27.3  36.6  No 
Lesotho 1993 legislative. 531.2 13.1  0  Yes 
Madagascar 1992 presidential. 249.8 14.6  28.6  Yes 
Malawi 1994 presidential. 135.0 34.6  33.5  Yes 
Mali 1992 presidential. 263.2 -6.2  0  Yes 
Mozambique 1994 presidential. 143.7 63.2  53.3  No 
Namibia 1989 legislative. 1997.2  15.1  0.0  Yes 
Niger 1993 presidential. 209.1 -1.2  34.3  Yes 
Nigeria 1979 presidential. 311.0 11.7  0  Yes 
Senegal 1993 presidential. 521.6 -0.6  58.4  No 
Sierra Leone 1996 presidential. 213.7 23.1  0  Yes 
South Africa 1994 legislative. 3828.0  8.9 20.5  Yes 
Sudan 1986 legislative. 207.5 24.5  0  Yes 
Zambia 1991 presidential. 465.5 93.2  24.2  Yes 
Zimbabwe 1980 legislative. 610.4 5.4 8.3  Yes 
Asia     
Bangladesh 1991 legislative. 282.4 6.4 0  Yes 
Indonesia 1999 legislative. 979.9 20.3  19.9  Yes 
Mongolia 1993 presidential. 371.3 268.2 38.7  No 
Nepal 1991 legislative. 195.6 15.6  0  Yes 
Pakistan 1988 legislative. 430.1 8.8 0  Yes 
Papua New Guinea 1977 legislative. 869.5 4.5 0  Yes 
Philippines 1987 legislative. 1002.0  3.0 0  Yes 
South Korea 1987 presidential. 6433.3  3.0 35.9  No 
Taiwan 1992 legislative. . 52.1  No 
Thailand 1992 legislative. 2277.9  4.1 0  Yes 
Europe     
Albania 1992 legislative. 563.0 226.0 25.7  Yes 
Armenia 1991 presidential. 695.5 0  Yes 
Belarus 1994 presidential. 1524.8  2221.0  4.6  Yes 
Bulgaria 1992 presidential. 1487.3  91.3 30.4  Yes 
Croatia 1992 presidential. 3783.0  625.0 0  Yes 
Czech Rep. 1992 legislative. 4653.3 14.0  Yes 
Estonia 1992 presidential. 2837.2  0  Yes 
Georgia 1991 presidential. 1378.6  0  Yes 
Greece 1974 legislative. 8825.5 26.9 0  Yes 
Hungary 1990 legislative. 4857.4  29.0 10.9  Yes 
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Latvia 1993 legislative. 1852.8  108.8  5.8  Yes 
Lithuania 1993 presidential. 2135.3  410.2  61.1  No 
Macedonia 1994 presidential. 2311.0 126.6 78.4  No 
Moldova 1994 legislative. 408.9 22.0  Yes 
Poland 1990 presidential. 2604.3  555.4  9.2  Yes 
Portugal 1976 presidential. 6376.9  18.2 0  Yes 
Romania 1990 presidential. 1702.4  0  Yes 
Russia 1991 presidential. 4068.0  0  Yes 
Slovakia 1992 legislative. 3345.6  14.7  Yes 
Slovenia 1992 presidential. . 63.9  No 
Spain 1977 legislative. 10759.6 24.5 0  Yes 
Turkey 1983 legislative. 2071.5  31.4  0  Yes 
Ukraine 1991 presidential. 1768.1  0  Yes 
Latin America     
Argentina 1983 presidential. 6923.9  343.8  0  Yes 
Bolivia 1985 presidential. 835.3 11749.6  0  Yes 
Brazil 1986 legislative. 4280.5  147.1  7.8  Yes 
Chile 1989 presidential. 3220.6  17.0 29.4  Yes 
Dominican Rep 1978 presidential. 1324.7  3.5  41.6  Yes 
Ecuador 1979 presidential. 1787.8  10.3  0.0  Yes 
El Salvador 1984 presidential. 1335.5  11.5 43.4  No 
Guatemala 1985 presidential. 1330.4  18.7  0  Yes 
Haiti 1990 presidential. 501.7  21.3 0  Yes 
Honduras 1981 presidential. 728.6 9.4  0  Yes 
Mexico 1994 presidential. 3405.8  7.0  48.7  No 
Nicaragua 1990 presidential. 446.3 7485.5  40.0  Yes 
Panama 1989 presidential. 2381.9  0.1  0  Yes 
Paraguay 1989 presidential. 1846.5  26.4  75.9  No 
Peru 1980 presidential. 2569.0  59.1  0  Yes 
Uruguay 1984 presidential. 4338.2  55.3  0  Yes 
Average     1924.4  427.2  18.0    
Median   1324.7 18.7 7.8  
Standard Deviation     2156.3  1807.3  22.1    
 
Sources: Political Handbook, the Database of Political Institutions (2000), and  
              World Development Indicators (2003).   
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Table 4-2  Authoritarian Regimes and Interim Governments 
The year of transition for those countries experienced multiple democratization in parentheses.  
* Monarchy, ** South Africa was a “racial discrimination regime” (Huntington 1991), *** Mean vote share of authoritarian successors. 
Sources: various including Political Handbook, CIA World Factbook, and World Almanac.   
Interim Governments Authoritarian 
Regime Type 
 Authoritarian Incumbent Reformers of 
Authoritarian 
Ruler 
Independent 
Personnel 
Opposition Party Leader Leader of Coups 
Military Regime  Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, 
Turkey, Uruguay 
Argentina, 
Nigeria 
Haiti, Pakistan, 
  Thailand 
Bolivia, Greece, Spain Ghana (1979), Guatemala, 
Honduras, Lesotho*, Sierra-
Leone, Sudan  
 mean vote share*** 8.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Military Party 
Dominant  
Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, 
Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Ghana (1992), 
Kenya, Mozambique, 
Panama, South Korea 
Guinea Bissau, 
Indonesia  
Bangladesh  Mali, Paraguay, Portugal  
 mean vote share*** 31.7 % 33.1 % 0.0 %  25.3 % 
One Party Dominant 
(Nationalist)  
Malawi, Mexico, Taiwan, 
Zambia 
  Philippines  
 mean vote share*** 39.6 %   0.0 %  
One Party Dominant 
(Socialist)  
Benin, Congo, Madagascar,  
Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal 
    
 mean vote share*** 34.2 %     
Communist-
Totalitarian   
Albania, Mongolia, Russia, 
Poland 
Hungary, 
Bulgaria 
Romania   
 mean vote share*** 18.4 % 20.7 % 0.0 %   
Communist & 
Seceded Regime 
 Lithuania, 
Macedonia, 
Slovenia 
 Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, 
Slovakia, Ukraine. 
 
 mean vote share***  67.8 %  6.1%  
Others Namibia, Papua New 
Guinea, South Africa**, 
Zimbabwe 
  Nepal*  
mean vote share*** 7.2 %   0.0 %  
 
Table 4-3 Electoral Support for Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections I 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  1.99  1.56    
under authoritarian rule (0.64)*** (0.58)***   
Logged inflation (+10) 1.06     
under authoritarian rule (2.12)    
GDP per capita growth rate    1.92  2.05  
in the year of founding election   (0.94)** (0.81)** 
Logged inflation (+10)   0.77   
in the year of founding election   (1.79)  
Military authoritarian regime -17.06  -17.78  -17.66  -16.40  
 (5.27)*** (4.85)*** (5.73)*** (5.39)*** 
Opposition initiation of -7.76  -10.05  -11.53  -12.93  
interim governments (5.17) (4.54)** (5.51)** (4.90)** 
Democracy (Polity2) -1.80  -1.54  -1.55  -1.50  
 (0.64)*** (0.63)** (0.74)** (0.71)** 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.19  -0.18    
under authoritarian rule (0.09)** (0.09)**   
Polity2* GDP per capita growth    -0.29  -0.33  
in the year of founding election   (0.13)** (0.11)*** 
Legislative election -9.35  -2.89  -11.77  -5.79  
 (6.08) (5.09) (6.35)* (5.43) 
Asia -8.65  -8.43  -2.83  -5.68  
 (7.69) (6.73) (7.91) (7.45) 
Latin America 0.45  2.32  -1.73  0.00  
 (5.35) (5.25) (6.41) (5.83) 
Europe -10.22  -10.56  2.14  -3.84  
 (8.14) (5.69)* (7.72) (6.53) 
Constant 39.25  39.76  39.51  40.32  
 (8.21)*** (4.66)*** (7.52)*** (5.25)*** 
R-squared 0.63 0.54 0.53 0.49 
Observations 50 61 57 67 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
     
     
Source: World Development Indicators, 2003. 
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Table 4-4 Electoral Support for Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections II 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  1.49  1.44    
under authoritarian rule (0.53)*** (0.53)***   
Logged inflation (+10) 0.50     
under authoritarian rule (2.11)    
2.10  GDP per capita growth rate    1.75  
in the year of founding election   (1.13) (1.12)* 
Logged inflation (+10)   -0.10   
in the year of founding election   (1.78)  
Military authoritarian regime -17.31  -17.63  -17.43  -16.29  
 (5.49)*** (5.21)*** (6.10)*** (6.00)*** 
Opposition initiation of -7.11  -9.13  -9.85  -14.56  
interim governments (5.48) (5.09)* (5.67)* (5.30)*** 
Democracy (Polity2) -1.94  -1.88  -1.79  -1.61  
 (0.68)*** (0.68)*** (0.75)** (0.76)** 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.17  -0.15    
under authoritarian rule (0.09)* (0.09)   
-0.33  Polity2* GDP per capita growth    -0.30  
in the year of founding election   (0.18) (0.18)* 
Legislative election -6.53  -3.02  -8.68  -7.40  
 (6.56) (6.15) (6.90) (6.48) 
Asia -7.82  -5.91  -5.10  -0.68  
 (8.12) (7.81) (8.91) (8.55) 
Latin America 1.87  2.85  0.46  0.61  
 (5.62) (5.46) (6.54) (6.24) 
Europe -11.74  -12.98  -0.44  1.58  
 (8.06) (6.99)* (7.94) (7.22) 
Constant 39.30  40.50  41.28  40.30  
 (8.37)*** (4.89)*** (7.53)*** (5.49)*** 
R-squared 0.60 0.57 0.51 0.47 
Observations 49 54 54 61 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
     
Source: Penn World Table 6.1.  
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Table 4-5 Electoral Support for Interim Governments in Founding Elections  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
GDP per capita growth rate  1.20 0.72 
in the year of founding election (0.93) (0.95) 
Logged inflation (+10) 2.17  
in the year of founding election (1.76)  
-25.24 -26.98 Military authoritarian regime 
 (5.65)*** (6.30)*** 
Opposition initiation of 1.23 7.10 
interim governments (5.43) (5.73) 
-1.34 -0.86 Democracy (Polity2) 
 (0.73)* (0.83) 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.09 -0.10 
in the year of founding election (0.12) (0.13) 
-15.91 -17.33 Legislative election 
 (6.27)** (6.35)*** 
Asia 0.74 0.39 
 (7.81) (8.71) 
Latin America -0.60 2.43 
 (6.32) (6.81) 
19.49 18.9 Europe 
 (7.62)** (7.63)** 
33.10 36.44 Constant 
 (7.42)*** (6.14)*** 
R-squared 0.55 0.49 
Observations 57 67 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4-6 Ousting Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  -2.75  -2.79    
under authoritarian rule (1.83) (1.55)*   
Logged inflation (+10) -0.45     
under authoritarian rule (0.66)    
GDP per capita growth rate    -0.56  -0.63  
in the year of founding election   (0.29)* (0.28)** 
Logged inflation (+10)   -0.06   
in the year of founding election   (0.32)  
Military authoritarian regime -5.37  -5.05  2.26  2.12  
 (4.43) (3.52) (1.85) (1.87) 
Opposition initiation of 16.73  17.12  2.26  2.56  
interim governments (13.50) (11.84) (1.43) (1.39)* 
Level of democracy (Polity2) 4.19  4.21  0.49  0.50  
 (2.85) (2.31)* (0.18)*** (0.18)*** 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  0.41  0.42    
under authoritarian rule (0.27) (0.23)*   
Polity2* GDP per capita growth    0.08  0.10  
in the year of founding election   (0.04)** (0.04)** 
Asia 10.27  -6.30  -0.40  -0.59  
 0.00  (4.21) (1.45) (1.41) 
Latin America -0.34  -0.73  0.15  -0.03  
 (2.13) (2.04) (1.20) (1.11) 
Europe   0.03  0.26  
   (1.49) (1.36) 
Constant -20.56  -22.18  -1.98  -2.15  
 (14.05) (12.34)* (1.47) (1.13)* 
Pseudo- R-squared 0.71  0.70  0.40  0.41  
Observations 44  46  57  67  
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
     
     
 
       
       
       
 
Table 5-1 Economic Voting in Post-founding Elections I       
 
 
  Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 10 
Lagged incumbent vote share 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.62 0.64 
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Lagged GDP per capita growth rate 0.87  0.86 1.03  0.80  0.92  0.88 
 (0.20)***  (0.21)*** (0.38)***  (0.46)* (0.18)***  (0.20)***
Logged inflation (+10)  -0.89 0.21  -3.97 -2.30  -2.12 -0.72 
  (1.02) (1.01)  (1.51)** (1.78)  (0.85)** (0.88) 
Asia -11.27 -9.60 -12.58 -9.12 -7.37 -8.97 -10.62 -9.10 -11.58 
 (3.67)*** (4.03)** (3.90)*** (7.58) (7.59) (7.57) (3.33)*** (3.58)** (3.50)***
Latin America -9.07 -7.07 -9.52 -10.56 -8.88 -9.90 -9.59 -7.57 -9.56 
 (2.97)*** (3.19)** (3.09)*** (4.34)** (4.41)** (4.40)** (2.44)*** (2.58)*** (2.52)***
Europe -13.23 -10.85 -13.45 -11.57 -8.07 -10.45 -12.51 -10.06 -12.47 
 (2.94)*** (3.15)*** (3.07)*** (4.73)** (4.85)* (4.99)** (2.45)*** (2.61)*** (2.58)***
Constant 17.51 21.02 17.40 15.78 32.42 24.62 16.14 24.54 19.15 
 (4.20)*** (5.25)*** (5.07)*** (6.81)** (7.94)*** (9.06)*** (3.42)*** (4.25)*** (4.27)***
R-squared 0.52 0.45 0.51 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.47 0.42 0.46 
Observations     168    163     163      99      98       98      267      261      261 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 5-2  Determinants of the Strength of Economic Voting       
  Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Lagged incumbent vote share (%) 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.60 0.58 0.61 
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Lagged GDP per capita growth rate 1.33  0.75 -4.71  -6.01  -0.14  -1.01 
    (1995 USD) (1.06)  (1.15) (2.33)**  (2.39)** (0.92)  (1.00) 
Logged inflation (+10)  -15.20  -12.77   -15.36  -22.67   -14.06  -15.36  
  (6.93)** (7.34)*  (12.11) (12.11)*  (5.57)** (5.95)** 
Economic development 4.45 1.68  6.37 -6.16 -1.64 -13.43 0.31  -3.03  -4.58  
    (1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high) (2.06)** (6.79) (7.51) (3.18)* (11.05) (11.47) (1.77) (5.49) (6.04) 
Level of democracy  0.09 -1.35 -0.64 -3.10 -5.33 -3.46 -1.07 -1.7 -1.25 
    (0.65) (2.10) (2.13) (0.90)*** (3.08)* (3.24) (0.53)** (1.58) (1.61) 
Number of elections -0.26 -6.03 -8.56 -2.57 0.29 -13.37 -0.12 -3.83 -6.58 
 (0.69) (3.21)* (3.48)** (1.73) (7.38) (8.83) (0.66) (2.33) (2.61)** 
Globalization  0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 -0.34 -0.3 0.02 -0.13 -0.14 
    (trade/GDP, %) (0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.23) (0.24) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) 
Lagged GDP per capita growth *  -0.18  -0.41 1.94  1.86 0.64  0.47  
       Economic development (0.39)  (0.42) (0.60)***  (0.66)*** (0.34)*  (0.36) 
Logged inflation (+10)*  0.94 -0.16  0.74 2.69  2.02 2.00 
Economic development  (2.17) (2.24)  (3.48) (3.54)  (1.74) (1.81) 
Lagged GDP per capita growth *  -0.15  -0.10 0.04  0.02 -0.12  -0.11 
Level of democracy (0.12)  (0.12) (0.15)  (0.16) (0.09)  (0.09) 
Logged inflation (+10)*  0.19 0.09  0.67 0.08  -0.01 -0.03 
Level of democracy  (0.61) (0.61)  (0.87) (0.89)  (0.45) (0.45) 
Lagged GDP per capita growth *  0.23  0.37 0.99  1.23 0.22   0.38 
Number of elections (0.16)  (0.17)** (0.42)**  (0.47)** (0.15)  (0.16)** 
Logged inflation (+10)*  2.09 2.67  -0.31 3.13  1.28 1.97 
Number of elections  (1.05)** (1.10)**  (2.27) (2.57)  (0.75)* (0.80)** 
Lagged GDP per capita growth *  0.00   0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  
Globalization  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Lagged inflation (logged)*  0.03 0.02   0.09 0.09  0.04 0.04 
Globalization   (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.03) (0.03) 
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Lagged government finance -0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.32 0.14 0.30 0.01 -0.05 0.03 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.40) (0.42) (0.42) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Asia -11.02 -6.83 -8.72  -1.74 1.87 2.33  -7.61 -4.45 -5.31 
 (4.32)** (4.36) (4.38)** (9.09) (9.48) (9.21) (4.02)* (4.04) (4.05) 
Latin America -12.96 -8.62 -10.12 -2.38 -1.57 -0.22 -8.24 -5.70 -6.09 
 (3.74)*** (3.84)** (3.87)*** (5.37) (5.56) (5.41) (3.11)*** (3.14)* (3.16)* 
Europe -18.74 -13.29  -16.23 -3.61  -0.15 1.17 -11.44 -8.27 -8.92 
 (3.99)*** (4.13)*** (4.27)*** (6.14) (6.81) (6.69) (3.34)*** (3.53)** (3.61)** 
Constant 12.16 60.34 50.68 54.73 96.14 129.38 23.57 68.10 71.76 
 (6.70)* (20.71)*** (23.06)** (12.83)*** (37.52)** (39.04)*** (6.08)*** (16.83)*** (19.02)***
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.50 0.45 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.51 
Observations 155 154 154 98 97 97 253 251 251 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Table  5-3  Economic Development and Economic Voting 
  Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Between $1 and  Lagged GDP per capita 0.90   0.91 -0.48   -1.00  0.42  0.45 
and $1000  growth rate (0.35)**  (0.36)** (0.72)  (0.83) (0.33)  (0.36) 
(Low) Logged inflation (+10)  -1.66 -1.13  -7.92 -10.21  -3.20  -2.67 
   (2.77) (2.62)  (5.40) (5.69)*  (2.52) (2.55) 
 R-squared 0.56  0.49  0.55  0.33  0.34  0.37  0.44  0.43  0.44  
  Observations 52 51 51 41 40 40 93 91 91 
Between $ 1001 Lagged GDP per capita  0.62   0.51 0.92   1.15 0.81  0.86 
and $3000  growth rate (0.29)**  (0.35) (0.58)  (0.91) (0.29)***  (0.37)** 
(Middle) Logged inflation (+10)  -2.55 -1.08  -2.16  1.16  -2.05  0.37 
   (1.59) (1.87)  (2.30) (3.47)  (1.38) (1.70) 
 R-squared 0.68  0.66  0.68  0.27  0.23  0.27  0.46  0.42  0.46  
  Observations 46 46 46 34 34 34 80 80 80 
More than $ 3000 Lagged GDP per capita  1.12  1.1 2.58   2.25  1.32  1.21 
(High)  growth rate (0.36)***  (0.39)*** (1.09)**  (1.16)* (0.38)***  (0.41)***
 Logged inflation (+10)  0.63 1.76  -4.53  -2.59  -0.93  0.21 
   (1.23) (1.22)  (3.06) (3.04)  (1.23) (1.24) 
 R-squared 0.62  0.58  0.63  0.39  0.29  0.41  0.51  0.45  0.50  
  Observations 68 64 64 25 25 25 93 89 89 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Estimates for previous vote share of an incumbent, and of dummy variables for Asia, Europe, and Latin America, are omitted. 
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Table  5-4  Democracy and Economic Voting 
  Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Less than 7 Lagged GDP per capita  0.74   0.40 0.45   0.47  0.59  0.52 
(Low)  growth rate (0.44)  (0.48) (0.62)  (0.83) (0.36)  (0.44) 
 Logged inflation (+10)  -6.66 -5.43  -2.32 -0.93  -3.20  -1.66 
   (3.00)** (3.34)  (3.06) (3.93)  (2.06) (2.43) 
 R-squared 0.47  0.49  0.50  0.16  0.15  0.16  0.30  0.29  0.30  
  Observations 44 44 44 39 38 38 83 82 82 
Between 7 Lagged GDP per capita  0.61   0.67 0.49   -0.1 0.58  0.35 
and 8  growth rate (0.31)*  (0.37)* (0.57)  (0.64) (0.28)**  (0.33) 
(Middle) Logged inflation (+10)  -0.42 0.84  -4.22  -4.4  -2.08  -1.43 
   (1.20) (1.37)  (2.05)** (2.40)*  (1.04)** (1.21) 
 R-squared 0.57  0.53  0.55  0.37  0.43  0.43  0.48  0.47  0.48  
  Observations 63 60 60 35 35 35 98 95 95 
More than 8 Lagged GDP per capita  0.94  1.15 0.79   0.55  0.86  0.89 
(High)  growth rate (0.30)***  (0.35)*** (1.73)  (1.78) (0.33)**  (0.36)** 
 Logged inflation (+10)  -2.16 -1.50  -5.79  -5.41  -3.15  -3.06 
   (3.10) (2.84)  (6.79) (7.06)  (2.76) (2.68) 
 R-squared 0.52  0.37  0.49  0.31  0.33  0.33  0.41  0.35  0.40  
  Observations 59 57 57 26 26 26 85 83 83 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
Estimates for previous vote share of an incumbent, and of dummy variables for Asia, Europe, and Latin America, are omitted. 
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 Table  5-5 Democratic Consolidation and Economic Voting 
  Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Model 
7 Model 8 Model 9 
1st or 2nd Lagged GDP per  0.76  0.77 -0.20   -0.63 0.46  0.38 
elections capita growth rate (0.28)**  (0.30)** (0.60)  (0.69) (0.31)  (0.33) 
(Low) Logged inflation (+10)  -3.8 -2.60  -3.23 -4.51  -3.11  -2.41 
   (2.67) (2.53)  (2.44) (2.82)  (1.76)* (1.86) 
 R-squared 0.64  0.58  0.65  0.21  0.22  0.24  0.35  0.34  0.35  
  Observations 42 40 40 43 42 42 85 82 82 
3rd Lagged GDP per  1.40   1.28 1.52   0.49 1.39  0.90 
elections capita growth rate (0.63)**  (0.70)* (0.58)**  (0.75) (0.41)*** (0.44)** 
(Middle) Logged inflation (+10)  -2.99 -3.04  -7.64 -6.27  -5.68  -4.45 
   (2.40) (2.33)  (2.24)*** (3.10)*  (1.58)*** (1.66)*** 
 R-squared 0.60  0.56  0.60  0.59  0.64  0.65  0.59  0.60  0.62  
  Observations 45 43 43 31 31 31 76 74 74 
4th or 
above Lagged GDP per  0.79  0.99 3.90   3.89  0.98  1.18 
elections capita growth rate (0.28)***  (0.33)*** (1.26)*** (1.30)*** (0.30)*** (0.34)*** 
(High) Logged inflation (+10)  -0.44 1.93  -3.15  -0.16  -0.51  2.19 
   (1.39) (1.53)  (8.91) (7.61)  (1.50) (1.62) 
 R-squared 0.49  0.44  0.50  0.58  0.38  0.58  0.47  0.42  0.48  
  Observations 79 78 78 26 26 26 105 104 104 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimates for previous vote share of an incumbent, and of dummy variables for Asia, Europe, and Latin America, are omitted. 
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Table 6-1  Institutional Arrangements in New Democracies    
Nations 
Political  
Systems 
Electoral  
Systems: 
Electoral  
Systems: 
Bicameral 
Systems** 
Federal  
Systems 
    (Legislative) (Presidential)     
Africa      
Benin presidential proportional TRS - - 
Burkina Faso presidential-parliamentarism proportional TRS yes - 
Central African Rep. presidential-parliamentarism majority TRS - - 
Congo Brazzaville presidential majority TRS - - 
Ghana presidential plurality TRS - - 
Guinea-Bissau presidential proportional TRS - - 
Kenya presidential plurality TRS - - 
Lesotho parliamentary* semi-proportional - yes - 
Madagascar presidential-parliamentarism semi-proportional TRS - - 
Malawi presidential plurality FPTP - - 
Mali presidential-parliamentarism majority TRS - - 
Mozambique presidential proportional TRS - - 
Namibia presidential proportional TRS - - 
Niger parliamentary semi-proportional TRS - - 
Nigeria presidential plurality TRS yes yes 
Senegal presidential semi-proportional TRS - - 
Sierra Leone presidential plurality TRS - - 
South Africa presidential-parliamentarism proportional - yes yes 
Sudan presidential plurality TRS - - 
Zambia presidential plurality FPTP - - 
Zimbabwe presidential plurality TRS - - 
Asia      
Bangladesh premier-parliamentarism plurality - - - 
Indonesia premier-parliamentarism proportional TRS - - 
Mongolia presidential-parliamentarism plurality TRS yes - 
Nepal monarchy  plurality - yes - 
Pakistan premier-parliamentarism plurality - yes yes 
Papua New Guinea parliamentary plurality - - - 
Philippines presidential plurality FPTP yes - 
South Korea presidential semi-proportional FPTP - - 
Taiwan presidential semi-proportional FPTP - - 
Thailand parliamentary* plurality - yes - 
Turkey premier-parliamentarism proportional - - - 
Eastern Europe      
Albania premier-parliamentarism majority - - - 
Armenia presidential semi-proportional TRS - - 
Belarus presidential majority TRS yes - 
Bulgaria presidential-parliamentarism proportional TRS - - 
Croatia presidential-parliamentarism semi-proportional TRS yes - 
Czech Rep. premier-parliamentarism proportional - yes - 
Estonia premier-parliamentarism  proportional - - - 
Georgia presidential semi-proportional TRS - - 
Hungary premier-parliamentarism semi-proportional - - - 
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Latvia premier-parliamentarism proportional - - - 
Lithuania presidential-parliamentarism semi-proportional TRS - - 
Macedonia presidential-parliamentarism semi-proportional TRS - - 
Moldova premier-parliamentarism  proportional - - - 
Poland presidential-parliamentarism proportional TRS yes - 
Romania presidential proportional TRS yes - 
Russia presidential semi-proportional TRS yes yes 
Slovakia presidential-parliamentarism proportional TRS - - 
Slovenia presidential-parliamentarism proportional TRS - - 
Ukraine presidential plurality TRS - - 
Latin America      
Argentina presidential proportional TRS yes yes 
Bolivia presidential semi-proportional TRS yes - 
Brazil presidential proportional TRS yes yes 
Chile presidential proportional TRS yes - 
Dominican Rep presidential proportional TRS yes - 
Ecuador presidential proportional TRS - - 
El Salvador presidential proportional TRS - - 
Guatemala presidential semi-proportional TRS - - 
Haiti presidential majority TRS yes - 
Honduras presidential semi-proportional FPTP - - 
Mexico presidential semi-proportional FPTP yes yes 
Nicaragua presidential proportional TRS - - 
Panama presidential plurality FPTP - - 
Paraguay presidential proportional FPTP yes - 
Peru presidential proportional TRS - - 
Uruguay presidential proportional TRS yes - 
Southern Europe      
Greece premier-parliamentarism proportional - - - 
Portugal presidential-parliamentarism proportional TRS - - 
Spain parliamentary proportional - yes yes 
 Political institutions in 2002     
 
* monarchy 
** tricameral systems in Croatia (1990) and Slovenia (1990). 
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Table 6-2  Parliamentary Systems and Economic Voting     
Variables 
Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   
Lagged incumbent vote share 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.64 0.65   
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)***   
Lagged GDP per capita growth 0.95 0.82 0.58 0.81 0.79   
 (0.24)*** (0.19)*** (0.42) (0.22)*** (0.19)***   
president-parliamentarism 0.10   -11.62 -3.78     
 (3.79)  (7.53) (3.37)    
premier-presidentialism 0.54   -1.79    
 (3.70)   (3.70)    
parliamentary system 1.27 1.30  -0.98 0.56   
 (4.53) (3.93)  (4.98) (4.66)   
Lagged GDP per capita growth * 0.44   2.75 0.92     
president-parliamentarism (0.68)  (1.85) (0.69)    
Lagged GDP per capita growth * -0.64    -0.49     
premier-presidentialism (0.47)   (0.53)    
Lagged GDP per capita growth * 0.08 0.22   0.22 0.25   
parliamentary system (1.03) (1.02)  (1.22) (1.22)   
Asia -8.64 -8.93 -7.63 -8.56 -9.28   
 (3.98)** (3.78)** (8.25) (3.70)** (3.62)**   
Latin America -8.45 -8.28 -11.98 -9.78 -9.17   
 (2.91)*** (2.81)*** (4.73)** (2.55)*** (2.48)***   
Europe -12.38 -12.7 -13.52 -11.64 -12.76   
 (3.52)*** (2.78)*** (5.83)** (2.96)*** (2.51)***   
Constant 15.1 15.68 20.88 17.38 16.53   
 (4.08)*** (4.01)*** (7.08)*** (3.59)*** (3.47)***   
R-squared 0.56  0.55  0.32  0.47  0.46    
Observations 163 163 100 263 263   
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
_ a binary coding scheme is used : parliamentary systems include both parliamentary and premier-presidential systems. 
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Table 6-3  Electoral Systems and Economic Voting    
Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
       Model 1              Model 2        Model 3 Model 4 
lagged incumbent vote share 0.69 0.67 0.52 0.64 
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)*** (0.06)*** 
lagged GDP per capita growth 0.49 0.54 -1.19 -0.27 
 (0.59) (0.37) (0.87) (0.49) 
majority system 9.58  -7.85 -4.24 
 (8.60)  (4.27)* (2.85) 
semi-proportional system -2.70   -5.93 
 (4.32)   (3.93) 
proportional system -0.22 1.20  -3.47 
 (3.80) (2.47)  (2.89) 
lagged GDP per capita growth * -1.65  2.37 1.49 
majority system (4.74)  (0.96)** (0.59)** 
lagged GDP per capita growth * 0.20   1.04 
semi-proportional system (0.76)   (0.74) 
1.19 lagged GDP per capita growth * 0.46 0.41  
proportional system (0.64) (0.44)  (0.55)** 
Asia -6.08 -7.02 -8.62 -8.46 
 (4.29) (3.94)* (8.87) (3.94)** 
Latin America -7.10 -8.95 -10.73 -8.48 
 (3.43)** (3.02)*** (4.51)** (2.49)*** 
Europe -11.08 -12.98 -10.43 -11.74 
 (3.43)*** (3.03)*** (5.08)** (2.64)*** 
Constant 13.36 14.41 28.83 19.52 
 (4.87)*** (4.11)*** (8.04)*** (4.07)*** 
R-squared 0.56 0.55 0.36 0.48 
Observations 163 163 100 263 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 6-4  Bicameralism and Economic Voting   
Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
lagged incumbent vote share 0.64 0.60 0.64 
 (0.06)*** (0.11)*** (0.05)*** 
lagged GDP per capita growth 0.97 0.51 0.85 
 (0.22)*** (0.55) (0.23)*** 
bicameral system 2.48 -2.98 0.44 
 (2.09) (3.97) (1.96) 
lagged GDP per capita growth * -0.43 0.26 -0.18 
bicameral system (0.40) (0.79) (0.38) 
Asia -9.13  -8.95  -9.31  
 (3.73)** (8.32) (3.61)** 
Latin America -9.00  -9.84  -9.30  
 (2.87)*** (4.83)** (2.55)*** 
Europe -12.62  -11.70  -12.76  
 (2.76)*** (5.19)** (2.50)*** 
Constant 15.15  21.34  16.48  
 (4.00)*** (7.30)*** (3.48)*** 
R-squared 0.55  0.31  0.46  
Observations 163 100 263 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6-5  Federalism and Economic Voting   
Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
lagged incumbent vote share 0.65 0.61 0.65 
 (0.06)*** (0.11)*** (0.05)*** 
lagged GDP per capita growth 0.88 0.67 0.83 
 (0.19)*** (0.42) (0.19)*** 
federal system 4.11 -2.96 1.54 
 (2.89) (6.12) (2.81) 
lagged GDP per capita growth * -0.86 -0.03 -0.56 
federal system (0.74) (1.90) (0.76) 
Asia -8.44  -10.08  -9.11  
 (3.71)** (8.25) (3.58)** 
Latin America -8.54  -10.55  -9.15  
 (2.82)*** (4.72)** (2.49)*** 
Europe -12.44  -12.19  -12.67  
 (2.76)*** (5.20)** (2.50)*** 
Constant 15.08  20.27  16.26  
 (3.97)*** (7.24)*** (3.45)*** 
R-squared 0.56  0.30  0.46  
Observations 163 100 263 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6-6  Institutional Consensuality and Economic Voting I 
 
Variables Legislative 
Elections 
Presidential 
Elections 
All Elections 
lagged incumbent vote share 0.65 0.56 0.64 
 (0.06)*** (0.11)*** (0.05)*** 
lagged GDP per capita growth 1.62 -0.51 0.76 
 (0.45)*** (0.81) (0.41)* 
Consensuality 1.64  -4.11  -0.73  
 (1.17) (2.32)* (1.10) 
Consensuality *  -0.51  0.87  0.02  
 lagged GDP per capita growth (0.26)* (0.53) (0.25) 
Asia -9.49  -9.12  -9.22  
 (3.71)** (8.29) (3.59)** 
Latin America -9.47  -9.62  -8.84  
 (2.90)*** (4.61)** (2.53)*** 
Europe -13.38 -10.62 -12.28 
 (2.87)*** (5.11)** (2.57)*** 
Constant 13.72 27.08 17.68 
 (4.18)*** (7.78)*** (3.82)*** 
R-squared 0.56  0.34  0.46  
Observations 163 100 263 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Table 6-7  Institutional Consensuality and Economic Voting II  
Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections  All Elections  
 Low Moderate High Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
   Consensuality
(0-1) 
Consensuality
(2) 
 Consensuality 
(3-4) 
Consensuality 
(0) 
Consensuality
(1) 
 Consensuality 
(2-4) 
 Consensuality
(0-1) 
Consensuality
(2) 
 Consensuality 
(3-4) 
Lagged incumbent vote share 0.58 0.75 0.45 0.24 0.44 0.72 0.58 0.74 0.54 
 (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.20)** (0.32) (0.16)*** (0.18)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.15)*** 
Lagged GDP per capita growth 1.05 0.63 1.05 -0.78 0.02 1.59 0.69 0.86 1.18 
 (0.27)*** (0.28)** (0.64) (1.12) (0.63) (0.52)*** (0.27)** (0.27)*** (0.53)** 
Asia -4.31  -19.67  -31.67  6.41  -21.66  0.00  -6.46  -14.01  -31.33  
 (4.35) (7.91)** (10.13)*** (9.86) (12.37)* 0.00  (4.22) (8.64) (9.49)*** 
Latin America -3.90  -19.40  -17.06  1.88  -11.20  -12.53  -4.30  -16.46  -16.49  
 (3.99) (5.23)*** (7.51)** (7.23) (7.04) (7.60) (3.38) (4.75)*** (6.34)** 
Europe -10.38 -22.63 -15.11 22.07 -19.80 -5.40 -11.92 -15.79 -14.93 
 (3.88)*** (5.05)*** (7.73)* (12.59) (7.51)** (8.13) (3.48)*** (4.67)*** (6.90)** 
Constant 15.64 21.48 29.67 31.51 35.27 8.16 18.89 15.28 25.45 
 (5.30)*** (6.40)*** (13.25)** (18.18) (10.21)*** (11.58) (4.58)*** (5.96)** (11.28)** 
R-squared 0.53  0.65  0.68  0.61  0.26  0.54  0.37  0.51  0.72  
Observations 76 61 28 17 50 33 143 87 35 
Standard errors in parentheses         
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
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Figure 2-1  Traditional Retrospective Voting Model  
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Figure 3-1  Average Level of Democracy Across Time  
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Source:  Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004; http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/) 
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Figure 6-1 Causal Chains of the Clarity of Responsibility Theory 
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Appendix 1  Elections in 70 New Democracies (1974-2002)  
Country Legislative Elections Presidential Elections 
Albania 1991, 1992, 1996, 1997, 2001 no 
Argentina 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 1983, 1989, 1995, 1999 
Armenia 1995, 1999 1991, 1996, 1998 
Bangladesh 1991, 1996, 2001 no 
Belarus 1995, 2000 1994, 1995, 2001 
Benin 1991, 1995, 1999 1991, 1996, 2001, 
Bolivia 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002 
Brazil 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002 
Bulgaria 1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001 1992, 1996, 2001 
Burkina Faso 1992, 1997, 2002 1991, 1998 
Central African Republic 1993, 1998 1993, 1999 
Chile 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001 1989, 1993, 1999 
Congo Brazzaville 1992, 1993, 2002 1992, 2002 
Croatia 1990, 1992, 1995, 2000 1992, 1997, 2000 
Czech Republic 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002 no 
Dominican Republic 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2000 
Ecuador 1979, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2002 1979, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002 
El Salvador 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 
Estonia 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999 1992 
Georgia 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999 1991, 1995, 2000 
Ghana 1979, 1992, 1996, 2000 1979, 1992, 1996, 2000 
Greece 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 no 
Guatemala 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999 
Guinea-Bissau 1994, 1999 1994, 2000 
Haiti 1990, 1995, 2000 1988, 1990, 1995, 2000 
Honduras 1980, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001 
Hungary 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 no 
Indonesia 1999 1999 
Kenya 1992, 1997, 2002 1992, 1997, 2002 
Korea South 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 
Latvia 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002 no 
Lesotho 1993, 1998, 2002 no 
Lithuania 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 1993, 1997 
Macedonia 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 1994, 1999 
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Madagascar 1993, 1998, 2002 1992, 1996, 2001 
Malawi 1994, 1999 1994, 1999 
Mali 1992, 1997, 2002 1992, 1997, 2002 
Mexico 1994, 1997, 2000 1994, 2000 
Moldova 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 1991, 1996 
Mongolia 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 1993, 1997, 2001 
Mozambique 1994, 1999 1994, 1999 
Namibia 1989, 1994, 1999 1994, 1999 
Nepal 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999 no 
Nicaragua 1990, 1996, 2001 1990, 1996, 2001 
Niger 1993, 1995, 1996 1993, 1996, 1999 
Nigeria 1999 1999 
Pakistan 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997,2002 no 
Panama 1994, 1999 1994, 1999 
Papua New Guinea 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 no 
Paraguay 1989, 1993, 1998 1989, 1993, 1998 
Peru 1978, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001 
Philippines 1987, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 1992, 1998 
Poland 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001 1990, 1995, 2000 
Portugal 1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 1976, 1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 
Romania 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 
Russia 1993, 1995, 1999 1991, 1996, 2000 
Senegal 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1996, 2000 
Sierra Leone 1996, 2002 1996, 2002 
Slovak Republic 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2002 1999 
Slovenia 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 1990, 1992, 1997, 2002 
South Africa 1994, 1999 no 
Spain 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 no 
Sudan 1986, 1996, 2000 1996, 2000 
Taiwan 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001 1996, 2000 
Thailand 1992, 1995, 1996, 2001 no 
Turkey 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 no 
Ukraine 1991, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2002 1991, 1994, 1999 
Uruguay 1989, 1994, 1999 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999 
1991, 1996, 2001 Zambia 1979, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 
Zimbabwe 1990, 1995, 2000 1990, 1996, 2002 
 
Appendix 2  Variables and Data Sources  
Variables  Definition and Measurement Data Sources 
Elections   
Vote Share of Incumbents Vote share of incumbent parties  
    in a parliamentary election/  
Vote share of incumbents  
    in the first round of presidential elections  
Various 
Election Types Legislative elections=1, Presidential systems=0 Various 
Number of Elections Number of elections Various 
Economic Performance   
Inflation Logged inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI, 2003 
GDP Growth Rate GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI, 2003 
Economic Growth GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) WDI, 2003 
Economic Boosting Efforts   
Government Expenditure General government final consumption  
     expenditure (annual % growth) 
WDI, 2003 
Globalization   
Globalization Trade (% of GDP) WDI, 2003 
Regime Change   
Democracy Democracy score (Democ) Polity IV 
 Democracy score (Polity2) Polity IV 
Regime Transition   
Authoritarian Regime  
Types 
Military regimes=1,  
     others=0 
Various 
Transition Types Opposition initiation=1,  
     others=0 
Various 
Institutional Clarity   
Parliamentary Systems Parliamentary =4, presidents are elected 
      by the parliament=3, 
      Parliamentary but presidents are elected  
     by popular votes=2, presidential=1 
Various 
Proportional Systems Proportional=4, semi-proportional system=3,  
plurality=2, absolute majority=1. 
Endersby et al. (2004),  
SNS, IDEA etc. 
Bicameral Systems Bicameral=1, unicameral=0 Various 
Federal Systems Federal system=1, non-federal system=0 Griffiths et al. (2005) 
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Appendix  3  Descriptive Statistics of Founding Elections (Chapter 4)    
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All country code 71 404.8 219.5 41.0 910.0 
Elections year of election 71 1988.7 5.7 1974.0 1999.0 
 types of elections 71 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 vote for (ex) authoritarian rulers (%) 71 18.0 22.1 0.0 78.4 
 vote for incumbent rulers 71 27.9 25.3 0.0 87.0 
 ousting authoritarian regime in founding elections (ousting=1) 71 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 military government (military government=1) 71 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 interim government (opposition initiation=1) 71 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Polity2 scores, Polity IV 70 5.7 3.5 -7.0 10.0 
 GDP per capita, WDI 69 1924.4 2156.3 135.0 10759.6 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), WDI 62 -1.2 6.9 -27.9 11.2 
 1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), WDI 67 -3.8 8.4 -34.1 9.9 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI 68 -2.1 7.2 -30.9 10.6 
 polity2*1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate (%), WDI 62 -3.9 45.9 -139.6 100.6 
 polity2*GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI 68 -10.2 48.8 -216.3 69.6 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged, logged Inflation, WDI 53 3.5 1.2 1.7 8.5 
 1year (election year) lagged, logged Inflation (+10)  (%), WDI 55 3.7 1.3 1.7 8.5 
 logged Inflation (+10), WDI 59 3.8 1.6 1.3 9.4 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate (%), PWT6.1 55 -0.1 7.6 -12.9 37.2 
 1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), PWT6.1 55 -0.1 7.6 -12.9 37.2 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %), PWT6.1 62 0.0 5.9 -18.1 11.8 
 polity2*1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), PWT6.1 54 1.9 45.8 -103.4 185.8 
 polity2*GDP per capita growth (annual %), PWT6.1 61 -0.7 38.5 -126.7 82.6 
 combined-1year lagged (authoritarian) GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 64 -1.1 6.9 -27.9 11.2 
 combined-1year (election year) lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 70 -3.7 8.3 -34.1 9.9 
 combined (election year) GDP per capita growth rate  71 -2.1 7.2 -30.9 10.6 
 polity2*combined-1year lagged (authoritarian) GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 63 -3.9 45.6 -139.6 100.6 
 polity2*combined (election year) GDP per capita growth rate  70 -11.2 48.4 -216.3 69.6 
 Africa 71 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Asia 71 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 Latin America 71 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 Europe 71 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Presidential country code 48 334.5 177.8 41.0 732.0 
Elections year of election 48 1988.8 5.4 1976.0 1996.0 
 types of elections 48 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 vote for (ex) authoritarian rulers (%) 48 22.4 24.3 0.0 78.4 
 vote for incumbent rulers 48 32.9 27.4 0.0 87.0 
 ousting authoritarian regime in founding elections (ousting=1) 48 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 military government (military government=1) 48 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 interim government (opposition initiation=1) 48 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Polity2 scores, Polity IV 48 5.1 3.8 -7.0 10.0 
 GDP per capita, WDI 47 1658.6 1733.5 135.0 6923.9 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), WDI 41 -1.9 6.4 -15.1 11.2 
 1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), WDI 45 -3.8 7.0 -21.3 9.9 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI 46 -2.5 6.6 -21.0 9.9 
 polity2*1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate (%), WDI 41 -8.0 46.2 -121.2 100.6 
 polity2*GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI 46 -12.4 42.6 -158.4 69.6 
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 1year (authoritarian) lagged, logged Inflation, WDI 36 3.6 1.4 1.7 8.5 
 1year (election year) lagged, logged Inflation (+10)  (%), WDI 37 3.8 1.5 1.7 8.5 
 logged Inflation (+10), WDI 40 4.0 1.8 1.3 9.4 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate (%), PWT6.1 37 -0.7 8.8 -12.9 37.2 
 1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), PWT6.1 37 -0.7 8.8 -12.9 37.2 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %), PWT6.1 41 -0.5 6.3 -18.1 11.8 
 polity2*1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), PWT6.1 37 -0.5 51.6 -103.4 185.8 
 polity2*GDP per capita growth (annual %), PWT6.1 41 -3.8 40.4 -126.7 82.6 
 combined-1year lagged (authoritarian) GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 42 -1.9 6.4 -15.1 11.2 
 combined-1year (election year) lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 47 -3.8 6.9 -21.3 9.9 
 combined (election year) GDP per capita growth rate  48 -2.7 6.5 -21.0 9.9 
 polity2*combined-1year lagged (authoritarian) GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 42 -7.8 45.7 -121.2 100.6 
 polity2*combined (election year) GDP per capita growth rate  48 -13.8 42.3 -158.4 69.6 
 Africa 48 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Asia 48 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 Latin America 48 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Europe 48 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Legislative country code 23 551.5 229.0 140.0 910.0 
Elections year of election 23 1988.3 6.3 1974.0 1999.0 
 types of elections 23 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
 vote for (ex) authoritarian rulers (%) 23 8.8 12.8 0.0 52.1 
 vote for incumbent rulers 23 17.5 16.5 0.0 52.1 
 ousting authoritarian regime in founding elections (ousting=1) 23 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 military government (military government=1) 23 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 interim government (opposition initiation=1) 23 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Polity2 scores, Polity IV 22 7.0 2.0 1.0 10.0 
 GDP per capita, WDI 22 2492.3 2824.5 195.6 10759.6 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), WDI 21 0.1 7.8 -27.9 9.4 
 1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), WDI 22 -3.8 10.9 -34.1 7.6 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI 22 -1.3 8.5 -30.9 10.6 
 polity2*1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate (%), WDI 21 4.1 45.4 -139.6 62.2 
 polity2*GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI 22 -5.6 60.5 -216.3 60.2 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged, logged Inflation, WDI 17 3.3 0.6 2.7 5.3 
 1year (election year) lagged, logged Inflation (+10)  (%), WDI 18 3.4 0.9 2.3 5.5 
 logged Inflation (+10), WDI 19 3.5 0.8 2.6 5.5 
 1year (authoritarian) lagged GDP per capita growth rate (%), PWT6.1 18 1.2 4.5 -7.8 9.9 
 1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), PWT6.1 18 1.2 4.5 -7.8 9.9 
 GDP per capita growth (annual %), PWT6.1 21 0.8 4.9 -8.6 10.8 
 polity2*1year lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%), PWT6.1 17 7.0 30.2 -62.1 62.0 
 polity2*GDP per capita growth (annual %), PWT6.1 20 5.8 34.3 -68.9 54.2 
 combined-1year lagged (authoritarian) GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 22 0.4 7.7 -27.9 9.4 
 combined-1year (election year) lagged GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 23 -3.4 10.8 -34.1 7.6 
 combined (election year) GDP per capita growth rate  23 -0.9 8.5 -30.9 10.6 
 polity2*combined-1year lagged (authoritarian) GDP per capita growth rate  (%) 21 4.1 45.4 -139.6 62.2 
 polity2*combined (election year) GDP per capita growth rate  22 -5.6 60.5 -216.3 60.2 
 Africa 23 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 Asia 23 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
 Latin America 23 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
  Europe 23 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
   9 18  16 4 16  11 3 12  9 
17 . 13 . 
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Appendix 4  Missing Cases 
Nation Year of    Under Authoritarian Rule In the [year-1] of founding elections In the year of founding elections
  
founding  
elections  
 
GDP per  
capita growth 
rate  
Inflation GDP per  
capita growth 
rate   
GDP per  
capita growth
 rate  
Inflation GDP per  
capita growth 
rate   
GDP per  
capita growth 
rate  
Inflation GDP per  
capita growth
 rate  
     WDI WDI PWT WDI WDI PWT WDI WDI PWT 
1991  . . . . . . -11.32  . . 
1993  . . . -21.17  . . -15.84  6.04 . 
Albania 1992  -27.92  . . -27.92  . . -7.23  5.46 1.78  
Armenia 
Belarus 1994  . . . -7.81  7.09  -14.95  -11.60  7.71 -9.80  
Bulgaria 1992  10.82  2.52 . -7.53  5.85  . -6.27  4.62 -10.45  
Croatia 1992  . 7.25 . -21.25  4.88  . -11.66  6.45 . 
Czech Republic 1992  . . . -11.15  . -10.63  -0.60  . 0.24  
Estonia 1992  2.20  . . -7.53  . . -19.73  . . 
Georgia 1991  -7.71  . . -14.96  . . -21.04  . . 
Latvia 1993  5.06  . . -34.12  5.53  -32.05  -13.35  4.78 -6.75  
Lithuania 
Macedonia 1994  . . .  -7.85  . 9.01  -2.46  4.92 -10.91  
Moldova 1994  4.91  . . -1.13  . . -30.90  . . 
Poland 1990  . 5.54 0.16  . 5.54  0.16  . 6.34 -6.93  
Romania 1990  -0.99  . 1.32  -6.20  . -5.48  -5.82  . -10.17  
Russia 1991  -3.37  . . -3.37  . . -5.26  . . 
Slovakia 1992  1.46  . 1.96  -14.57  . -17.76  -7.14  . -8.62  
Slovenia 1992  . . . . . -9.19  . . -5.64  
Ukraine 1991  -6.59  . -6.49  -6.59  . -6.49  -8.58  . -8.32  
Benin 1991  -0.01  . -1.94  -0.01  . -1.94  1.51  . 2.36  
Mongolia 1993  -10.95  . . -10.95  . . -4.50  5.63 . 
Sudan 1986  -7.81  3.79 . -9.03  4.01  . 2.98  3.54 . 
Taiwan 1992  . . 6.52  . . 6.52  . . 6.29  
N. of Missing (I) 
N. of Missing (II)**  20 . 
              
Note: Bolded values are those that only PWT 6.1 has available data.         
** Number of missing values in either GDP per capita growth or inflation.       
 
Appendix 5 Standardized Regression Coefficients on Electoral Support  
for Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections 
 
 
 
Legislative 
Elections
Presidential 
Elections All Elections
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  0.58  0.53    
under authoritarian rule     
Logged inflation (+10) 0.07     
under authoritarian rule     
GDP per capita growth rate    0.45  0.68  
in the year of founding election     
Logged inflation (+10)   0.05   
in the year of founding election     
Military authoritarian regime -0.39  -0.41  -0.36  -0.34  
     
Opposition initiation of -0.19  -0.26  -0.26  -0.31  
interim governments     
Democracy (Polity2) -0.31  -0.27  -0.25  -0.24  
     
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.39  -0.42    
under authoritarian rule     
Polity2* GDP per capita growth    -0.49  -0.74  
in the year of founding election     
Legislative election -0.25  -0.10  -0.26  -0.14  
     
Asia -0.07  -0.08  0.00  -0.04  
     
Latin America 0.01  0.06  -0.03  0.01  
     
Europe -0.13  -0.20  0.06  -0.06  
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Appendix 6 Electoral Support for Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections III 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  2.04  2.05    
under authoritarian rule (0.66)*** (0.61)***   
Logged inflation (+10) 1.08     
under authoritarian rule (2.17)    
GDP per capita growth rate    0.95  1.29  
in the year of founding election   (1.27) (1.22) 
Logged inflation (+10)   0.91   
in the year of founding election   (1.88)  
Military authoritarian regime -17.13  -17.23  -20.18  -18.65  
 (5.40)*** (4.87)*** (6.04)*** (5.66)*** 
Opposition initiation of -7.96  -8.27  -10.16  -11.79  
interim governments (5.34) (4.84)* (5.77)* (5.30)** 
Level of democracy (Polity2) -1.87  -1.84  -1.58  -1.61  
 (0.66)*** (0.63)*** (0.76)** (0.73)** 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.19  -0.19    
under authoritarian rule (0.09)** (0.09)**   
Polity2* GDP per capita growth    -0.09  -0.16  
in the year of founding election   (0.20) (0.18) 
Legislative election -9.41  -6.27  -12.63  -8.32  
 (6.72) (5.96) (7.05)* (6.36) 
Asia -7.98  -10.43  -2.76  -5.29  
 (8.17) (7.61) (9.23) (8.73) 
Latin America 1.03  2.15  -1.05  0.45  
 (5.50) (5.11) (6.62) (5.98) 
Europe -11.10  -13.08  3.59  0.72  
 (9.14) (7.10)* (8.24) (7.37) 
Constant 39.12  41.96  38.63  40.81  
 (8.39)*** (4.56)*** (7.78)*** (5.38)*** 
R-squared 0.63 0.62 0.51 0.49 
Observations 48 52 53 58 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2003.  
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Appendix 7 Electoral Support for Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections IV 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  1.46  1.47    
under authoritarian rule (0.54)*** (0.51)***   
Logged inflation (+10) 1.14     
under authoritarian rule (2.22)    
GDP per capita growth rate    1.56  1.93  
in the year of founding election   (1.13) (1.07)* 
Logged inflation (+10)   0.32   
in the year of founding election   (1.79)  
Military authoritarian regime -17.78  -17.37  -17.79  -16.40  
 (5.52)*** (5.00)*** (6.05)*** (5.63)*** 
Opposition initiation of -7.46  -8.16  -10.71  -12.32  
interim governments (5.50) (5.05) (5.65)* (5.14)** 
Level of democracy (Polity2) -1.95  -1.91  -1.79  -1.83  
 (0.68)*** (0.65)*** (0.74)** (0.71)** 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.17  -0.16    
under authoritarian rule (0.09)* (0.09)*   
Polity2* GDP per capita growth    -0.27  -0.32  
in the year of founding election   (0.18) (0.17)* 
Legislative election -8.58  -4.61  -10.55  -6.83  
 (6.91) (6.06) (6.98) (6.25) 
Asia -5.90  -8.92  -3.20  -5.47  
 (8.38) (7.83) (8.94) (8.40) 
Latin America 1.44  2.50  -0.10  0.53  
 (5.64) (5.24) (6.50) (5.84) 
Europe -7.51  -11.45  2.14  -0.45  
 (9.22) (7.31) (8.10) (7.21) 
Constant 37.75  40.67  40.51  40.98  
 (8.54)*** (4.71)*** (7.48)*** (5.15)*** 
R-squared 0.61 0.6 0.53 0.51 
Observations 48 52 53 58 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
Source: Penn World Table 6.1. 
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Appendix 8 Electoral Support for Authoritarian Rulers in Founding Elections V 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP per capita growth rate  2.04  1.51    
under authoritarian rule (0.64)*** (0.60)**   
Logged inflation (+10) 0.37     
under authoritarian rule (2.00)    
GDP per capita growth rate    1.93  2.12  
in the year of founding election   (0.95)** (0.85)** 
Logged inflation (+10)   0.42   
in the year of founding election   (1.79)  
Military authoritarian regime -16.66  -18.24  -17.71  -16.56  
 (5.25)*** (4.97)*** (5.79)*** (5.65)*** 
Opposition Initiation of -7.71  -10.77  -10.61  -14.60  
interim governments (5.16) (4.55)** (5.53)* (5.02)*** 
Level of democracy (Polity2) -1.77  -1.52  -1.55  -1.31  
 (0.63)*** (0.65)** (0.75)** (0.74)* 
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  -0.18  -0.17    
under authoritarian rule (0.09)** (0.09)*   
Polity2* GDP per capita growth    -0.30  -0.33  
in the year of founding election   (0.13)** (0.12)*** 
Legislative election -7.93  -1.49  -10.62  -5.92  
 (5.90) (5.15) (6.38) (5.60) 
Asia -10.17  -5.99  -3.71  -2.15  
 (7.52) (6.72) (7.98) (7.60) 
Latin America 0.86  2.53  -1.17  0.12  
 (5.33) (5.39) (6.47) (6.12) 
-13.66  -11.80  Europe -0.04  -2.00  
 (7.32)* (5.63)** (7.66) (6.58) 
Constant 41.12  39.83  40.13  39.80  
 (7.97)*** (4.78)*** (7.60)*** (5.52)*** 
R-squared 0.62 0.52 0.51 0.46 
Observations 51 63 58 70 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Added cases:  Poland (Model 1, Model 3), Poland and Taiwan (Model 2), Poland, Taiwan, and Slovenia (Model 4).  
 
Sources:  combined economic indicators using World Development Indicators (2003) and Penn 
World Table 6.1. 
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 Appendix 9 Probability Change of Government Alternation  
  min->max       0->1       -+sd/2      -+1/2 Marginal Effect  
GDP per capita growth rate  -0.99  -0.12 -0.39  -0.04 -0.04  
Military authoritarian regime 0.10  0.10 0.06  0.14 0.13  
Opposition initiation of  
      interim governments 
0.16  0.16 0.08  0.18 0.15  
Polity2 0.97  0.13 0.11  0.03 0.03  
Polity2* GDP per capita growth  1.00  0.00 0.40  0.01 0.01  
Asia -0.04  -0.04 -0.01  -0.04 -0.04  
Latin America 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Europe 0.02  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.02  
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Appendix 10 Descriptive Statistics (Chapter 5)      
  Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All incumbent vote share 272 37.79 18.98 0.00 92.70 
Elections lagged incumbent vote share 272 43.80 17.12 0.00 95.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth rate 272 2.01 4.84 -30.04 16.22 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10] 266 3.28 1.06 -0.96 8.51 
 lagged government finance 264 14.02 5.40 2.98 31.92 
 GDP per capita 272 1.98 0.84 1.00 3.00 
 Democracy 268 7.09 2.55 0.00 10.00 
 number of election 272 3.49 1.74 1.00 11.00 
 Globalization  267 67.47 31.32 13.75 162.99 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * GDP per capita 272 4.65 9.72 -30.04 32.43 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10]*GDP per capita 266 6.50 3.56 -0.96 23.25 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * democracy 265 15.18 31.45 -107.39 97.30 
 l lagged, logged [inflation+10]*democracy 263 23.04 10.82 -7.66 65.07 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * number of election 269 7.36 16.56 -60.09 81.08 
 l lagged, logged [inflation+10]*number of election 266 11.20 5.69 -2.87 38.76 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * globalization 267 148.28 339.76 -2032.84 1182.39 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10]*globalization 264 214.40 115.60 -151.21 732.98 
 Africa 272 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 Asia 272 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
 Latin America 272 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
  Europe 272 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Presidential incumbent vote share 102 42.86 20.75 0.60 92.70 
Elections lagged incumbent vote share 102 49.97 17.48 16.90 95.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth rate 102 1.76 4.66 -14.27 10.61 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10] 101 3.36 1.11 2.08 8.46 
 lagged government finance 101 13.44 5.04 4.43 29.57 
 GDP per capita 102 1.82 0.80 1.00 3.00 
 Democracy 101 6.65 2.66 0.00 10.00 
 number of election 102 2.99 1.20 1.00 7.00 
 globalization  102 66.88 28.98 17.25 162.99 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * GDP per capita 102 3.95 9.17 -28.54 31.24 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10]*GDP per capita 101 6.20 3.62 2.08 22.71 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * democracy 101 12.89 30.98 -107.39 83.30 
 l lagged, logged [inflation+10]*democracy 100 22.19 11.55 0.00 65.07 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * number of election 102 5.62 13.53 -49.22 42.44 
 l lagged, logged [inflation+10]*number of election 101 9.85 4.35 2.49 25.93 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * globalization 102 137.53 309.47 -1055.34 838.34 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10]*globalization 101 220.76 115.90 48.80 710.61 
 Africa 102 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
 Asia 102 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
 Latin America 102 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
  Europe 102 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Legislative incumbent vote share 170 34.74 17.19 0.00 81.40 
Elections lagged incumbent vote share 170 40.10 15.83 0.00 81.40 
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 lagged GDP per capita growth rate 170 2.15 4.95 -30.04 16.22 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10] 165 3.23 1.02 -0.96 8.51 
 lagged government finance 163 14.37 5.60 2.98 31.92 
 GDP per capita 170 2.07 0.85 1.00 3.00 
 Democracy 167 7.35 2.44 0.00 10.00 
 number of election 170 3.79 1.94 1.00 11.00 
 globalization  165 67.83 32.76 13.75 159.38 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * GDP per capita 170 5.07 10.04 -30.04 32.43 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10]*GDP per capita 165 6.69 3.52 -0.96 23.25 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * democracy 164 16.58 31.74 -107.39 97.30 
 l lagged, logged [inflation+10]*democracy 163 23.57 10.35 -7.66 65.07 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * number of election 167 8.42 18.11 -60.09 81.08 
 l lagged, logged [inflation+10]*number of election 165 12.02 6.24 -2.87 38.76 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * globalization 165 154.92 357.97 -2032.84 1182.39 
 lagged, logged [inflation+10]*globalization 163 210.46 115.60 -151.21 732.98 
 Africa 170 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
 Asia 170 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 Latin America 170 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
  Europe 170 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Appendix 11  Missing Values        
      Nation Year T VS LVS LG LLI LGF GDP Democ NE Tr 
Argentina 1985 L   42.0 46.0 0.68 6.44 . 2  8  2  18.01 
Argentina 1987 L 37.0 42.0 6.34 4.50 . 2  8  3  15.45 
Argentina 1989 P 32.5 52.0 -3.81 5.84 . 2  7  2  19.64 
Argentina 1989 L 29.0 37.0 -3.81 5.84 . 2  7  4  19.64 
Argentina 2001 L 23.1 43.6 -1.67 . 13.78  2  8  10  21.74 
Armenia 1999 L . . 8.83 2.16 11.05  0  6  2  70.56 
Belarus 1995 L . . -11.60 7.71 20.51  0  3  1  103.72 
Belarus 2000 L . . 3.75 5.68 19.50  0  0  2  141.61 
Brazil 1989 P . . -1.89 6.44 12.59  1  8  1  13.24 
Brazil 1990 L 8.3 . 1.50 7.27 14.26  1  8  2  15.16 
Brazil 1994 L . 8.3 3.34 7.56 17.66  1  8  3  18.67 
Burkina Faso 1992 L 48.5 . 6.18 0.92 12.25  0  0  2  30.40 
Central African Rep. 1999 P 58.5 37.3 2.58 . 11.60  0  5  2  25.71 
Congo 1992 L 14.4 . -0.90 . 21.00  0  6  1  82.95 
Congo 1993 L 37.6 31.2 -0.71 . 21.15  0  6  2  94.36 
Ecuador 1984 P . . -5.10 3.88 12.50  0  8  2  49.06 
Ecuador 1996 P . . -0.25 3.13 12.50  0  9  6  50.48 
Ecuador 2002 P . 34.9 3.49 3.63 10.15  0  6  8  55.42 
Georgia 1992 L . . -21.04 . 9.50  0  5  2  101.93 
Georgia 1995 P 74.3 95.0 -9.90 . 9.83  0  6  2  67.83 
Georgia 1995 L 23.7 . -9.90 . 9.83  0  6  3  67.83 
Ghana 1992 L 77.5 . 2.76 2.89 9.48  0  1  1  45.99 
Guatemala 1995 L . . 1.32 2.38 5.57  0  4  3  44.69 
Guatemala 1995 P . . 1.32 2.38 5.57  0  4  3  44.69 
Guinea-Bissau 1999 L 24.0 62.0 -30.04 1.87 9.32  0  . 2  67.66 
Guinea-Bissau 2000 P 23.4 46.2 4.96 . 10.79  0  5  2  90.01 
Haiti 1995 L . . -10.22 3.67 4.70  0  7  2  40.78 
Haiti 2000 L . . 0.67 2.16 6.81  0  1  3  46.11 
Honduras 1985 L 49.2 . 1.10 1.55 13.20  0  5  2  54.16 
Lesotho 1998 L 60.6 74.8 7.06 . 27.88  0  . 2  126.15 
Lesotho 2002 L 54.9 60.6 2.27 . 31.92  0  8  3  157.92 
Macedonia 2002 L 24.4 38.8 -4.95 . 24.80  0  9  4  95.19 
Madagascar 1993 L 1.4 . -1.36 2.68 8.22  0  9  1  39.93 
Madagascar 1998 L 42.0 . 0.54 1.50 7.82  0  7  2  50.80 
Madagascar 2002 L 34.0 . 2.99 1.94 8.34  0  7  3  38.56 
Moldova 1996 P 38.7 . -1.20 2.49 27.08  0  7  2  129.18 
Namibia 1994 P 76.3 . -5.00 2.14 31.58  0  6  1  99.79 
Nicaragua 1996 L 46.0 . 1.37 2.39 15.67  0  8  2  98.64 
Niger 1996 L 56.7 . -0.89 2.36 14.11  0  0  1  40.41 
Niger 1996 P 52.2 . -0.89 2.36 14.11  0  0  1  40.41 
Niger 1999 L . . 6.59 1.51 13.08  0  4  2  38.28 
Niger 1999 P . . 6.59 1.51 13.08  0  4  2  38.28 
Nigeria 1992 L . . 1.81 2.57 12.17  0  0  1  82.74 
Nigeria 1993 P . . -0.01 3.80 18.39  0  0  1  97.32 
 192
Nigeria 1999 L . . -0.77 2.33 9.67  0  4  2  74.32 
Nigeria 1999 P . . -0.77 2.33 9.67  0  4  2  74.32 
Pakistan 1990 L . . 2.32 2.06 16.78  0  8  2  38.91 
Pakistan 1993 L 39.6 . 5.04 2.25 12.91  0  8  3  38.75 
Pakistan 2002 L . . 0.11 1.15 10.24  0  0  1  37.73 
Panama 1994 L . . 3.50 -0.79 15.14  1  9  1  76.75 
PNG 1987 L . . 2.02 1.70 22.98  0  10  3  92.84 
PNG 2002 L 11.9 8.3 -5.66 2.23 . 0  10  6  . 
Peru 2000 L 42.1 52.1 -0.67 1.24 10.84  0  . 5  34.14 
Peru 2000 P 49.8 64.4 -0.67 1.24 10.84  0  . 5  34.14 
Peru 2001 P . . 1.33 1.32 10.64  0  9  6  33.63 
Philippines 1992 P 23.6 . -2.80 2.92 9.93  0  8  1  63.16 
Philippines 2001 L . 49.0 3.55 1.47 13.08  0  8  5  100.30 
Poland 1991 L 12.0 . . 6.32 19.29  0  8  1  48.97 
Portugal 1986 P . . 2.58 2.98 14.38  2  10  3  60.17 
Portugal 2002 L 37.9 44.1 1.37 1.48 20.66  2  10  11  . 
Russia 1993 L . . -14.57 . 13.86  1  5  1  68.70 
Russia 1995 L . . -12.46 5.73 19.10  0  5  2  55.18 
Russia 1999 L . . -5.04 3.32 18.73  0  5  3  69.39 
Russia 2000 P 53.4 . 6.83 4.45 14.58  0  7  3  68.09 
Senegal 1993 L 56.6 75.9 -0.37 . 15.04  0  2  1  50.34 
Slovakia 1994 L 8.6 37.3 -4.03 . 25.07  1  7  3  113.60 
Slovakia 1999 P 37.7 . 3.81 1.90 22.49  1  9  1  126.38 
Taiwan 1995 L 46.1 52.1 6.24 . . 2  7  3  . 
Taiwan 1996 L 53.3 46.1 5.34 . . 2  8  4  . 
Taiwan 1996 P 53.3 . 5.34 . . 2  8  1  . 
Taiwan 1998 L 46.4 53.3 5.42 . . 2  9  1  . 
Taiwan 2000 P 23.1 53.3 . . . 2  9  2  . 
Taiwan 2001 L 36.6 29.6 . . . 2  9  2  . 
Thailand 1995 L . . 8.10 1.62 9.76  0  9  3  90.43 
Ukraine 1994 L 12.7 . -14.27 8.46 15.98  0  6  1  73.94 
Ukraine 1998 L . . -2.19 2.77 27.40  0  7  2  86.05 
Ukraine 2002 L 11.8 . 10.14 2.48 19.62  0  7  3  108.12 
Uruguay 1989 P 30.0 . 0.88 4.13 12.18  2  10  2  41.19 
Uruguay 1989 L . . 0.88 4.13 12.18  2  10  2  41.19 
Zimbabwe 1990 P 83.0 . 1.78 2.56 18.69  0  0  3  45.66 
Missing    32 53 3  20  11  0  4  0  8  
      Total   80  80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80  
            
Notes:             
T: type of elections (L=legislative election, P=presidential elections) 
VS: vote share of an incumbent, LVS: vote share of an incumbent in the previous election. 
LG: 1 year Lagged annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
LLI: 1 year lagged, logged inflation 
GDP: level of GDP per capita (0: low, 1=middle, 2=high) 
Democ: democracy score of Polity IV 
Tr: percentage of trade to GDP 
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Appendix  12 Economic Development and Democratization 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2003. 
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Appendix 13 Annual Growth Rate of GDP per capita in New Democracies 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2003. 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 14 Economic Voting in Post-founding Elections II 
  Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All Elections
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Lagged incumbent vote share 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.56 0.57 
 (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
Lagged GDP per capita  0.77  0.75 0.36  -0.08  0.64  0.57 
growth rate (0.20)***  (0.21)*** (0.41)  (0.48) (0.19)***  (0.21)***
Lagged inflation (logged)  -0.88 0.09  -3.87 -4.04  -2.07 -1.15 
  (1.03) (1.03)  (1.67)** (1.98)**  (0.91)** (0.96) 
Asia -11.12 -10.00 -12.48 -9.36 -8.74 -8.60 -10.70 -10.13 -11.61 
 (3.69)*** (4.01)** (3.93)*** (8.55) (8.36) (8.45) (3.57)*** (3.75)*** (3.75)***
Latin America -8.8 -7.13 -9.09 -10.71 -9.29 -9.22 -9.21 -7.74 -8.81 
 (2.97)*** (3.16)** (3.10)*** (4.77)** (4.74)* (4.78)* (2.58)*** (2.67)*** (2.67)***
Europe -13.15 -11.09 -13.22 -10.69 -8.25 -8.04 -12.58 -10.70 -12.12 
 (2.93)*** (3.11)*** (3.06)*** (5.27)** (5.30) (5.49) (2.61)*** (2.72)*** (2.74)***
Constant 19.27 22.65 19.55 24.87 37.97 38.75 19.79 27.46 
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23.95 
 (4.15)*** (5.14)*** (5.04)*** (7.35)*** (8.41)*** (9.67)*** (3.59)*** (4.36)*** (4.50)***
R-squared 0.48 0.43 0.47 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.37 0.39 
Observations 170 165 165 102 101 101 272 266 266 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
 
 
 
Appendix 15 Descriptive Statistics of Post-founding Elections (Chapter 6)   
  Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All incumbent vote share 263 37.53 18.75 0.00 92.70 
Elections lagged incumbent vote share 263 43.40 17.02 0.00 95.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth 263 1.89 4.83 -30.04 16.22 
 presidential system 263 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 president-parliamentarism 263 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 premier-presidentialism 263 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 parliamentary system 263 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
 plurality system 263 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
 majority system 263 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
 semi-proportional system 263 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 proportional system 263 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 bicameral system 263 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 federal system 263 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
 consensuality 263 1.52 0.92 0.00 4.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * presidential system 263 0.48 1.67 -8.92 8.35 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * president-parliamentarism 263 0.85 4.20 -30.04 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * premier-presidentialism 263 0.50 2.16 -8.99 16.22 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * parliamentary system 263 0.06 0.78 -5.66 6.91 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * plurality system 263 0.26 1.89 -10.22 8.61 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * majority system 263 0.54 2.65 -14.27 10.57 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * semi-proportional system 263 0.47 1.96 -4.95 16.22 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * proportional system 263 0.61 3.39 -30.04 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * bicameral system 263 0.56 2.93 -13.42 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * federal system 263 0.20 1.29 -4.02 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * consensuality 263 2.95 8.00 -30.04 32.43 
 Africa 263 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
 Asia 263 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 
 Latin America 263 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
  Europe 263 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Presidential incumbent vote share 100 42.64 20.44 0.60 92.70 
Elections lagged incumbent vote share 100 49.68 17.31 16.90 95.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth 100 1.68 4.62 -14.27 10.57 
 presidential system 100 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 president-parliamentarism 100 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 premier-presidentialism 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 parliamentary system 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 plurality system 100 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 majority system 100 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 semi-proportional system 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 proportional system 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 bicameral system 100 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 federal system 100 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
 consensuality 100 1.23 0.81 0.00 3.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * presidential system 100 0.72 1.76 -1.25 8.35 
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 lagged GDP per capita growth * president-parliamentarism 100 0.97 4.43 -14.27 10.57 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * premier-presidentialism 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * parliamentary system 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * plurality system 100 0.28 2.19 -10.22 8.22 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * majority system 100 1.40 4.16 -14.27 10.57 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * semi-proportional system 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * proportional system 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * bicameral system 100 0.42 3.11 -13.42 10.41 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * federal system 100 0.07 1.00 -4.02 4.66 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * consensuality 100 1.89 6.82 -26.85 20.83 
 Africa 100 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
 Asia 100 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
 Latin America 100 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
  Europe 100 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Legislative incumbent vote share 163 34.40 16.94 0.00 81.40 
Elections lagged incumbent vote share 163 39.55 15.69 0.00 81.40 
 lagged GDP per capita growth 163 2.01 4.97 -30.04 16.22 
 presidential system 163 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 president-parliamentarism 163 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
 premier-presidentialism 163 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
 parliamentary system 163 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
 plurality system 163 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
 majority system 163 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
 semi-proportional system 163 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 proportional system 163 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 bicameral system 163 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 federal system 163 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 consensuality 163 1.70 0.94 0.00 4.00 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * presidential system 163 0.33 1.59 -8.92 5.92 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * president-parliamentarism 163 0.77 4.07 -30.04 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * premier-presidentialism 163 0.81 2.70 -8.99 16.22 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * parliamentary system 163 0.10 0.99 -5.66 6.91 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * plurality system 163 0.25 1.68 -5.66 8.61 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * majority system 163 0.02 0.23 -0.71 2.74 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * semi-proportional system 163 0.76 2.45 -4.95 16.22 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * proportional system 163 0.98 4.27 -30.04 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * bicameral system 163 0.65 2.82 -13.42 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * federal system 163 0.28 1.44 -3.81 10.73 
 lagged GDP per capita growth * consensuality 163 3.60 8.60 -30.04 32.43 
 Africa 163 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 Asia 163 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
 Latin America 163 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
  Europe 163 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Appendix 16 Parliamentary Systems and Economic Voting  
Variables Legislative Elections
Presidential 
Elections All Elections
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
lagged incumbent vote share 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.65 
 (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.11)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** 
lagged GDP per capita growth 0.84 0.83 0.74 0.82 0.79 
 (0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.41)* (0.19)*** (0.18)*** 
president-parliamentarism 1.02   -3.85 -1.63   
 (3.55)  (5.43) (3.01)  
premier-presidentialism -1.47   -3.68  
 (3.41)   (3.29)  
parliamentary system 1.24 1.63  -0.86 0.92 
 (4.29) (3.63)  (4.67) (4.30) 
Asia -8.44 -8.95 -9.41 -8.46 -9.31 
 (3.96)** (3.76)** (8.21) (3.70)** (3.61)** 
Latin America -8.29 -8.27 -11.50 -9.71 -9.17 
 (2.90)*** (2.80)*** (4.75)** (2.55)*** (2.47)*** 
Europe -12.35 -12.68 -10.59 -11.28 -12.75 
 (3.51)*** (2.77)*** (5.52)* (2.95)*** (2.50)*** 
Constant 15.66 15.61 20.64 17.35 16.48 
 (4.03)*** (3.98)*** (7.13)*** (3.55)*** (3.46)*** 
R-squared 0.55  0.55  0.31  0.46  0.46  
Observations 163 163 100 263 263 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
_ a binary coding scheme is used : parliamentary systems include both parliamentary and parl-presidential 
systems 
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Appendix 17  Electoral Systems and Economic Voting 
  
Variables Legislative Elections 
Presidential 
Elections All Elections 
lagged incumbent vote share 0.67 0.65 0.57 0.64 
 (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.11)*** (0.06)*** 
lagged GDP per capita growth 0.86 0.84 0.74 0.83 
 (0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.40)* (0.19)*** 
majority system 7.62  -6.28 -2.81 
 (7.46)  (4.33) (2.77) 
semi-proportional system -3.02   -5.23 
 (3.57)   (3.21) 
proportional system 0.05 2.04  -2.66 
 (3.64) (2.31)  (2.86) 
Asia -7.15 -8.06 -14.63 -10.38 
 (4.01)* (3.79)** (8.76)* (3.82)*** 
Latin America -7.25 -9.30 -11.43 -8.79 
 (3.37)** (2.99)*** (4.62)** (2.51)*** 
-11.34 -13.55 -10.44 -11.76 Europe 
 (3.39)*** (2.96)*** (5.21)** (2.66)*** 
Constant 14.07 14.91 26.25 18.98 
 (4.65)*** (4.07)*** (8.19)*** (4.02)*** 
R-squared 0.56 0.55 0.32 0.46 
Observations 163 163 100 263 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Appendix  18  Index of Consensuality    
Score of  Legislative Elections Presidential Elections All elections
Consensuality Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
0 12 7.36 17 17 29 11.03 
1 61 37.42 50 50 111 42.21 
2 61 37.42 26 26 87 33.08 
3 22 13.50 7 7 29 11.03 
4 7 4.29 7 2.66 
Total 163 100 100 100 263 100 
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Appendix 19 Institutional Consensuality and Economic Voting III  
 
 
Variables Legislative Elections Presidential Elections  All Elections  
 Low Moderate       High Low Moderate High Low Moderate High 
   Consensuality 
(0-1) 
Consensuality
(2) 
 Consensuality
     (3-4) 
Consensuality
(0) 
Consensuality 
(1) 
 Consensuality
(2-4) 
 Consensuality
(0-1) 
Consensuality
(2) 
 Consensuality
(3-4) 
Lagged incumbent vote  0.58 0.75 0.53 0.24 0.44 0.72 0.58 0.74 0.56 
           share (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.21)** (0.32) (0.16)*** (0.18)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.16)***
Lagged GDP per capita  1.05 0.63 0.58 -0.78 0.02 1.59 0.69 0.86 0.87 
          growth (0.27)*** (0.28)** (0.62) (1.12) (0.63) (0.52)*** (0.27)** (0.27)*** (0.53) 
Asia -4.31  -19.67  -29.24  6.41  -21.66  0.00  -6.46  -14.01  -30.82  
 (4.35) (7.91)** (10.61)** (9.86) (12.37)* 0.00  (4.22) (8.64) (9.95)***
Latin America -3.90  -19.40  -13.73  1.88  -11.20  -12.53  -4.30  -16.46  -15.29  
(6.62)**  (3.99) (5.23)*** (7.71)* (7.23) (7.04) (7.60) (3.38) (4.75)***
Europe -10.38 -22.63 -13.27 22.07 -19.80 -5.40 -11.92 -15.79 -14.93 
 (3.88)*** (5.05)*** (8.10) (12.59) (7.51)** (8.13) (3.48)*** (4.67)*** (7.24)** 
Constant 15.64 21.48 25.69 31.51 35.27 8.16 18.89 15.28 25.39 
 (5.30)*** (6.40)*** (13.82)* (18.18) (10.21)*** (11.58) (4.58)*** (5.96)** (11.84)**
R-squared 0.53  0.65  0.64  0.61  0.26  0.54  0.37  0.51  0.69  
36 Observations 76 61 29 17 50 33 143 87 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses       
    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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